A Critical Examination of the Recent Theories of Profit by Siddiqi, Mohammad Nejatullah
A C R I T I C A L E X A M I N A T I O N 
O F T H E 
RECENT THEORIES OF PROFIT 
THESIS SUBMITTED 
FOR THE AWARD OF THE 
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN ECONOMICS 
AT THE 
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY, ALIGARH 
BY 
MOHAMMAD NEJATULLAH SIDDIQI 
D E P A R T M E N T O F E C O N O M I C S 
A L I G A R H M U S L I M U N I V E R S I T Y 
A L I G A R H 
t 9 6 5 
^^81 
Ft: B6^ -
T587 
A B S T H A C f 
fSi« tbeorjr of profit hat been in an uasatisfaetofy 
•%a%« for sos« tiae* fho dcvalopa^t of the theory of 
pxoflt upto Kalght'a JSLfflS ^ttffifglftlRlr M.4 fVQtJX ««• « 
syateaatle pmoasa along an aaaiXy^  dlaoamabla logical 
XixuB* Ona daraiopsaat led to another eolMlnating m 
Knight's theory. In onhaeqaeat additions to profit 
theozf this sequential developnent i s aisslng« There 
i s thus aead toT axaslning the deralepBents in profit 
theozy after Knight* s woric relating these to his 
theory and foraiaating t^e reeent n9v» in clearer 
tems* 
The advent of sarginal analysis l a eoonoaie theory 
led to the aeeeptaaoe of the prineiple of Marginal 
produotirity as goreming distrilmtlon under perfectly 
eonpetitlve oonditlons* <r«B« GX&Jk. eaphasised the 
static nature of the vorld in %fhloh the coi^etitive 
proeess effects a resalnderless dlstrihuticn of the 
product among the productive services* I^ynaaie changes 
disturb this equllibriuB state diaruptiJig the ecpiality 
hetveen revards and productivities and creating surpluses, 
Sc^U!^eter*s Circular Flow of Bconcmlo Life i s also a 
BO-profit tysteia. Scisuapeter eaplaias the surpluses 
accruing in a developing econoay as the result of 
lanaratloas* Tbaac are produo«r initiated ebanget 
whose essenee l i e s in the adoi^tioii of new eomMnation 
of produetive serviees which are sere produetiTe than 
the aelfeoda already ia vogue* 
Knight argues that dynaaie ehmgee or eoononie 
deTelopaent as sueh i s not the eanse of profit* 
Qiirea a perfeet koowXedge of the fature, the eoapetitive 
process would tend to hring about equality hetweea 
faotor rewards and faotor produetivities throu^out 
the sjstea* Xt i s the lack of knowledge -^ unoertaiaty ' 
about the iiq^eading ehanges that aeoounts for the 
disparity between rewards which are deelded at tha 
beginning of the process of prodmetion and tSie 
productivities which are oorrectly known onl^ wtien 
the product i s aai^dted* Profits acerae to entrepreneurs 
who sueeessfully faee uneertain situations exsrelsing 
their individual judgeaent and are willing to aecept 
the consecpenceStt Knight explains ^ e eoneept of 
uneertaintyf distinguishing i t from rlgks which ean be 
insured sgainst and esphaMsing the uni^eness of 
imcertate situations* 
A significant contribution to the uncertainty theoxy 
was aade 1^ Shackle 1^0 presents an analysis of 
d«eislon*aakliig process in faod of onedrtaiti situations* 
BftOh •XtematlTd course of aotloii open to an eBtreprene^r 
has varloas outooaes lisroltring a gala or a loss* With 
each gain or loss goes a certain degree of posslblIit7 
whloh Sbaoiae aeassires ladlreetly through t^ ie 
surprise a person vauM feel slumld that gain or loss 
aatuaXIy aaterlaXlse* The e^paelty of a Iqrpothesls 
to attract or to repel Is a resultant hoth of the slxa 
of the gain and loss IrnrolTed and I t s degree of 
posslMllty, for eaeh oourse of action their I s a 
00 St attraotlve and a aiest repellent hjrpothesis* the 
eholee of a oourse of aotlon Is aade lif a eoiq^arison 
hetween the different pairs of ai%eh hypotheses* 
fhe theories of aenopollstle eoapetltlon vera i»t 
iastnwental In hzlnglng about a new theoxy of profit* 
Ttomf resultedi hovever, in greater ea^hasls helng plaoed 
on the rents and t^^sl rents arising due to vailcet 
1 •perfections* Xt was also reeognlsed that these 
li^erfeetlons increase the uacertatety surroumdlng 
entrepreneurial deelsloaa* 
A aa|er contribution to the theorsr of profit was 
••ae ^ B«3* Kalrstead niho gave due recognition to thia 
r4U «5tf Market li^erfections* Bis theory also draws 
upon the eontrlbation of Wrd Ktjrnts, tspcolall^ 
his «BjAiasls on cspootatloDS aad on vlalfftll profits 
arising dns to ehsnges in the prico XsveX folXonlng 
ehangss in «ffsetiT« dflB^dt TTneertainty oontinues 
to be th« Qliief «;q^X«nation of profit| ^ t the 
uneertainty surrounding tlia ©oapetltlva Irniotator^s 
daelslons i s (Slstlngul^od fron that surrounding 
other entrepreneurial deeisions. 
The BweroeeonoKie theories of dis tr i l iut i^ presented 
during the last two deeades study ^ e detersdnation 
of aggregate profits* fla^f- diyide the total Incoae 
of society into wages and non-wages vMeh are ealled 
profits* ¥he sisplest aodel along these l ines i s 
that of Kaldor who assoaies ful l «Kploy»entf a given 
level of Inooae aad separate saving propensities for 
wozicers and oapitalists* fhe share of profits in 
laeoae i s shown to depend on ^ e ratio of investaent 
to output. Kaleokl*s theory of the deteraination 
of aggregate profits i s s ial lar to that of Kaldor* 
But his theory of relative shares assigns iSie deter-
aining role to the degree of asnopoly^ defined as ^ e 
ratio of the dlfferenoe between price and aarginal 
oost to priee* A rise in the degree of aonopoly 
reduoes the share of wages in national inooae* The 
theory i s based on the assnaption of isiderutillaatioa 
of production oapaeity* Though superior to Kalder's 
th«ox7 in so far as i t t r ea t s th* level of Ineoaa 
as a variable, i t i s iappeclse on aeeoimt of Tagueoess 
of i t s key concept — the degree of aonopoly* 
Boul(iing» s Bodel i s more coaprehensiTe as i t 
includes liqjuidity prefereace and firms* dividend 
dis t r ibut ion policy as deteralnmits of the level of 
income and i t s distribution* the aain conclusions 
are the saae as those of Kaldor, bat I t i s shown that 
they are l iable to change i f the basie assnaptions 
are changed* 
A s t i l l more coBq^rehensive analysis i s o f f e r s Igr 
Sidney Veintraub. I t retains the ^phas i s on uncertainty 
as the expl^atic»i of profit at the aicroeconoaic le^el . 
Besides l iquidi ty preference and dividend policy, i t 
empliasises the iaportance of labour productivity in 
determining labour's share in income and assigns a 
role to the degree of acnopoly* fhe ^aphasia on 
productivity i s rather exaggerated as i t Is only in 
tiie perfectly competitive situation that i t determines 
the ra te of wages* As regards the degree of monopoly, 
the correct positlcna i s eicplained \3y Joan Bobinsont 
the share of profi t in income i s determined by the 
ra t io of Investment to income Imt the aiiKiunt of incom 
associated with a given rate of investmeut i s influenced 
by the production capacity in existence luad the degree 
of BOTOdpoIy* According to Joan Hoblnson eqpiilibriun 
re(|alres that tfa« YoI\uie of sorings must be such 
that tiie saving s*capltal patio i s 8<jaal to the rat io 
that Investment bears to oap l t a l | l*e»« the rate of 
accaaulation. This ec|tiallty Is brought aboat by 
adjustments both in the level of Income and i t s 
d is t r ibut ion . 
SSaple yet comprehensive, Joan Robinson's model 
contains the essence of the current theory of raaero-
dis t r ibut ion . But Weintyaub*8 analysis which proceeds 
i n terms of aggregate demand and aggregate supply, 
laying greater emphasis on the l a t t e r , remains a 
d i s t ino t al ternative to the Roblnsonlan model because 
of i t s unique approc^h* 
Profit as defined by these nacrosoonomic theories i s 
a BKUsh Wider category than the pure profit of the 
uncertainty t ^ o r y . I t i s possible however to separate 
contractual payments and cfuasi rents from non-'wages 
to arrive at the sum of pure prof i ts and losses in 
the economy as a whole* 
Seen In t h i s l ight there i s no conflict between 
the maeroeoonomic and microeconoBie analyses of profi t . 
They mippl8ia«nt each other, and a eoaprehenslve view 
Inoorporatlai both leads to a bet ter xmci erst and ir^ 
of the nature of profi ts and determination of the i r 
nagnl tilde* 
The main contribtttlcsn of the present study I s 
included l a chapter seven* Here the macroeconomic 
theories of profit h«re been compared with one another 
and an atteaipt has been made to relate these to the 
aicroeconomlc theories* Chapter five contains ar 
original oxgposltlon of the Inpl lca t io is of the theories 
of aKsnopolistie oofflpetitioti for profit theory* The 
same i s t rue of the part of chapter four eximining 
Shackle* 8 contribution and i t s relevance to profit 
theory. 
We hope that by eoabining the study of the microeconomic 
and macroeconomic theories of profit and bringing 
together a l l the main develojfflaents in our subject 
during the l a s t f i f ^ years, we have advariced the 
stiaiy of the subject. Our c r i t i c a l approach Is l ikely 
to stimulats further attempts at takir?; a comprehensive 
view of profi t . 
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The daTeXopKectta In profit theory during tttn l««t 
f i f ty y»ar8 for* th« objeet of tWLs study* Of lat« i t hat 
b«en fe l t that the theory i s not la a satlsfaotozy state* 
I t i t difflo^ilt, for Instaaaeo, to give a elear stat^ient 
of what th« ourront theory of profit i s . Thia was not so at 
ths beginalog of the period imder review* ^le develepMeat 
of marginal analysis in teenoiaic theory had resulted in a well 
defined theory of distribution — the atarglnal productivity 
theory *»- that was worked out by a umber of eeonoBistt 
oulainatiiig in the profit theories of J.B, Clax^ and «r«A, 
S^uapeter* According to this version profits oould not 
exist in the statie e^i l ibr iua as the ooapetitive proeess 
ensured ec^^lty between the rewards of the produetivs 
ssrviees and their eontributlens to the produee* Ifot in a 
ohanging world certain forees tend to disturb the ecpsiHbriuB 
as a result of which a surplus^ positive or nsgative, i s 
l e f t over after distribution takes plaos aosording to ths 
factorial narginal productivities* These are profits and 
losses* Profits z^sult fron dynaiBie < .^anges and eeoncmdc 
dsvelopasnt* 
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In 19211 ?*B, Knight dwionstrated that It vas not 
ehang« or devalopMent as such toat the uncertainty suriouiidlng 
entrei»ren«urlal deelslont In a changing, developing eeono^r 
that was the root eiuise of profits and losses. Profits are 
nniapnted •alue residues arising beeause of the failure of 
the cuKn^etltlTe process folly to voik and 'sstahlli^ tho 
equality of factorial rewards vlth their awrginal productivities 
This was the theoiy of profit at the beginning of tiie 
period under review* I t was eodorsed hy the leading 
•eonoiists though i t was noted that i t eoqplained only *pure' 
profits, not the gross profits of business* It was this 
theory that eventually found i t s way Into standard textbooks 
on econoitic theory and doainated the literature on the 
subject* 
The advent of the tiitories of Boaopolistlc ooapetition 
and Keynesiaa aaeroaconoidQs during the *90s created a deep 
inpression on eeonogiic analysis, necessitating fresh tMidclng 
on a]JK)st every laportuit subject} and the theory of profit 
was no exception* During the *40s afi4 *50s a nuaber of 
attenpts were aade to re*exanine the uncertainty theory m 
the ll<^t of tSiese developoents* There were also SOIBB new 
views on ^ e subject and attempts at synthasi^og the new 
I l l 
ld«as with the old theory vers undertaken* KejnacLan analysis 
Inspired a stMy of inooioe dls t r lbat lon at the aggreg&te level 
result ing In a nuabar of BiaeroeooiiOBd.c theories of profit* 
Soae of the oontrlbutlona to owe suhjeot during th« 
l a s t few decades oan Ym d lme t ly related to the e&rller 
theor ies , hut there are entirely new strands of thou'^ht 
as well* thero 13 nasd for an azairdnatlon of their 
Interx^latlonadilp and a oareful eonsideration of the i r 
eoBOEsoii as well as unit^e features* I t i s only }sy such a 
e^oprehonslvti study that we ean hope t o arrive at a clearer 
view of the current state of the theory* 
Tine present study hilnga together a l l the important 
developsients in profi t theory following Knight's work* I t 
r e la tes reeent eontrihutlons to the ea r l i e r theories and 
a t teapts at a eonprelienslve view of the analysis of profit 
at the DaoroecK^nomie and the alero#«onoBle levels* 
To provide an adec|tiat@ background to Kjiisht* s theory 
older theories of profit have been discussed in the f i r s t 
two chapters* Chapter One traces tJie development of profit 
theory from Adam Saitb upto tha r i s e of the asaarglaalist 
school leading to the aarslnal productivity theory. The 
prof i t theories of ^^B* Claik and J*A* Sclnaipeter cone 
in for review in the Second Qiapttir* Against this background 
v« prooaad to dlseugs Knight* s vork in 80B« detail in tht 
Third Chapter, This Chapter «xaaln«» crit ical ly the 
uncertainty theory of profit and notes soiie of the veiJc 
points in Knight** anaXysi»« 
Chapter Four i s an evaluatiai of the later contributions 
to the nncartainty theory, {^ecially those of J.R. Hicks, 
(l,L,S» Shackle and J«F« ^'estoa. Asi eTalnatlon of these 
contributions gives us a clearer idea of %m imoertainty 
theoxy as i t stands today* Before we pass on to an 
exaaination of the atteispt )}y B«a» Keirstead to incorporate 
this theory into a Isroader fraaeitfoi^, we rcTiew two important 
developMmtt in eeononic theory that occunwd daring the 
*30s of this centuxy* These are th« theories of noaopolistie 
^npetition and Keynesian aacro*econoaic analysis. Ch^ter 
Five studies theffi wilb a Yim* to hilnging out their 
isplioations for the analysis of profit* 
Chapter Six siuenanaes and eraluates Ksirstead's 
attenpt at a synthesis between the Tarious strands of thought 
in profit theory upto the *80s. Finding t l i s synthesis 
inade<p^ate in »> far as i t fa i l s to take due notice of ^ e 
•acroeoonoaie analysis of profit, the Serenth Chapter 
discusses the macro-theories of profit presented lay Kaldor, 
KaledSii Bouldlng;, Sldne^r VelntTaab and Mrs. Joaa Bobin»oa» 
The outeoae of our dlsoussiooi i s a fa i r ly elaar understardting 
of the forces deten^nlng aggregate grosa prof i t s . In 
concl-aslon we hare t r ied to r«lat«5 th« avaoroaoonoBle analysis 
of profit wltii I t s analysis at tbs mlcrotoonoale lav«l. I t 
has been notad that both the macroeoonoale and tfiloroaoonoale 
analyst J have useful fimctlons to perform* 
Throughout th i s study our approach has beer, to 
evaluate c r l t i e a l l y the various contributions with a view to 
relat ing them with one another, noting the points of 
s l a l l a r l t y between thai ai*d the i r tmlcpt features* As a 
resul t I t I s now posislbXe to have a more ccaaprehsnstvo 
and clearer view of the current state of profit theoiy* We 
have t r i ed to spell out the essentials of th-a analysis of 
profi t at the aleroeeonoale and maoroeeonoitle levels* 
In preparing th i s thesis we have ftiliy u t i l i sed the 
l i t e r a tu re on tbe subject available In the ^ g l l s h Xangtis^s. 
We have extensively surveyed the periodlical l i t e ra ture of 
the l a s t fifty years. All tbe works on profit durii^ the 
period imder review and raajor ea r l i s r contributions to the 
subject have been carefully studied froai original sources. 
CEAPTSH OlIE 
Ekmt TLWilB Oi PROFIT 
The elassical eeonoalstt Tlev«d profits as the 
ineoioe of a distinct soda l elassf the oapltallsts, who 
shared the total Income of society with Its two other 
classes, labourers and landlords* This tripartite 
division of total produce, and behaviour of the relative 
shares during progress of the aconcaor was, however, 
not studied by a l l these soonoolsts with equal attention. 
Adam 3inlth noted the subjeot but did not analyse i t , and 
Halthtts had l l t t l a to offet in this regard. It was David 
Bieardo who declared i t to be the principal problem in 
Polit ical SooiK>fflgr^ ^ Sohn Stuart Mill also ?ave the 
subject greater attention than aalth had given i t . These 
economists also viewed profits as a necessary eleaent 
in the cost of production of oooaodities, which they 
regarded to be the regulator of prices. A uniforn rate 
of profit per cent of capital invested was established 
in the eeonony by the coapetitive process* 
As to the nature and source of profits,they held 
different views. Snlth regarded them to be a deduction 
f roB title produce of labour. LalKmr added value to the 
t . David Bicardot tfas, m n g i a l j t Qf ggU^lSlO, ggglWir . 
and faj^ioi i . PrafaaCf p l^y Everyman's 
Idbraiy Edition. 
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•alue of t3ii@ oatarlaXs i t worked upon, but the oapttallst 
retalnsd part of the value added as profits on * stock of 
materials aM wages % 1^0h he advaneed*.^ Bieardo, on the 
other handy regards profits a aeeessary addition to the cost 
of production as deteBained ^ labour.^ He eertalnJLy did 
not regard profits to be a deduction froa the value produced 
by labour. But J.S. l i i l l leaning though aiore heavily towards 
the Mcardlan viiw tried to aceoaaodate both these views 
simultaneously*' Malthus struek a new note by 
relating profit i| to the prod activity of capital. Coi ta l 
was viewsd by these eeonoadsts as including aaohines and 
instrtaients, raif aaterials, and the fund out whioh wages 
wers advaneed, Mai thus thought that profits were *only 
a fair rananeration for that part of the production 
contributed by the capital ists , estinated exactly in the 
same way as the coatribution of the labourer.*^ Despite 
an earlier resaik V 3«lth that *the intention of the fixed 
1, Adaa SteitiAi gM WJittH tf ^fttlqnit P*4S«also p.dS. 
Caiiaan edition, Ifodem Libraly* 
2* David ^eardot Op.clt. | p# 23{ p,30 fn, and p*1t6 fn, 
3 . J.S. Mini Pi^n^pj^ff gtfqmiml ^99mWi,^9l'^ 
pp 400*40S{ 49ft-3if 440*43, The Colonial 
Press, Haw Tork, 1900, 
4. T.B.Mait^ust fiinvkuMikM fQUtifi*! HflgBgiyi p*f^ 
Augustus H.Kelly IncNaw toxic, 1901, 
ei^ltal i s to luer^aM the produetlvt power of Xaboar*, 
the ppoduetlTltf ri&w did not 111^ fa-roar with the 
followers of anith and Bleardo. 
A distinction was aXwsgrs aade betwaen gross profits 
and the pore &t olear^ profits* 3ross profits Ineluded 
Ifltsresty a premlioi oovering r l ^ of loss , and va^es of 
stiprlntendenee* These thrse constituent parts of profits 
were elearlsr distinguished bgr J«S,MilI« The sane distinction 
can, howerer, be traced back to Salth^ Hleardo and other 
classioaX eeonoaists as well* Profits were necessary to 
induce oapitallsts to save and imdartake ths r l ^ s of 
investaent, and for rewarding tb» labour and trouble involved 
in supervising production* Hicafdo eaphaslsed the element 
of tiae for «Mch capital was locked in production* Senior 
propounded that bf abstaining fros consuaptton In order to 
save, the capitalists aade a sacrifice which necessitated 
a c<»Bpensatl(m* 
According to Saith the rate of profit per oent on 
capital i s deteminsd by the sappljr and demand of capital 
with sG^ply playing the aa|or role* Supply of capital 
constitutes the deaand for labour, while population deteraines 
1* Adea Saith, op.dt* p* 271* 
2. Ibid*I p* 96* 
S* H*w. Senior I in Qutltet Qrttet J9lffB9i .gl foUUgf i 
JmfOMff pp» tl9HlO{ 091 18i* deorge AlXca 
aad Oawln Iftd*, Londoui 1991* 
th« mppl^ of labour* Interaetlon of the two determinas th« 
rata of vages to which ths rata of profit la Inversely 
rslatad* As tha supply of capital Inoreasas there Is 
Inartaslng coapetltion among capitalists for I t s productiva 
ei^loyBent with the result that wages risa and profits fa l l . 
A rise in wagas encourages p^ulatlon growth* As «ore and 
Bora aeoosnlatlcm takes place, (qpportuQlties of profltabla 
investnent dwindle* tTltdaataly there would eo«e a stage 
when tha rate of profit would be so low as to leave no 
incentive to tha capital ists to save and invest further, 
<ktce 8«cu«Llation stopped population would cease inei^asing, 
there would be no further progress, the econoaijr wwild 
eontinue into a long-teira e^ilibrluM stationary state*' 
Despite the fa l l in the rate of profit, aggregate 
profits say eoutlnua to Imrease for son* tlaa because 
of the increasing volusc of capital* ^ t even a^regate 
profits flBist start decreasing as the rate of profit becomes 
lower and lower wid, as a conseqfEienoe, the process of 
acGiaRulatlon slows down* The .^ iftSg of profits in total 
Incose i s , however, always dedlniiig with the progress of 
the eeonoaqr* A riiilng wage rata with em increasing 
1* Smith visualises the possibility of a declining state 
of society after the staticmary state* This would happen 
in a country irttere*the funds destined for the maintenance 
of labour were sensibly decaying** As a eonseoRience 
demand for labour would decrease, wages would fal l to a 
very lew level making the condition of labourers really 
miserable* 'Want, famine, and mortality would laaiedlately 
f revall in that class* and from thence extend themselves o a l l the superior classes t i l l the ttnber of InlMliltwcits 
fop^t^tlon Absorbs gTeatsr and greatdr portion of iiatioa&X 
1 BOOMS* On tho othar hand landlords^ bjT vlrtua of tbslr 
•onopolr ovnershlp of land, are able to raise rents as 
damand for land iaoraasss vith the iAoreaslng somumlatlcm 
of oapttal* fbns tbo profit shars i s sheeted between a 
rising vage shars and an inoreasing rent share* It i s evident 
froo l^ith* s analysis that it/ a falling rate of profit 
which i s the pria^ry phsnonanon and oeeasions the profit 
sfaar^ to deelinsi and not the oth^r wagr roniiA* 
Rioardo's analysis i s different, attention being 
foensssd on the aha ye rather than the SSiXSi* Profits are 
deterained by the produee of the aost inferior sc^l to Whi^ 
the aargin of oaltiTation i s extended under the pressure 
of demand for food* This marginal land yields no rent, 
and tfas difference between the total prodnce and wages 
aeeraes to the eapitalist farmer as profits* The natural 
tendeney of wages i s to reaain at the subsistence level* 
They rise above i t only temporarily as inoreasing aecuaulation 
inereasss the deaand for labonr« Bat ttie higher wages soon 
eneour^e population grovrth, inerease the deaand for food 
and necessitate further ejctsnsion of the aargin of ealtivatlon* 
More inferior soi l gives saaller produce and as wages esm 
hardly go below the subsistence level , profits are reduced* 
All the above^aai^inal lands produce acre and the surplus 
goes to the landlords as rent* With the progress of the 
eeonoay, which aeaas greater aocuaalatioR and larger popalatiea, 
the deaand for agrieultoral products inereasss, the aargla of 
« 
ottltivatloii 18 «xt«a&d«<ly the prodaee at the aargln deereatts, 
and as the lahonrert eannot tubal at without a certain level 
of Teal wages, l e ss and less of the produoe aocTues to the 
eapital ists as profflti* Rleazdo states the same In terns 
of the laoreaslng labour oost of producing corn — the 
principal wage good, Wages tharafore Increase in Walue' 
as aiors and nore labour Is required to produce tha means of 
«2bsl8tsnee« Profits fa l l wltti overf Increase In wages. 
Profits In the nanufacturlng Industries are detenaSned by 
profits In the agricultural seetor* The cause of a declining 
profit share and a falling rate of profit Is tha Increasing 
di f f icult ies of production In agriculture-^ tha operation of 
th: law of dinlnlshlng returns. ConS'^ qpiently a greater 
and greater portion of th<^ ; total labour of tti^ country Is 
required to produce the aeeessarles of l i f e for the labourers. 
the ratio of this to the total labour of the oouutry i s 
i 
u^lzed by Sieardo to ateasure tha rata of profit fbr tha 
econoiqy as a whole,^ This rata tends to fa l l during progress 
as the above ratio vast oontlnae to rise* In terns of the 
produce the deellne in profit share Is eansad hy an ever 
Inereasing rent share eneroaehlng upon the profit diara 
whloh I s unable to eneroach upon an aloest stationary wage 
share* ^  
1* David liieardoi qp«eit. | p« 31, 
2* Ibid«, pp«73*7S» 
Tli« a&wmeM toward the stationa-y state i s eicplalned 
hf a tai^eriag of aocuanXation eonae^ent upon the tendanoy 
of the rate of profit to fa l l toward* saro* Aetuallr 
aooasalatioii atopa at ao«e positive rata aa this rata 
beeoses so low that there i s no ineentlve for farther 
aecuBaXatioR* Both i i i t h and Bioardo raoognise the iaproTs* 
laents in sgrienlturaX production whieh retard the adTanea 
towards the stationary state* 
J.S.MiXl analysed the 'Influence of the Progress of 
lodustzy audi P<q^ation on Bents, Profits and Wagas* at SOBS 
length* The analysiS| iiAiioh i s essentially Bicardisn, leads 
to the eonslttsion thatt 'The eeonoMieal progress of a society 
eonstituted of landlords, eapitalists^and labourers, tends 
to the progressive enritiMent of the landlord olass) while 
the oost of ^ e laisourer's mhsistenee tends on the n^ole 
to iBorease, and profits to fall**^ 
The tendency of the rate of profit to fa l l i s studied 
separately wherein Mill discusses at some length the*<K>unter* 
acting circiiBStancas* whieh arrest this tendency*^ Comerclal 
crises destroy part of the existing capital, thus reducing 
i t s supply and arrestii^ the fa l l in profits. laipronrf^ Tients 
in production have the effect of creating new opportunities 
for investment, without depressing the rate of profit* laport 
of cheap goods, specially wage goods, fra« ahroad lowers 
1. J»S. Mill* op*Cit* vol .11, p.239. 
tk« eost 9i ]l&b(mr moA imiM* th« ]*•«• of profit. knA 
UkttXff ma. m^fflwt of Sftfiit*]. into ooloalea mm fortiga 
©Ottntriea, irtiar® hi^lisr pra4lt« OMi b« vamod, redueet th* 
pmtiiirf of oonptttitloii «t boM. 
M«lttfBt latroduottS th9 muBiA^rmtim of effeetlvo 
dmmiA Into tlifi ditoatfioa on tim fc l l i sg tvndsnejr of tli« 
rato of profit* %itfe bad fouad i t s mplaaaticxi In th« 
in«r«6«iR« mpplf of capital «iilU tfea oppoHmltli^a of Ita 
piDfitabIa MiplOfwaRt want on Hirliiiciag* Bieatio iaflft04i 
timt tha laa?«aaiAg dif fiooltiaa of agriattltarai prodaetiofi 
v«9f« t ^ oalr oaaaa of thia |^ iana»«aon* Kalthaa raoognitad 
the iapoftanea of Moarie'a oig»I.aaaUon bat ra^avdad i t to 
ba tlia Uait iag faotor oaiy, *Ai«faaa «i€ ralativa abitadaaaa 
of Mpital vaa tha * r^EuI^oyf pxtnelpXa* ^ for iraHationa 
in tlia rata of profit* Sigh profita iadaea »or« aavin^a, 
graatar aacawtXatiaii and iaofaaaai produetloit* Oir^rproduotioti 
oaaaaa fa l l in prieaa and iowara profita at wail, aa vagaa* 
If ^ 0 oapitalitta vara not to eai^aiX thair axpanditora on 
Xuxufiaa md aavad oaly part of thair inoraaaad profltOf 
thia along with tha rentier Oimaunption woiiXd er^sars highar 
^affaatu^l de»»ndy* highisr profita and highsr wagaa*® 
In Marx* a hand th& analyaia of profita beoasie a 
powarf^l aaana foraipoaing tha r^al Sitttrf^  of oapitaliaa* 
mmmmtmmmmmimmmmfimmmmwt nwiiin iiiiinii m i • m u m 11 in > m MHiimini ii i mini iii ii n ii ii • m m m i n i m i i i i i , r«ii IMMI 
t* t,H« HaXthaa, op«oit«» p* S7d* 
&• Ibid*, pp» 3t9»«»« 
Tb« soare« of profit ««• Tmlue ersated lay labour, vliloh was 
eapAbXa of produoing niTpiu* •alua *— Talua in «xeest of 
i t s owa exobanss value* The ox^iang« value of lalKmr, that 
la the rate of va',es, remained at ^ e aabaiatenoe level. 
Oatimt per worker vaa larger, and oould be Inereased farther 
l^ leiigtdieniiig the walking day and improving the nethoda of 
production* Cai^ltallsta were able to appropriate tdiit 
aurplua value by virtue of their o«merflhip of tkm aeant of 
production* Profits rent and lntez«st vere aerely sub-
divisions of surplus value indie&ting hov i t was shared bf 
oa^italists . 7har« were in reality only two distrlbfttive 
shares! Vages and ProfitsC^rplus 7alue). 
ITnlik© Bicardo, Marx did not pay any attantion to the 
law of diminishing returns. In fact the evidence of technolo-
gleal improvements was too impressive to permit a decisive 
role for that pilncipla. with the progress of the eojncaqr 
output per worker increased, iuad with i t increased the 
discrepancy between produce per worker and his wages, which 
did not Increase with progress* This implied a relative 
decline in the wage share* 
But the rate of profit tended to fa l l with progress, 
despite the growth of profits both in agiragate and as a 
share of the total produce* Marx tried to explain tha falling 
tmdencr of the rate of profit by tb» rising proporticai of 
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constant capital, fixed la the torn of buUdlogs,machinery 
and raw materials, in the total capital. This proportion 
tended to rise with technological iaprovements. Capitalist! 
were eager to introduce madhlnery, e tc . , a» i t increased 
the otttpttt per nan^hour* But surplus value was created hjr 
the Tariahle capital, capital expended on paying wages, and 
i t s Bagnltude was directly related to the magnitude of the 
variable capital. Constant capital only reproduced i tse l f , 
whereas variable capital re-eaerged with surplus value. The 
rate of profit was calculated hy dividing the total surplus 
value by the total, capital, vaiflable as well as constant, 
talcing into consideration their various periods of turn-
over. Assuaing a constant relationship between surplus value 
S, and variable capital, V, the rate of profit r (»S/C • ?) 
would go on declining as C/OT went on rising, ^ t the 
assumption of a constant S/7 in face of Ijsprovlng technology 
indietcted by the increasing proportion of the constant capital 
C i s untenable.^ Critics have correctly pointed out, therefore, 
• » » » « « • » » » » — — — " — » • I I n n Ill II I I I ! • — — — — I — Ill i im i i i I • ! I l l II 11 I 
U Bven a syapathetie enos i tor like P«EI1 H.Sweeiy ^ inks 
i t to be so(vide,1lie Theory of Oiiyitalist DcvelOBaent. 
pp 100-104. Dennis Dobson t>td«, Ziondon 19S8). 
As a rising organic conpositlon of capital i s accoapanied 
by increasing labour productivity, a constant rate of 
surplus value would laply a rise in real wages eaftctly 
proportionate to the increase in productivity. This,how-
ever. cannot be adaitted in the Marxian i^stsm, as i t 
a i l i ta tes against the idea of increasing aiserv and creation 
of a reserve anqr with the process of aecuaulationCpp.100* 
101). Sweesf <|ttotes Harx to provs that the assuaption of 
a constant rate of surplus value slnmltanecusly with a 
rising orgttile composition of capital i s hardly iustlflcd 
in t e » s of Majrx*a own theoretical s<Aieme«(pp.10i*10S). 
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tha t the law of the fal l ing rata of profi t cannot really be 
derived from inoreaslng organic composition of capi ta l . 
The scope of t h i s study does not warrant a thorough 
exsBination of the profit theory of Marx or those of the 
e lass ica l eoonoaists* The sketchy surrey given above i s 
e3q>eoted to serve as a baokgrotmd of l a t e r developaents. 
In Marx's hand the labour theory of value received a 
fomulatlon which becaae both logically untenable and 
po l i t i ca l ly unbearable* The c lass ica l tradit ion had already 
crysta l l i sed in the form of an eapir lcal cost - of - production 
theory ^nd the need to repudiate Marx further consolidated 
the orthodoagr In tha t position* The uneasiness fe l t in 
t reat ing the various Items of cost of production — the 
labourer 's wages, the landlord's rent and the c a p i t a l i s t ' s 
prof i t s —> on tlie ssoae footing was essential ly moral. I t 
was beyond redress so far as the cost-of-production theory 
was concerned* Only an entirely new approach could satisfy 
the conscience by changing the veiy context in %^ich the 
problem was placed* This i s irtiat actually happend* 
THS MAiOIlWJ. PRODUCTIVITY THSOIff 
In 18?1 appeared the worits of Carl Manger and itfilliaB 
Stanley Jevons, followed by the work of Leon Walreas in 1874, 
t« 
vhieh rerolutlonlsed ceonooio thinking, Utilitir and Its 
reiatton %ritk con sine r demand was nothing n«v$ the elassieal 
eeononlsts were quite familiar irlth it* The nev developsent 
was th@ reaUsatlon of th« principles of dlBlnlshlng ut i l i ty 
of th« sueeasfflva laerenonts of tho ooBModltjr ernisiaod, th« 
neoassity of a^allslng the fiaal(aarglnal) u t i l i t i e s In 
•arlous lines of eonstiaptioa for aaxiaising the total u t i l i ty , 
and the recognition of the si^^lflGaat relyti^a bntwsan the 
final u t i l i ty and prlaa*^ A coaplete suhjeotif© theory of 
value vas the result^ r(md«rin3 the cost-of-pitiduetlon ^\«0Ty 
and, of course, the labour theoiy of value, obsolete. For 
value i s 'the i«portance that Individual goods or quantities 
of goods attain for us beoause ve are conscicms of being 
dependent on cc^ aiaaiid of th^pi for the satisfaction of our 
needs* .^ Agents of production, such as lai^ ai^ labour, 
themselves derived their value fron the value of the goods 
they helped to produce* Thus th^ ^ focus of attention In 
eeonoMlc theoiy shifted froa costs to u t i l i t y , fr(» supply to 
deoand and fron production to ecmstuiption* 
Manger, ifhose oontributicn i s the nost outstanding, 
as also ^ e least a«.tiie»atical, dMionstrated how the valuation 
of goods of higher order '^ as he diaraeterlsed the agents 
1* The Chief early witlclpator of ths theory was H Ton 
Thiinen *os« Uu ligXlgrlfi ,^%m% appeared In isai . 
2. Carl Mengert Pftr^^plfff g | ^9«|1gll.f§* P.116. llencoe, 
I l i inois^ The Free Press, 1950, 
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of produetlon *— was based on the SHB« prinelple of 
»ab3«ctlYe l«portaiio«, though indlwet ly . Hian the saae 
principle of marginal ooixtrltmtlon go?erB0d dlatributlon 
vhloh •xplalned vh«) Taluatloa of eensiwers* goods{ * t^e 
•aXtte of goods of higher order i s always aod without 
•xosption deteimlnad bf tha prospaetlve valua of tht goods 
©f lowar order In whose production thoy serre*. This 
process Hunger oaXls Zeraohnung (imputation), though he does 
not fully worii i t out* As re»ard8 the fjuestlon whether 
this method of valuation of prodnetive agents eidiausts tha 
total produeti i t i s not raised by Hanger,^ 
laplioatlons of t!» marglnallst revolution for 
diet Ibution theory were fully worked out by H^-y^g^r* B two 
great dlseiples, Fredrielc Von Wies-^ r and Rugen fan BhoB 
BaweA, ^ o i Bawerk djveloped ti» thaoi^' of iaputatlon, 
1»t distinguished between the diare imputdd to a faetor 
and the share aotually * distributed* to i t . While the 
latter i s based on the toaem-^r i t i s seldcv ths saiss in 
magnitude because of the aotual etreuastanees leading te 
a unique eraluatioa relevant to ths speelfle set of faets.^ 
This dlohotomy between imputation and distribution barred 
1# Uarl Menger. op»olt,, p« 1B0, 
2# Tide 'J.J.Stlgleri Produetlon and Distyibutign gheoilos. 
p.iSS* Wie Maemillan md Qo», ^td., !7ew York, 19S1. 
3* Ibid, p*191. 
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hi t va/ to th« aothaattloa of the product problea«1 This 
problea vas takaa ixp \if Vlaier vho did not see aajr saeh 
dleliotoar* kfiaser f a l l j worked out the piioeess of lapfatation 
and postuXatad two condltioas for Its applleatlont 
1) that the TaXua of the prodtictlTa agents i s equal 
to the lain* of their produeb, and 
2) that the productive agents combine In fixed 
proportions w:idi vary between Industrfes. 
Be uses a sat of siaultaneous e^iuatlons for aaasurinf 
the productlva contribution of each faotor*' thus taia 
eidiattstlon of the product i s assuiMd right away Instead of 
beic^ looked upon as a problcn on whose solutloi depended the 
eoapletloa of the marginal productivity theory. The seas 
position i s taken by tfalras who also visualised fixed 
9 
production ooeff lc l^ts* The unrealistic nature of this 
asnaptlon was* however, realised by others who adopted a 
different i^pzoaeh* 
The asftiiaastion of the product proU.em was f irst 
explicit ly raised and solved \qr P«B« Mleksteed In ^ Sff^v 
on the Coordination of the Iisews of Distribution published 
U B^ut Bawerk fievelopcd a unique theory of prctfit — defined 
as the divergence of tha actual froa the normal rate of 
interest — i^ose study i s not relevant for our purposes. 
2« Ibid, p* 166, 
3« Ibidt pp* 238,242 and 258* 
1» 
i n 1894,^ k»mmlm hoaogeiteoat produotion fnnctlons of ths 
f i r s t degree he deaonstrated aatlieaatlcalXjr that faetorlel 
rewards accordtng to the i r aarginal produetivlties Just 
exhausted the predact* 
The eontrlhutlon of an^ one factor to ^ e product, 
i t s aarginal efficienoyi I s detertrinad by ' the effect upon 
the product of a small iaererieat of that factor, a l l the 
others raaainin? constant* *2 j f p j^ g the product and K i s 
capi ta l than fP/fK i s the aarginal efficiency of capital and 
K, dP/dK i s the share of capi tal in the t o t a l product* I t i s 
held self evident that under perfect eoapetition the rate 
of ps^raent to a factor will confora to i t s oontril»ati<m to 
the product* 
The crucial prohlea i s to deaonstr&te that i f ea(^ 
factor i s payed at the rate of i t s aarginal productivity 
the sua of these payaents exactly exhausts the to t a l product. 
I f P a F (A,B,C,, , . ) where P I s tha product and A,B,C,.,*. 
are the various factors of production, then i t must be 
shown that 
P « - - * A • T5*B • • - • * G - f , , , . , 
dk dB dC 
1* A London School Reprint appeared in 193S« 
2* P,H* tfiolcsteed in Coprdinatl^on <|aoted 1^ Stiglert 
Production aod Distilhutlon Theories^ p* 32i* 
1« 
AsnudBg tiCHOgeneoas and lln«ar pxoduetlon ftmetlon, 
! . « • , P s" F CA,B,C, • , . • ) aad XP « F(XA,iB,xC,.,.. ) th« 
dsslrod Qonelusions follov iaaadiately* This i s the so called 
Bular Theorea,^ 
Wlckste«d does not u t i l i s e the Btaer theoraa dlrodtlf.^ 
Taking two faetors land and laboiur (suppleaented bgr capital), 
he demonstrates through graphie analysis that rent as a 
residual equals the reward of land deteradned by the aarginal 
productivity principle, and that the wages of labour detemined 
according to marginal productivity ean be shown to appear as 
rent. The reward of the factor taken to be constant i^ipears 
as a residual tntt when the sane faetor i s tx^ated as a 
variable the same roward appears as deternined by Marginal 
productivity, Qraj^le treateaent i s suppleiiteiited by nunerioal 
• xaaples in the Coaaaonsense • ' 
The analysis i s extmded to the case of more than two 
factors. It i s ftssuned that factors of production are subs* 
titutable for one another at the aargin, 
1, O.J, Stigler, op«cit«, pp« 329-S89* 
2 . Ibid,, also see Lecture XI2 in the * Selected Syllabus of 
Sxtansion Lficture Courses' included in 1933 edition of 
tfielcsteed's €<apionsen»c of Poljtieal Keonoay» 
3, P.H, wicreeds ggmonggBif Q^ fgXilU.<iiA M^mBri^Q^*^^ 
Chapter vX, Gaorge BUxitledge and Sons,London,1933, 
I f 
* Within llMltSy the »ost apparently tmXlke of these 
faetors of production can he suhstltiitad far eaeh othor 
at the sargln and so brought to a ooiwon neasure of marginal 
•ervlceahlenes jr-tn-produotion *«' 
Wotf the produetlTs oontrlhutlon of eaeh faetor ean be 
measured *iQ one and the same unit* a»i tlm share of eadi can 
be detr mined' i f we divide the prooaeds by the SUB of these 
uni ts* . Eatreprenaurs* ui^a for aajdnisaticsi and froe 
competition wil l ansure ttiat prices of the factors of 
production equal the i r aar^inal p)K)du«ts»' Departure frcw 
cflBipetitiTe conditions, e«S«, existence of nonopoly, wil l 
r«s> I t in the entrepreneurs earning SCMBWthing aore than t b i l r 
distributiTO shares In the pK>duet as nsasured by thcWrg laa l 
industr ia l eftlolenisy*,* 
After Wlck8tead*s presentation of the theory a laniber 
of contributors developed i t on the Continent, Barone offered 
a aatheiaatical proof of the exhaustion of the product probles 
which i s not based on l^s Sul t r Thtorem* Bat the theory was 
l a t e r withdrawn at the behest of Pareto*^ 
1. Ib id . Vol . I , p . 3«1. 
a. Ibid . p. 369. 3, Ib id . , p . 371 
4 . Ibld. ,7ol«lI<%llabas of X«eeture Courses )p«8«8 
i« Q.J. a t lg le r , op*cit», pp* 360-4U 
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As Pareto* s Grltlclsn has also influenced Wlckstaed* s 
later Y!.6VS on the sabjset i t nay b« notod in passing. Hs 
erit leised the assussd independsnce of th« yarlcws factors 
of pi^ijctlon, end tiis elaia that thsy wire fully snbstitntahls 
for one another* ^ome faotors, he strasssd, have a unlqa« 
functional relationship to output or to oortaln other factors, 
regardless of th» aaotmts of the remaining faotors* This 
being the ease, factors of production vers not perfectly 
substltutablt for ons another* For the saae reason i t was 
not possible to measure the separate Marginal productivities 
of the factors eaployed* He rejected the adalssibility of a 
homogeneous and liatar production function aiKl Insisted <m 
explicit consideration of the scale of production in dealing 
with distribution of the product*^ 
Th(^h a number of the leading eoonoalsts of th« period 
participated in the cant rover iqr, the chief def«ider of 
Wiekstead i^ainst his or i t les was Kaat Wldcsell who 'rediscover-
ed* the marginal productivity theory around the year 1900 
and th^n realised the significance of \tfiCkste«id*s work to 
2 
tfhidi oontaaporarlea had not given due consideration* 
Vicksell% jQ^UiMS^t SftBil^a %4 Mn%^ » published in 1893 
contained, though implicitly, a aathematlcal forsRilHtion of 
the general aiarglnal productivity theory* 3:t was fully 
developed and aade •o^l le i t in a long article *0n the Marginal 
1* For a cr i t ica l axaaination of Pareto's orlt icisn refer to Stigler, op*eit« pp, 364-9i8* 
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ProducUvitf at a Basis for Sconoale Dlatrttoutlon'(1900), 
In th i s aikl h i s l a t e r fozmiXations and aiaboraticffis, ona of 
tha chief tasks vhlch WlekselX perfomied was to hamotilse 
><leitstaed» s •arginal produetlvity tbeoiy with BOIUB Baweik' s 
theory of in t e i^s t , 
Begarding the eidhianstlon of the product protoleia, 
»«lcksell shows that ei ther i t has to be assuaed that the 
production function I s l inear and hooogenous or ' t ha t a l l 
productlTe enterprisas have already reached the l i a i t heyond 
which a further increase in the scale of production wil l no 
longer yield aay advantage*.^ Elaborating upon the f i r s t 
al ternative the following production function i s suggested 
as m. explici t solutions 
P a A** B^ where «(• f « 1 
Wicksell recognises that t h i s approach has veiy 
res t r ic ted applicability* Hence the other al ternat ive. 
Constant returns to scale are visualised as a t ransi t ional 
phase in the growth of a firm, beyond which l i e s the phase 
of increasing costs (decreasing r e t a m s ) . This i s saggestad 
1. Aeprint'^d in *f|Xff|^4 .CiP^t.gg 9^ftgHjL<? ^^fgy* ^ K. 
Wicksell, pp, 93-120, Qeorge Allen and TJnwin,London, 19SS, 
2, K,Wiek80lli I^eotttres on Pol i t ica l Boonoaqr.yol«I« p. 186, 
Jeorge Routlec^ge aaa i^ oiis iitd.,liondon,1934,see also 
Selected Papers, pp.98-100, 
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«t the moT€ seneraU/ i^pXleable condition* TJnder oonetant 
rdturns to 0ealet and tlven perfeet fubst l tuttonal i ty , 
lncya«S6 in aay produetlire service inereased the product 
proportionateijr and perfeet ecmpekition ensured taie distribu-
ti(Hi of the inerenental product to the inereoental sarrice« 
Marshall does not aittcept the marginal prodictivitjr 
theory CfMspletely and vhole^eartedly* The theory, he thinks, 
o^er-saphaslses the dMiaiid slde,^ lAiereas t^e fact i s that 
'supply and demand exert eoordinate infLueuces* and 'neither 
side has a o la ia to pred<mlnaiies any nore than has either 
blade of a pair of se i tsor*,^ Wages equal net product of 
labour,^ but i t i s not correct to say that thoy are *ov'^ ^ned 
by i t , ^ because the net product i s i t s e l f deternined by supply 
and the general relaticois of dersand and supply*^ Then i t i s 
not possible to separata and measure the narginal net product 
rej 
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i 
of a labourer* According to Marshall the theory reprtseated 
only the deaand side of the theory of distribution* 
In tile short run hoveTer, i^en the supply of a factor 
i s ^ v e n , i^6 dfHsand side does play the decis ive role . Thus 
1, A.Marshalli Principles of Eeonoaics.CSth Edltion)p.450, 
Maeaillan anS* Co*,Ltd«, London* 1M1. 
2* Ibid*, p* 442 
3* Ib id . , pp* 429,430,44«,447* 
4* I b i d . , p. 447 
S* I b i d , , pp. 446-447* 
«• Ibid*, p. 447 
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*ln each ease tha InooKe tends tx> eqiaal the TaXua of the 
•ars ina l net product of the agenti in each ease th i s i s 
governed for the t ine by the to ta l 8to<^ of the agent and 
the need the other agents have of I t s ald'» 
St lg ler re^aids t h i s as aa outright aeceptanee of th« 
aargiaal productivity thsory,^ t e t the l«portant (jaalifications 
to which Harshall subjects the theory can hardly be Ignored. 
Marshall s tates the *e3diaa8tlon of the product* 
principle in unanblguous terms.* T e^ arguaent I s similar to 
that of Wickstaed though ha has not been referred to* 
As to profi ts Marshall refers to the • fundaaantal unity 
underlying the eansas that determine oonaal prof i ts and nomal 
wages*.^ For, as In ease of wages, prof i ts are also regulated 
by th« forees of supply and demand* dross profits eannot long 
diverge fron 'the normal supply price of the capital needed, 
added to the nonsal supply price of the ab i l i ty and ^ e 
energy required for aanaglng the business, and l a s t l y the 
nomal supply price of that organisation by which the 
appropriate business ab i l i ty and the raquirad capital are 
9 
brought toiethei'*. 
1»Ibid, p. 
2 . a .J .St ig lar i PiDducticm and glstelbutlon Theorles^p.SJg^ 
3 . A. Marshall I ££iBSiaiSfli P»**» 
4 . I b i d . , p. S17 
&• I b i d . , pp. S03, also P.B05, 
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In Aaerlea JToha Bates Clark worked out the aarglnal 
u t i l i t y and tfa« marginal productlirlty theories, Hl» thf^ ory 
of distribution vas ecw^lete and g«ieral in application, 
Tto «3aia»»ti<m of the produot proWLam waa solvad hy dia-
grametiaally proving that rent as a residua equalled rent as 
daterffllned toy aiarginal productivity. I^ls method csould ba 
applied to a l l coi^etltlTe returns| Clark showd. The Suler 
theorsffl, or any mathematlaal foroulaa for that matter, vera 
not utl l lsad. He also eaphaslsed cost-prlea e^al l ty to 
prove tha same proposition. His axposlticm wil l come In 
for furthar ccmslderatlon In the nsxt ehaptar, 
ScHia of tha proponents of tha marginal productivity 
theory held that the shara of tha aatrepranaur, tha organiser 
of production, i s also datamlnad 1^ his * marginal Industrial 
affloiency', Though a detailed axaraination of this concept 
of tha marginal efflolancy of the entrepreneur was often 
lacking, the tandency was to interpret It In terms of 
buslnass ability*® lAdras, of course, saw no role for the 
antrepranaur In tha general aqfolllbrlum so that profits did 
not axlst in that systam* tfi^sall held that *wlth tha flxa 
at i t s optimum slse tha antrapranaur no longer racalves a S 
profit.* But this Idea was not aaeaptable to others Uks 
1, P,B» Vleksteadi ^smSXBMMMt op , e l t , | p« &«2 
(Selected Sfyllabus of Extanslon Leetura Cours@s,Xieetura XII; 
2* Marshall! Ibid*, pp«803 and 51S« and Barona (potad In 
Stlgleri *^roduotlon and B^strlb^tj^,^ Thaorl ef, pp,9&9*«0 
^ K.tfickseiit jiBttftMi oa FflUU5?ftlHiaBam:>youi»p>iso. 
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Mg«vorth who eon tended that i t was aiaiply iaconeelTabl* for 
th« QTt^SiTdLB&T of pTociuotifni to resaln tmrewarded* * Marshall 
also did not roeogr^ l^sa a nonprofit stata. Bat the reason In 
his case was, f irst ly that he always dealt with profits In tha 
boain€S3 aeeatrntini^ sense, not In tha pnra sanse as Wali^s 
did, and secondly that ha was pre-oaeupi^ with the r&al world 
iion*static eeonony*^ 
Th^ important point i s that a l l these eoononlsts rejected 
tha Idea of profits in a oonpetitiTe eeonony as a residual 
income^ whether profits ware interpreted as a functional incoae 
or in the pare sense. In th@ conpotitiTe system al l d l s t n -
bttti^e shares were detanained Ijy the wirginal ppoductirities 
of the agents of production, and this distrihutlon just 
eadiaasted the total product without leaving any surplus or 
causing any deficit . 
1» Vide Stigler, op«eit», p«128, 
«• J.A.Sdiuapateri Hjstoiy of i^ iconowic Analyiis»pp, t04a"4f« 
leorge Allen and irnwin|I'td«,lK>iidon t9i^« 
CHAPTBR TWO 
THE MGBIKJUIID TO KHIOHT'S T H J O U OF PBOFIT 
CLA!K-SCHiniPBT&B THEOH? 
84 
Bf th« sooond d««ai« of tMs eantursr the Margln&I 
Prodaetlvi^ Theory of Dlstiilmtidri bad tlrmly established 
itself* I t v&s generally held that luder eartala astuiiptioiis 
ravaftfsof th« produeti^a sarviaas a^ual their aarginal 
produotlTitiaai iftileh vera definad aa the net spaelfLe eontrl-
totiona of a ttoit of the produetlTa sayrica to the ralue-
produet of the indastxy* I t was further held, thoa^ less 
ganerallft ^^ ^^  under aavtaln rastzlotiTa aaataptiana pay* 
aent aoeording to the marginal produatlTltias just axhaustad 
the total valtte^prodaet, affaoting a raaainderless dlstrihatioQ 
of the total . There are no prof i t s or losaas mnder these 
oonditlons* ProfltCand losa) vas» therefore, %9 ha explained 
viHi referenae to a departure of tha aatoal conditions froa 
those assumadf as was generally the ease. This vas the 
position fandaaantally adhered H hy J* B* Clark and J.A. 
Sehaapeter, the two great eaonoaista vhosa profit theories 
iaaediately praeadad that of F»R* Knii;hty * iftio also shared 
the si^e stttid* 
Sinea this study starts v i ^ the profit theory of 
F.E, Knight, i t i s desirahla to pronda a haalcg»>und to that 
theory by explaining this position and studying though 
briefly, of course, tha analysis of profit o f f e r s by Clark 
and Schtaspeter* 
U GlartcU t^§ BlalrtlwUQB 9 | M^itlfe. «»£««P«d iu 1899 axii tha 
f irst densaa edition ©f SttlMipetar«s jh^n ftl ?lwag|U 
l>airej.^ i|CTit vas pubUahad in 1911. Rni^t'a mt,yiatflrtftlBtf i a 3 5 S F l » dated 1981. 
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The s ta te of the econooy In which pure profi ts do not 
exist has been irariously described as the ' s t a t i c s ta te ' bjr 
Claris, the 'Clpeular Flow of Economic Life' by Sohuapetar and 
the 'Perfectly Competitive S<|aillbrl\aii' by Knight, Though 
t h i s difference in noaenolature does, to s<nae extent, represent 
a difference in the relat ive asophasis placed on various 
character is t ics of the systeta, the three essential ly refer to 
the s&iie set of eQndlti(ms« They abstract avi^ certain 
impurities and imperfeetloas of the actual economic processes 
and assume given supply and ful l use of productive resources. 
Rational c jfnduet and free oompetitic«i along with private 
property and freedom of o<xitrafit provide the necessary frame-
voziE in which the working of industr ia l econoi^f I s studied. 
Following the choronologioal order we ahall study Clark's 
s t a t i c state and then note the d is t inc t ive features of tiM 
two l a t e r formulations, those by Sohumpeter and K n i ^ t . 
J . B« CI^ BK 
Claik presents the 'picture of a s t a t i c Industrial world' 
as one which 'produces and consumes wealth, but the kinds of 
wealth that i t creates and uses, and the quantit ies that i t 
creates of a l l the various kinds, remain unchanged. I t s methods 
and i t s tools are unvarying, and there i s no change in the 
MiouBt or In the chapa«tsr of the labour and th« capital that 
do the producing woric. The society aett and live*, but do«s 
so tn a ehangaless aanaeX'.* 
8\i^ a atate of society which I s , of course, an abstract-
ion froa reality I coma to exist becaase of the absence of 
fivs changesi population i s stationary, and so i s capital} 
teehni(^e of production and the isodes of organising labour 
and capital for produotire purposes reaain the sane; and 
there i s no Increase or refineaent in the wants of the 
eonsuaert* 
There are only two factors of production — social 
labour and social capital* Hetrogenelty in the labour force 
i s overeoae ^ ^ e familiar device of regarding the aore 
skilled labour as so aany units of slaple unskilled labour. 
Land i s treated as a special kind of capital good, %^ile 
capital I t se l f i s looked upon as a huge fund of mlue rather 
than as so aany instzuaents, plants etc*' The problea of 
•divisibil ity* therefore does not arise. It i s further stipulat 
-ed that labour and capital are perfectly aobile* The 
different durabilities of ci^ltal goods, and the tiae elaaent 
Kelly and HlUaen,Iner7lew York,ttW. 
2. Ibid, pp«60*^1| also s^e pp«400»401* 
9. J.B. Clark, j to ai^miifltlOT ^ ^f3i.lfefP*120 fn 
^ 
thtti lovolvod do not pose any proWea as ths process of 
production Is eoaplately •synchronised*,^ and ts In h&niony 
vltii oonsumptlon deaands* Indeed i t i s the vezy fuactlon 
of capital, as distinguiifeed froa capital goods, to effect 
this syne^ronisationf Clark gives elahorate exasples to 
i l lustrate the idea«^ In a stationazy eeonoay the given 
deasnd for constaiption goods are aet ^ a tmlfora flov of 
eonsuaers* goods, which i s ensured \sf a unifoia flow of 
produetlTS services oaloulated to aaintain their output* 
The universal urge for aaxiaisation and the absence of 
friction ensure that perfect ooapetition prevails. 
Consuiaer goods are valued according to their flral 
u t i l i t i e s* Factors of production are valued according to 
their contributions to the product* Their values, so to say, 
are 'iaputed* values* Final productivity of a factor 
deter: ines i t s reward* In each flra and each industry the 
employaent of a factor i s such that the reward paid to i t 
just equals i t s aarginal productivity* I t i s fallacious to 
argue that XAm productivity of the earlier units of a faster 
i s any h i ^ e r than that of the aarginal unit, and therefore 
Bore than Ute reward of ^ e factor, thus leaving a surplus* 
1* Ibid, chapter XX* 
2* Ibid. p. 312* 
3* Ibid* pp. 131-33 mA 312*18$also see CT,J,StiglQr,op.cit,, 
pp«313-14* 
4* J*B*Clark, op*cit*, pp,323{ 369* 
All units are e^alljr produotlva, and the productivity 
of eadi one of thaa i s aeasar«d Tsf tha one at the nargln, 
given tbQ <|ttantity of taie other factor vith which i t i s 
oomblned. There are, therefore,no •profits* in the 
statio state and a l l prices e<|aal oosts of prodaetlon«^ 
Wag&s and interest Just ej&aast the total product leaving 
no surplus, positive or negative. 
tftiea a l l adjustments have taken plaee there i s no 
Biovement in the statie state. There i s perfect mobility 
hut no notion, perfect flu^ity |wt no flow. Competitive 
prices of ^oods and factors of production once set perpetuate 
themselves. 
In the static state there i s no special function for 
the entrepreneur to perform* lftiatev0r managerial work h» may 
do i s rewarded on the same prinelple on which a l l other 
labour i s rewarded. 
The assumption of perfect mobility and unobstructed 
flow can be relaxed a l i t t l e to admit friction wM^ accotints 
for dif f icult ies in the entry of new firms in the industry, 
leading to monopoly profits. Similar profits may arise due 
to imperfect mobility of capital amd labour, An these 
profits are due to friction and may be tezmed as gaasi^profitSt 
to distinguish them from the nure ^rQfi,ts of a dsmamic 
1. Ibid,, p. 90 
2, Ibid, , p, 70 
St 
eeonooy. I t ihould ilao b« notad that theoretically the 
Btatle state 1» frlotionless} henoe even q^sl-pToflts are 
fdr^igxi to sueh a state of the econony. 
Clark' e solution of the •:duni8tlo& of the produot 
prohlea Is liy no means fljbirless, and he seeas to he imavaM 
of the strict eondltlon* under whloh this ohtalns* As 
tfioksteed and tfieksell have deaonstrated, i t rehires perfeet 
sahstltutlonality of faetors and/or thsit the production 
fanetlon he hoKOg«aeous sad Unear, lAiloh, hesldes Uniting 
the applleatloii of the idea of profitless dlstrllmtlon, raises 
the further question of the st&hllity^ of eosipetltloa unier 
these emidltions. Clazlc, hovever, seeks to deoonstrate the 
t r u ^ of his proposition In a taieh slapler vay* liven a 
fixed stoek of oapital ^M aarglaal productivity of labour 
in the iipbo^r eurve ean he easily dravn* cilven the supply 
of labour the vage rate i s detemined at the point of inter* 
section of the given simply line w i ^ the aarginsl productivity 
eurvei as in figure 1 beXov, l^ailarly given the labour 
forcci the aarglaal productivity eurfe for capital i s iasim 
ai3d the rate of interest determined iBry the intersection of 
the simply of capital line vith this euzre, as in figure 2* 
th3 30 rat as ojjual tha aarglnal productivities of labour and 
oapital respeetively* A higher rate cannot prevail, for in 
that situation soae of the units of the factor concerned will 
roaain uneaployad; and in eoapetiag with the rest to get 
eiroloyaent they would bring the rate dovn t i l l a l l of thea 
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are eaplofed, which h&ppeiK only at the rat« i«ileh eqaali 
•arglnal productivity* A lower r*te also cannot last at 
dm and for the factor would then exceed l t» supply and 
coapetltlon aaongst eaployars to hire the cearee factor 
w i n raise the rate of payaeat* That In erery firm, in each 
Industry «id In the econony at a whole wages and interest 
rates Mist eqiaal the aarglnal productivity of labour and 
om I ta l respectively fel lovs fro» the «axl«lsatl<m principle 
and prevalence of pure ooi^etltiou* I t I s only these rates 
which satisfy a l l concerned and pat a stop to further changes. 
//<? 1 /fa 2. 
'In figure 1 In which wages are thus detarailned. 
Interest I s a surplus that Is of the nature of rent* % 
another aode of stating the law(?lg,2) we get Interest at 
the anount that la positively fl3i»d hy tfce final productivity 
lctfi and wages are now the surplus that Is akin to rent, 
these snounts together aiOie up the whole static incoBC of 
51 
soeietr ••• Pxofit has no plae* in saeii static oondltlois* J 
All this appsars to %• salf^aridant to CXajlu H« 
prooaods to argue that a reauiinder for tha antreprananr 
aonl* ooonr only i f SBC > A»B«C»B% hut this was not 
possihla in tha statio conditions* * Static eonditiois, 
hov€f?e7« ezclnda such a profit ^ Baking thasa two areas 
aqaal**^ *1l3^ a statia hrpothesl: pravants the entire figure 
A&OB froB eontainine nere thaa vages and interest* • 
J . A, SCmiMPETER 
Sd»uq»etar takes a eomareiaXly ozganisad statsi ona 
in vhleh priTi|ta propartfi division of labour^ and free 
eeapatition prevail* Tha population i s stationary so that 
the labour force i s given* Capital goods are regarded as 
eaihodiBants of tha tvo original scans of productiont g i f ts 
of nature or l«nd| and labour servlees. There i s no 
essential difference between oonsuMirs* goods and producers* 
goods as a l l are ultiaately resolved into labour and land«^ 
the systea has a given stock of conanaer goods and capital 
goods at tha outset* Goods are produced for the aazket and 
^^ Ibid*, pp. 200-201. 
2* Ibid. , pf) 203. 
3. Ibid., p. 3S1. 
4. ;r«A«SchaMetenThe Theory of Sconoaie DevelopB8nt,p.5.Q:sfovd 
thiiversi^ Presl,»lll> tmtl, tKI . 
5. Ibid,, p. 17. 
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••dTjr wappl^ aset i vith a denand, so that a l l t^at i s produced 
during a slv«n period la sold aad used up during the aane 
period, there are no aKilnga* Ihurable goods pose no problea 
as produetloB and eonsuaiptloa are wIX iqmehronlsed* 
Teolmolegy Is also given, so that the production 
funetlons do not ohange, though the proportion In vhleh the 
various services are ooablBed amy be changed 1^ way of 
suhstltotliig one for the other* Consumers' wants are given 
and the dcmaBd conditions fully knownt hence production does 
not need aajr real leader.^ Organisation of production i s a 
routine affalr| looked after bgr labour of a higher rank* 
The saae goods in the same ^laatities are produeed period 
after period, and even If provision Is aade for s l l0 i t 
ehanges In demand, supply adjusts I tse l f to i t In a routine 
manner. ' • • • . we may thus visualise aa eeoiK>mlo process 
which merely reproduces I t se l f at constant ratest a given 
population not dianglng in either numbers or age distribution, 
organised for purposes of oonstaptlcm la households and for 
purposes of production and trade in firms, l ives and works 
In an unobanglog physleal ai^ sodal (Institutional) environ-
ment. The tastes (wants) of households are given and do not 
change. The ways of production and usasMes of oommerce are 
optimal from the standpoint of firms* Interest and with 
respeot to existing horlsons and poss ibi l i t ies , hence do not 
1. Ibid. p. 2t 
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ehaage vitlhsr imltss SOBO dattta i^aaget or soae ^ane« erent 
Intnidefl upon this worH**^ Gonmm&T goods are iralued 
aeooz^ng to their marginal u t iUt ias ,^ and their valua 
radiates baek to th« prodii«tiv« sartrieas usad in their 
production* Taluea of prodaetiva sarvloas therefbra are 
iapated val^Si and aqoal tha marginai produetlvities of these 
services*^ Sehaiiq;»eter refer a to Clark for an aeeurate 
statement of tha marginal produetivitgr tSieoxy and lajrs dovn 
that the prices of tb» sarviea^ of land and Xabowir in an 
ax^iange eeonosor^ that i s rent and vageSi are determined bf 
tiMi marginal produetivity of land and labour ai^ that under 
free oompatition landlord and labourer receive tha product 
of their means of produotion*^ This theorem^ he daolares, 
i s hardly a eontroversial one in mode in theorjr* I t i s then 
demonstrated that at the margin of production costs e<9Ud 
prices* *At ^ i s point emerges that relatlTely best posLtlon 
which i s usualljr ealled the eaonomie equilibrium^ and which, 
as long as the given data are maintained! tends to repeat 
5 
i t s e l f in every period** It foUoirs from i t that the 
U J*A.S«^peterj iMtoltf I %ff3ltt»Vol*If p. 33.Medraw Hill, 
New YoA and I»andtey19I9« 
2* J.A.Scfaaim)etert Tha Theory of 8oonamio Qeyelosment.p.ll. 
3« Ibid«, pp*84»8S* 
4* Ibid., p* 2S' 
5* Ibid. , p* 29. 
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las t tncreaent of every product wil l be produ««d wlthoat a 
gain In u t i l i t y above /sosts, and, further, that In production 
generally no surplus •alwi abovQ the value of producers' 
goods can be attainsd*^ For prices of a l l products anistt 
under » e e coapetitioa, be equal to tfee prices of the sertlces 
of labour and nature embodied In thea. Production arust flaw 
on essentially profitless* Ket profit cannot exist because 
the value and price of tlm original productive ssrvlces will 
always absorb the value and price of the product* 
1%ils profitless state obtains i^en eoiq)6tltlon I s 
perfect and the whole econooilc system i s accurately adapted 
to the production und«rtal»n and works horttonlwisly and 
undisturbed* Frictions are^ howcveri too cannon to be 
abstracted away» and certain surpluses, positive or negative 
aay occur In the Circular Flow due to those frictions* 
Similarly lagged adaptation of production to deaand <^an^eS| 
especially in ease of the sxpply of capital goodSf account for 
rents which can be lapnted back to the relevent t&Gtor* 1!hus 
even when ve adalt slow dSiange In wsats, end existence of 
friction and monopoly eleaents, pure surpluses do not and 
cannot arise In the Circular Floir. 
Soae of tha other conditions aay also be relaxed without 
doing any hara to the aain conclusion, that Is the profitless 
t . Ibid* p. 29. 
S* Ibid* pp* 30<-3t. 
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vorking of the systwt. Thus the popalatioa aay grow at a slow 
8t«ad7 rate* There aajr h« sone savings leading to gradual 
accuaulation* fhe circular flow can alisorh these e l^ents of 
Qrovth without an^ dislooaticm resaltins ih surpluses, 
Sdsnq^eter admits the videspi'ead existence of the r i ^ 
eleaeut in the Circular FloWi hat these risks are vet at a 
definite cost and do sot give rise to any virpluiss in the 
sjrstea. * 
Thus we find that both Sehuspeter and Clark agree on 
the important point that the perfectly eosipetitive e<]uilibrit» 
s/sten i s a profitless sgrstos* This Is due to the fact that 
coaQ»etition ensures to each factcnr of production a reward equal 
to i t s Biarginal produetivity. That these payaents exhaust ^ e 
total product has not been rigorously proved hy any of the 
two theorists* Clark, who faces the issue squarely, relies 
on a proof whose naivety prevents Ma froa probing further 
and discovering the precise 4M>nditions under which this would 
obtain* Schuapeter relies on co8t<*prlc@ eqfualil^ in the 
Walrasiim genaral equilibriua to declare that there would be 
no surpluses} unmindful, apparently, of the fact that on the 
aar^n costs may be rising or falling instead of being constant, 
thus Jeopardising the *e2baustioa of the total* principle. 
1* Ibid.p.S5 
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TbAse flaws are, howetar, Irrelovant to the purpose 
i n hand. We are Interested In how they 0a«>lain profits for 
whleh the la^ortant point I s that they conceive of a s tate of 
the economy which i s prof i t less and explain actual profits 
with reference to a departure from these conditions. I t i s a 
disturbance in the s t a t i c s ta te , a hreak in the Circular Plow 
i^ ieh , tearing apart the factor ia l rewards frora the i r raargiral 
productivit ies creates surpluses which, temporarily though, 
remain uniaputad, these pure surpluses are what they ca l l 
p rof i t s . Let us examine how each <me of them explains i t s 
erne Irenes* 
THE msmm^QE OF PROPifSi Ghkm 
Five generic changes account for the departure of the 
economy fr<»B s t a t i c s ta te and i t s Jcwmay on the path of 
progress, • These arei increase in population, increase in 
cap i ta l , improveoents in technology, improvements in the 
organisation of industry making i t more eff ic ient , and 
aul t lp l ica t ion of eonsuaers* wants. As a insult of these 
changes a new set of conditions coaes to prevail , requiring 
new ' s t a t i c standards* of factor ia l rewards. For these 
eloiaents of prepress raise the aarginal productivit ies a l l 
1. J .B. Claikt T%^  fi^i^ty^^tr,|<;^ 9t ^^mht pp.400-401, 
m 
round* Bat th« pr«vlaasljr te t stanSardfl, which conforotd to 
th« old oondltionS;do not ehanga overnight. They ean ohango 
ani reach tht new standards only gradually* During t h i s 
t ransi t ion fron the old (lower) ra t s s of wages and Interest 
to the new (higher) ra tes , a surplus accrues to the »coordinator* 
of product!(^ process — the entrepreneur. This Is the 'pure 
profit* — an Income which did not exist In the s ta t ic s ta ts 
and comes to exis t btosnss of the 'dynaalc* ohacies mentioned 
aho7e» 
To the (|uestlon lA^ a trimsltlOB from the old to the 
new standards Is slow and takes t ine Clark answers that I t I s 
beeause of fr ict ion.^ I f oonpetltlon were swift In working 
prof i ts would he annihilated as soon as they were created. 
But the dynaale profi ts are ^ nature teaporary. As 
coapetitlon works I t se l f out labottr and capital clala pe^yoent 
according to the higher prodtectixltles resulting tram t l» 
lapwrred nethodsi bet ter technique, increased demand e t c . , 
and force the entrepreneurs to yield to the i r claim. As they 
succeed In doing so, and In t h i s they are assisted 1^ 
competition asKingst the entrepreneurs themselves, in the manner 
descrl bed above, profi ts decrease said are soon wlp^ out. 
The erst-whlle prof i ts now pass partly into wages and partly 
1. Ib id . , p , 411. 
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loto Interest. A new static irtate wm&a Into being and once 
•gain a l l aoticm ceases. The new rates of wages and Interest 
are higher than tha old ones, nevertheless they equal the 
•arginal productirlties of lab<my and capital, only thfise 
produotl-fities are also higher as a result of progress. Chee 
again wages and interest es^aast the total product, lesring 
no remainder to the entrraprencmr* In faet the entrepreneur 
hiaself dls^>poars fren the seena , there being nothing mere 
for hla to do now. 
So profits, when they exist , are untransfonied ln«r««ents 
of wages and interest* *l>ynaade forces, then, aooount today 
for the eidstenaa of an 1 no one that static foroes wil l begin 
to dispose of tonorrow*. 
But dynaaio ehanges &re a continuous affair. One change 
foi lers aaother and the aconcffi^ y i s haMly glT<m the naaessafy 
t i sa fUlly to adjust i t s e l f to the previous one before tha 
naxt coaies otrer* iiivery new ehsnge oal ls for new standards, 
and i t takes over the eeonony in the process of attaining the 
new standards called for by the earlier changes. The result 
i s that tha appropriate standards r e a r e d by the progress of 
the eeon<»iy are never actually reached* Va^ e^s and interests 
always lag behind what they should be aoeording to the static 
standards, with their new productivities* This explains the 
n Ibid. , p. 41S. 
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eantinuoua exlstanoti the penMnenee, of profits as i t Is 
observed In real l i f e . Profits ore the results of djmamic 
dhanges« They eantinue to be earned by the entrepreneurs 
because OyneBai© <^aiges oontlnue to take plaee« Ths truly 
Statie State i s never rea^^ed for ehimge nvfer oeasss. Thus 
a permanent role i s assigned to the entrspiransitr in ^ e 
ever ciianging real vorld* 
Clark dismisses at length this role of the entrepreneur 
and how It entit les hiH to the profits nthieh accrue to hl«« 
The greatest role of the entrepreneur i s to Initiate dyoaulo 
ehangesi to secure progress. This he does by oeans of 
inventions and technolc^lcal iaprovemcnts, by better organis«<-
tion of produetitm, and hy establishing and aaiatalning eff l-
elegit relations between the agents of production.^ Lured by 
the px^speets of aaking profits he moves labour and capital Into 
avenues which are iBOst productive* In doing so ha has to 
attract labour and capital by pronising thea higher rewards. 
This is how wages and interest rise. Thus profit Is the 
unlv rsal lure that aakas the CMipetltlon work. And the 
e 
ultimate goal of tht fflovaments i s a no-profit state. 
I t i s these act iv i t ies of the entrepreneur which entitle 
hia to the profit he creates. As a natter of fact Clazk even 
goes to the extent of relating the entrepreneur's profits to 
his functions in ouch the sane way as the rewards of other 
factors are related to t^eir workst *free conpetition tends 
1. Ibid., p. 3. 
2« Ibid., p. 411. 
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to glT« to labour what lal>aur 0reat«s, to capitalists what 
capital ereatesi and to cntraprandura what tho coordinating 
factor creates'*' Bat the Idaa has not bean pressed to its 
logical llKltSy as no attempt has been aade to show the 
deterainatlon of profits according to the marginal 
productivity principle* Moreover Clartc remarks that 
coBipetlt on does not result in establishing a univarsal 
rate of profit, like that of wages and Interest, for such 
a possibility will attract capitalists to become entre-
preneurs till profits are annihilated,^ 
Clark is also not able to shed sufficient light on 
what determines the magnitude of individual profits 
beyond postulating that 'this lure must be sufficient to 
m ^ e men o'Tereome obstructions and take risks',^ 
Clark had promised fully to develop his dynaale theozy 
of profits la a later work which failed to appear. As It Is 
ve have the f&mlllar comparative statics* Comparing two 
t. J,B, Clark, op.clt*, p,3. 
2« Had Cla^ made this attemi » empt he would have realised the 
impossibility of this task and. therefore, the unscienti-
fic nature of his assertion. That profits are the 
creation of the entrepreneurs may or may not be a Just 
claim, but to assert that profits ait almllar to wages 
and interest in being detexmlned by the working of the 
competitive process Is certainly not correct as profits 
are a dynamic phenomenon arising out of a break down of 
the competitive process which fully works out only in 
static conditions, fhis is further substantiated by the 
fact, so ably demonstrated by Clark, that the competitive 
process tends to reduce profits, ultimately annihilating 
them altogether. 
3. J. B. Clark, op.dt., p« 891 fn« 
4. Ibid., p. 411, 
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s t a t i c «(|ttillbrla, his thaoiy points out that the transit ion 
from one set of factor payments to another higher one wil l 
only be gradual, t ^ p o r a r i l y yielding surpluses. As the 
econoay i s ever in the grip of dynamic changes these transitory 
surpluses becooe a pemanent feature of the changing real world 
economies. Thus Clark succeeded in underlining change as the 
slne-quf-am of p rof i t s , ttiough detailed snalysis of the 
appearance, prevalence, and disappearance of prof i ts and the 
changes vhich cause them i s lacking* 
THB SMSBQBBSCE OT PROFITSi SCHOMPSTBR 
Different tTom the slov and gradual process of growth 
i s the process of economic development brcmght about by the 
in terna l forces of the economy* Successful carrying out of 
new c<MBbination» of productive services i s the essence of t h i s 
process, I t » i s a d is t inct i^enomenon, enfelrely foreign to 
what may be observed in the c i rcular flow or in the tendency 
towards equilibriufli* I t I s spontaneous and dlsoontinttous 
change in the <^ann0ls of the flow, disturbance of efjuiUbrium 
which for ever a l t e r s and displaces the equilibrium state 
previously existing*. The new combinations of productive 
1. J,A, Schumpetert ||if, . t e^ fy M ^99nmX^ fiftTg^glWI^Blf P*0«* 
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senrloet are, generally •peakln*, aiore productiva than the 
old ones. Thay result In the production of nore ?oods and 
better goods. The sal« of these products yleMs a value 
surplui — value In excess of thg payments to the factors 
of production — lAich i s profit»• ' I t Is the premium put 
upon fttccessful innoTatloa In capitalist society.!/ The 
carrying out of new eoabinatioiis Is InnovatloQ, lihlch covers 
the following five eases: 
1. introduction of a new good air a new <|uality of 
an old good) 
2» introduction of a new aethod of i^K>duetion| that 
i s one not yet tested by experience in the branch 
of 1 ^ aanufaeture conceited. I t need not be 
founded upon a discovery scientifically new, and 
can also exist in a new way of handling a ccnmodlty 
ccaneroiallys 
3« the opening of a new market for a product; 
4* the oon^iest of a new source of raw materials or 
half^aanufaetured artioles; 
9. the carrying out of a new organisati<»i of an 
Industry like the creation of a monopoly position 
or the breaking up of a monopoly position. 
The init iat ive in this respect always rests with the 
producers. Far from being mere routine workers, as th<3y are 
in the circular flow, they become entrepreneurs — thos«who 
innovate and carry out new combinations of productive services. 
Entrepreneurs are a special type, possessing qualities which 
• — i — — I I I III I • • ' • l » • ! ! < l I • l i - H I l l I.I . • • • . I l l I . 
1. J.A.SchUBpeterJ l^aias&SJSsCSiSfit^ ^ol* If P.106 
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are not nA«d8d l a the elroular flow. They are leaders haTlng 
the ab i l i ty of thlnldng sofflethlng new and planning I t out. 
They are in te l l igen t , kean, vigorous and aabitiou* persons 
endowed with a sense of authority and egoism, a wil l to fight 
i t out and conquer, and a sporting s p i r i t . In carrying out 
innovations they hare to suroount a nuaher of suhjective and 
objective d i f f i cu l t i e s . Besides facing the d i f f icu l t ies 
of planning sonething new Vhen no adequate data are anrailable 
to guide action, and overcoaing one's own reluctance in 
i«pleBentin» a new scheme, they have to face the hos t i l i t y 
of others to the i r new ideas and suffer froa lack of eneourage-
ment and cooperation. 
Their d i f f i cu l t i es are s t i l l greater because they 
have to a t t r a c t productive services «way ttom other «sploy-
ments to be able to carry out the i r own production plans. 
For, in the circular flow the productive services are fully 
eaployad. niey have, therefore, to offer rewards that are 
higher than the prevalent ones to a t t r ac t thea. Ijinovations 
are generally carried on by new men ami the new combinations 
of productive services effected by new flzms. Their products 
generally take the form of new goods wM.eh involve an 
addition to the supply of goods, and might result in a fa l l 
in pr ices . 
^ t repreneurs are not c a p i t a l i s t s , end have nothing 
to invest . To effect new combinations they need funds for 
financing their producticm plans, t i l l the goods are produced 
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and •arkttted* Bat there ar@ no •Qcimftlated sayings, no 
capital in the Circular Flow, Sntrspronsurs, therefore, 
ask for credit and bocoae debtors. This credit i s created 
ad-hoo ^ the hanking systea* The entrepreneur in utlUsiBg 
this credit for making payments Increases the mmiay demand 
without slaoltaneously Increasing the supply of goods which 
come only later* HeaniAiile an inflationary siinatlon Is 
created and prices rise* 
When the new goods come to the market prices again 
come down, the loan may he paid back, and the credit created 
for financing the new production plan cancelled. The sale 
of Mw goods brings to the entrepreneur something more then 
the loan he had to repay i f his anticipations have come 
true and a surplus over cost i s r e a l i s t * This will happen 
only when the following conditions are fulfi l ledi 
U Cost per unit in the new method must be less 
than in the old <me( 
2* Increased supply due to the new productlcm must 
not result In such a fa l l in price that a l l the 
gain Is wiped out{ 
3* increased donand for nroductiyd services must not 
lead to such a rise in their remunerations as to 
make the cost per unit higher than the revenue 
per unit. 
Falling these conditions the entrepreneur incurs 
losses , and t^e new ejcperiment i s abondoned* 
These profits, \dhen realised, are neither fortuitous 
nor a mere residual but a functional return,"^ They are the 
— , , , - . . , . — - ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ . , J ^ 
1. J.A, Smhumpeteri SmlBlffff <fT9ln$P*'^0^ 
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reward of the entrepreneur* s functltm of innovating, of 
carrying out a new comMnation of productive services* 
These surpluses are the resul ts of the h l ^ e r productivities 
of the n«w methods. They are the resul ts of economic 
deveXopaent. The function of the entrepreneur l i e s in 
bringing about econoaie development. He takes up this 
haiardous t a ^ with a view to earning the profits which 
thus resu l t . 
The successful innovator continues to enjoy profits 
as long as his cost of production i s lower than thosg of 
others, or t i l l he dnj<^s a monopoly position as the 
producer of the new good or the sell@r in the iww maricet. 
But th i s can, ^ nature^ be only shortlived in a free 
competitive ecc»i(HBy« Others are quick to imit iate the 
leader and follow in h i s footsteps. The new method i s 
adopted by a l l ocmcemed. As a result of th is generalisation 
of the innovation, supply of goods increases farther and 
their prices f a l l , demand for productive services increases 
and the ir rMninerations r i s e . The innovator's advantageous 
posit ion regarding costs disappears. His costs increase 
and those of the others are lowered t i l l costs are e ^ a l 
every where. Profits are vlpmd out. The frui ts of 
development, which once took the tora of prof i t s , now pass 
on partly to the consumers who have to pay lower prices aaad/ 
or get better goods, and partly to the owners of productive 
services who get higher rewards. 
Profits SLTi) thus a temporaxy af fa ir . They saiapge at 
otm point In the eeotia^ and aooraa to the intwvator, th«a 
start dwindling as they are sharod by an increasing nuabar 
of Innovators on ons hand and eaten up by rising costs and 
fa l l ing prices on the other, t i l l thsy f ina l ly disappear. 
By t h i s t ine the developnent achieved in the fora of the 
newly Introduced nethod has been general!sed| eonpletely 
replacing the old Inferior ae^ods* Profits are t^us 
both the child and the viotloi of eeomoiale deTelopMont. 
The lust for prof i ts urges upon aen to iatiovate and developj 
eonpetltlon for developaent y ie lds profits and the same 
prof i t s make the developaent eomaon^ thus el lmlnatli^ 
profit s« 
Once again th^ coi^etit lTe process establishes cost* 
price ecpiallty a l l round* Factorial rewards equal marginal 
productivities* Wages and rents are now h l ^ e r and prices 
of consumer goods lower* But the Circular Flow once again 
comes Into i t s own* It continues t i l l the Flow Is again 
disturbed by some new Innovation* 
How Ion* w i l l I t take an Innovation to be ia l tated by 
a l l those Interested, and for the new developed ras^thod to 
become generalised, w i l l depend on the extent of fr ic t ion 
In the aconoaqr* In some oases fr ic t ion or Imobl l l ty may 
pers i s t and the process of generalisation may never be 
completed. Some characterlst ies of a productive service, 
or a control on sources of raw material supply, etc*, may 
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account for th i s phenomenon* In these cases a surplus wi l l 
continue to accrue to the owner of the reloiiant factor or 
pos i t ion. I t i s , however, different from the pure profits 
of the entrepreneur. I t Is of the nature of quasi-rant 
and should be iaputad to the factor concerned. When profits 
accrue due to some patent or legal res tr ic t ion , I t i s 
monopoly revenue. 
V(fe can note some of the Important points on which the 
two theories discussed shove d i f fer . With Clark we find 
that increase in population i s one of the dynamic forces 
disturbing the e<|tillibrl\» and necesyltatin* a readlustment, 
whereas Schumpeter does not regard It as capable of creat-
ing ffuch a disturbance. Changes In population are slow snd 
steady In rate and the system gets usad to adjusting 
I t s e l f to these changes. Clark i s right i^ tien he v i sua l i s e s 
a (flange in the marginal productivity of labour when the 
number of labourers changes, but the Change Is not sudden 
enough and big enough to throw the eocmomy off balance snd 
result in disparity of rewards and product ivi t ies . 
Anticipating Knight wc may also s tress the fact that 
population changes are known In advance and can be almost 
exactly calculated, hence the cconoay ad^fusts I t s a l f to 
these changes without any time lag. 
The same Is true of increase In capita l . ITotwi thstand-
ing the difference in the treateaent of capital by Clark amd 
Schumpetar, I t can be seen that accumulation at a slow and 
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•tesuiy rat« w i l l be looked a t d i f f e r en t ly W *h« ^^o 
t h e o r i s t s * W« c ^ d l « i l s s t h i s point as well wltti the smti 
remarks as al30ve« 
The t r ea teoea t of ohaoges In eonsuaers ' wants i s also 
d i f f e r e n t , but the difference l i e s in t h e i r views on the 
' enus l s of big changes In wants ra ther than regarding the 
Impact of these dianges on the ^ s t e s * While both agree 
t h a t s ign i f i can t dian^es In consoaers* waoks w i l l upset the 
equil ibrium and i n i t i a t e a sequence of changes and lagged 
adjustaentSi ^ohKuipeter I s qui ts aaphatle tha t big ehan';es 
In wants are engineered by producers. Uonsuaers* t a s t e s 
may dbiange on t h a l r o«n accord but t^ese changes are 
aa rg ina l and gradual and need not v i o l e n t l y d i s tu rb the 
equ i l lb r l t a i . They are par t of the procsss of growth. I t I s 
Innovators , however, who uss var ious devices to introduce 
new goods and new v a r i e t i e s of old goods to the consumer 
and persuade h la to ^ a n g e h i s d^aand. I t I s such 
producer - In i t i a ted changes in i«nt t h a t are r ea l ly revolu-
t ionary in t he i r l apae t . 
As to the reaaining two forces in C la rk ' s l l s t - o f 
the ibrces aaking for pro-^ress i t can be noted t h a t they are 
the essence of SchuBpoter*s concept of innovation. Indeed 
I t i s thess changes which have t l ^ p o t e n t i a l i t y to render 
the old reaard * product iv i ty r e l a t ions obsolete by 
r a i s ing the f a c t o r i a l p r o d u c t i v i t i e s , espec ia l ly the 
p r o d u c t l v l ^ of labour . 
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Both S©hiiiiq»«ter and Clark agree tha t I t I s fricticfn 
whdch prevent ! Instantansoua raadjustmeat and slvea the 
©ntreprenaur an opportunity t o reap p ro f i t s aaannhlXe. Thfiir 
ana lys i s of the ^e r^anea and gradual e l l a lna t lon of 
p r o f i t s i s in assanca the same, thouvjh the superlorilgr 
of the wider and deeper Schurapeterian ana lys i s oan hardly 
be doubted. The inalg^ht hs glvas regarding the nature 
of innovation, the terapar and role of entrepreneur, the 
appaarance of innovations and t h e i r i a i t a t i o n and the 
proeess of the aconony again aovini towards the neighbour-
hood of ( a new) e<jttlllhriua a4rve to oake h i s analysis 
deeper and raore comprehensive* This i s especia l ly so 
because Clark f a l l s t o analyse the ' f i v e generic changes' 
•aklng for progress . Their genes is , t h e i r i n t e r ac t i on 
a i^ t h e i r own course through h i s t o r i c a l t i a e I s l e f t un-
discussed. In the absence of any ana lys i s of the dynamic 
changes and the behaviour of the system during the 
t r a n s i t i o n frow one e(|ulllbrluia t o anjtther, the dynamic 
theory of p ro f i t ranains the s ta teoent of a t ru th supported 
by scanty analysis* iTnllke Schuapeter, Clark does not 
•xaaine the speci f ic condi t ions for a dynamic ch^nage 
ac tua l ly t o r e s u l t in p r o f i t s . Being a pioneer study, 
preceding tha t of Schunpeter hf more than a decade, the 
worth of Clark*» theory l i e s ne i the r in i t s depth nor i n 
i t s scope, on which c r l t e z l a i t ecmpBTas but poorly with 
the Schuapeterian sys tea , but i n i t s grasp of the e s sen t i a l s 
so far as the theory of p ro f i t i s concerned. 
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Af «ent imed abov;, Knight also s t a r t s from ^he same 
pos i t i on , th&t the per fec t ly competitive eq^dllbrlun i s a 
no-prof I t 8y3t<aa» His ana lys is of the pricing of productive 
s e r / i c e s I s e s s e n t i a l l y the same as t h a t of Clark and 
Schuapeter, though While examlaing the marginal producUvity 
theory of d i s t r i b u t i o n he seeks to c l e a r soati of the 
coafusloni created by I t s other expos i to r s , especia l ly 
Cleik,^ and answers soms c r i t i c s of the theory.* He 
c r i t i c i s e d ^Jlark for h i s concept of f ac to r s of production, 
h i s two fac tor modal, and h i s method of defining productive 
f ac to r s in pr ice t e rms .* 
notwithstanding these differences the analysis 
proceeds in much the saaie terms. Thus In the perfect ly 
competitive e(|Ulllhrluffl * consumption ?ood3 and productive 
serv ices must be so priced t h a t ecpal prlce'>amouuits of the 
second make equal pr lca contr ibut ions of the f i r s t /hlch 
have equal u t i l i t i e s to a l l persons In the system, '* 
Productive services *9t rewards equal t o th =ir marginal 
p roduc t iv i t i e s and these rewards jus t es^aust the t o t a l 
product* Knight ro fa rs t o Wicksteed for a solut ion jf the 
'adding up problsm* and c r i t i c i s e s C la rk ' s formulati ^n as 
Boston and Wew xorkjHoughton Miffl in Co., 
1921. 
2 . I b i d . , pp. 110.r114 
3 . I b i d . , p, 124 fn, 
4 . I b i d . , p . i n Ih . 
S» I b i d . , p . 12S. 
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*tttni«o«88arily abs t rac t and tmreal ' • Claife»a analysis 
of the woiklng of eoapet i t lon and the s t a t i c s t a t e i s also 
reviewad in d e t a i l and iapor tan t Ijaorovsnants are su»^ast-d 
i n ce r t a in respects* 
With a view to layini; tha foundaticm for h i s ovm 
emphasis on imcerta inty as the cause of prof l i , he subjects 
ce r t a in c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the systtfa to more searching 
a n a l y s i s . The most impoirtant dua rae t e r s l t l o of the 
competitive equ i l ih r iua system, according to him i s the 
absence of ' unce r t a in ty* , the presence or absence of vhicb 
w i l l appear as the most Important underlyin;; d i f f e r ' nee 
between the condi t ions which theory i s compelled to assume 
and those vriilch t a d s t In fac t* . 
While examining ttm assumptions underlying perfect 
competition in some d e t a i l s . Knight fldds Perfect Knowledge 
as the mo^ t^ important of t h e s e . Members of society are 
supposed to know what they want, and to seek i t i n t a l l i ently. 
They are supposed to know absolutely the conseqjionces of 
t h e i r ac t s when they are perfoarme4 and t o perfoi^ tham in 
the l i g h t of the consequences . , . ' 'Every po t en t i a l buyer 
of a good constant ly knows and chooses aaoi', the of fe rs of 
a l l po t en t i a l s e l l e r s , and converse ly ' .* The producers 
are l ikewise supposed to have coaqjlato knowledj^ of the 
p r i ces of productive ssrvloes and raw mate r i a l s , d«naixd 
n Ib id , p , 108 fn. 
2 . I b i d , , p , 61, 
5* Ib id* ,p . f 7 , 
4« I b i d . , p . 78, 
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eonditlonai and the technleal i t ias involved in production. 
They ar« si:^pos«d to have a knowledge of the future as well, 
in so far as savt « knowledge i s required for organising 
business eonduot in the present* In s^ort*under s t a t l e 
ootiditlons evary person would soon find out, i f he did not 
already know, Bv^ry thing in h is s i tuat ion which affected 
h i s conduct*.^ I t i s only with certainty regarding the 
magnitudes and behaviours of ths relevant variables on 
th« part of a l l concerned that ^sapetiticxi can ensure ths 
equality of prices with costs , and of factorial rewards with 
aaiiClnal productivit ies. Perfect knowledge has always been 
assuaed lay the t radi t ional s t a t i c •qui l lbr iua theory, 
Knight s tresses; only the full laport of th is condition has 
not always been realised* Conse<iiisnces which real ly follow 
froB this assuaption have erroneously been ascribed to such 
conditions as absence of cl^nge in the data, not realising 
that i t i s not the absence of change as such but the 
knowledge and certainty which obtain in a changeless system, 
which i s responsible for these consequences. This error 
has led to the aore grievous error of making change the 
key factor differentiating real world eeonoaies froa the 
abstract equilibrium aodels of theory* I t i s not ohan<;e 
but taieertalnty that distinguishes the two, A known change 
w i n not disturb the working of a competitive system and, 
1. Ib id , , p, f9 . 
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eons«(|aentlf» no stirplusas w i l l a r i s e due t o change i t s e l f . 
This vfouia be t i n e \then the ohaa^e I t s e l f was not precisely 
known but the laws Uiat govemsd the ©haaga are ful ly 
knonm. 
Knight aakes t h i s point the bas i s of h is a t t ack on 
C la rk ' s thaozy of p r o f i t i "Change aay cause a s i tua t ion out 
of which p ro f i t w i l l he made, I f I t br ings about Ignorance 
of the ftttuira • • • I t I s t h i s faet t h a t change I s a 
necessary condition of our being ignorant of the future 
(though ignorance ne«d not follow from the faet of change 
aod only to a H a l t e d eacbent does so) that has given r i s e 
to the e r ro r tha t change i s the eause of p r o f i t . • • I t i s 
not dynaistc change nor any change, as such, %rtilch causes 
p r o f i t , but the divergence of ac tua l condit ions from those 
which have been estipeetad and on the bas i s of whldi business 
arrangements have been aade**^ Re exaalnet the Changes In 
da ta i^ lch according to Clark sake for progress and lead 
t a the emergence of p ro f i t ai»i finds t h a t nany of these 
are rsot necessa r i ly aecoapanl^d by UBcertainty and, conse-
quently, vould not lead t o p r o f i t s . This I s spBCially true 
of lnoreas« in population and aecua lo t ion of c a p i t a l . Stich 
• progressive changes can usual ly be f a i r l y well foreseen 
and discounted and t h e i r e f fec ts are not generally laportant 
over ahovt periods of t ime. They produce r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e 
dis turbance In the conpe t l t l r e adjustasent unl are not a 
U Ibid*, p . 148. 
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• Ign l f l ean t oaoise of p r o f i t s ' . ^ 
He exaiaines o ther changas In the data basldas those 
In population and c a p i t a l , assuaed t o be j lven in the s t a t i e 
• t a t a , one by one. Mul t ip l ica t ion of valits or chan^.aa in 
the dis t r i l»2t ion of ovnership of productiT* lerf icesjaven 
Inventiona and iiaprovad laethod* of organisat ion w i l l r a su l t 
l a the «n«rgenee of p i o f i t t (mly insofar as they are not 
foreseen* He, the re fo re , coneliides t h a t t *Where the r e s u l t s 
of eoplcqnBeat of resources can be foreseen, eompetitlon 
w i l l force every user of any productive resources t o pay 
a l l t h a t he can afford to pay. Which i s i t s net specif ic 
contr ibut ion to the t o t a l product of indus t ry . No sor t 
of change i n t e r f e r s s v i t h the no-prof i t adjustaent i f the 
law of the ehmge i s known*.^ Tims not only C la rk ' s s t a t i c 
• t a t s but even a changing progressive «con(^y w i l l remain a 
no**profit ^ s t em as long as the laws of change are ful ly 
known* 
Tiewed froB tiiis angle Sehuopeter 's pos i t ion , though 
l e s s vu lnerab le , i s never theless open ix> the same e r i t i c i s a * 
Hajving disnissed the e leoents of growth — increase in 
population and aoouBnilatian of c a p i t a l '^ as incapable of 
dis turbing t l ^ Circular Flow, Schuatpeter has chosen Just 
those changes which are th«j l e a s t predictable* His ana lys i s 
1* I b i d , , p* 14a, 
2 . I b i d . , pp, 172-173, 
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of the gene83.8 of innovations lays great emphasis on th© 
4 
• loca l aai spawaodlc way in vjiiich they orl^lrmte* — 
Knight* s er i t e i lon for inve^ticns and iaprovcrcents to lead 
1w> prof i t s . Yet the faet reaalns that the causa of profits 
in Schtaapeter* f system i s the higher productivity of th« 
new asthod and the monopoly position of t^e ontreprenaur 
in the f i r s t instance, md not the uncertainty of the 
result* or the unpradietahle nature of innovations, l^ot 
that Schu^eter i s not eonscious of t h i s characteristic 
of Innovations or f a i l s to aenticsi i t | only the eaphasis 
l i ' S els«where, J.B^Clark also speci f ias perfect knowledge 
of present and future facts as one of the conditions 
olitaining i n the s ta t i c s tate , I^t the causal significance 
of t h i s assoiption I s net real ised. The same i s true, to 
some extent , of Sebiapeter as wel l , 
Kotvithstaiviing th is fai lure to lay the ^sphasis on 
the right point i t can eas i ly be realised that the two 
theor i s t s , Knight and Sdmapeter, are close to ore another 
in e33)laining the emergence of profits* As v» shall find 
belov^ the type of uncertainty which Knight regards to be 
the cause of prof i t s i s generally assoeiateu with innovations, 
to the exclusion of otiier types of change. Then innovations 
are hardly ever foreseeable and the ir actual results oan 
seldom be calculated in advance, Innovcitions and 
1« I b i d . , p* 143, 
2 , Chi^ter s ix . 
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uncer ta in ty apu InMparabl* phsnomana, 30 t o speak, 
Schtiap«t«P admits tha t thara ara r i sks which ' a r - -o t 
faresean' aad these r laks 'haaoao on the ono hand ^aujrc^n 
of teiaporaiy lo«3 and m the o ther hand SOUPCGS of 
taaporary ^a ln ' . ^ Bat than he proeeeds t o axgita that the 
»chlsf aomrce of these gains and losses . . . i s spontaneous 
changes In the da ta Which the Individual I s aceustonad to 
reckon . '^ Adjustaent to such chanties i s , by na ture , la^^ed, 
and causes surpluses which he chapaetsr tses as * quasl - rents*. 
Knight would not ^ P 6 a to t h i s . And i t I s highly doubtful 
i f a l l unforeseen r i s k s can he explained away i n t h i s 
aanne r* 
The above discuss ion has provided us with the 
necessary background for tails studyi by c lar i fying the 
meaning of ' p ro f i t* whose natxire and source these t h e o r i s t s 
seek t o explain* The most outstanding c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
observed so far i s t h a t p r o f i t i s a rewalnder, a value 
8urpluS| accruing because of a departure of ac taa l 
c o m i t i o n s from those required for a roaainder less d i s t r i -
but ion according to the asarglnal p roduc t iv i t i e s of the 
pa r t i c ipan t se rv ices . As such i t i s d i s t i n c t from the 
o ther d i s t r i b u t i v e shares both in i t s nature aai i t s source. 
U J.A.Schusqieteri Bw I&WIT a l gfOBlftllifi ,PfT«3iQMflnt»»P*33. 
2» Ib ld» , p« S5a 
S* l b l d « , p* 34* 
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I t s nature i s tha t of a surplus; I t s soiircfl, accord!rig 
t o Clark and Schuapater, an laeraase in the prcKluctivttles 
of productive 3eririC3« because of sojia tm,.rov3C3cnt3 in the 
s i t u a t i o n . On t h i s v i t a l point Knight tak?s a d i f f - r a n t 
sta&dy tbe source according t o him Ming tb#i fa i lure to 
foresee t h i s Increase r&tlier than the increase i t s e l f . 
P r o f i t has thus been o lea r ly dis t inguished froa vages, 
i n t e r e s t and rent whose de te ra lna t lon i s goremed W «i 
e n t i r e l y d i f fe ren t pr inc ip le* These are inputed values 
accruing to the productive agents according t o t h t i r 
con t r ibu t ions to the value product. P r o f i t s have also been 
dist lnguislMd from qjuasi^rents owing t o iBimobilitgr, or 
i n d i v i s i b i l i t y or i n f l e x i b i l i t y of supply in th= short run. 
They are a lso d i s t i n c t from oonopoly revenue, fliers i s a 
d i f fe rence , however, In the treatment of monopoly revenue 
by Schumpeter and Knight on (M€ hand jrd by Clark on the 
o the r . For Clark monopoly revenue i s p ro f i t of the 
entrepreneurs wl^ich the monopolists appropriate t o themselves 
by v i r t u e of the power they enjoy. Knight and Schuap^tBr 
would ratJwr impute laonopoly revenue to the sit 'oatton or 
pos i t ion respcmsible for monopoly contix>l. 
As to the re la t ionsh ip between p ro f i t s Mid the 
functions of the entr«preneur, Clark and Schuapoter regard 
p r o f i t s in sone sens* as the product or creat ion of the 
en t r ep reneur ' s a c t i v i t i e s while Knight refuses to do so, a t 
we i^aXl d lMuss l a t e r* 
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Hafing dlitingul»hed profit* fron wages, interest 
and rent and fToa •onopolf rvraiiae and quasi-rents, 
there reaains the eoapensation for risk hearing* A 
separation of this eleownti so as to Isave profits 
entireXr pure, i s attempts but not eoapleted bjr Clark 
and Sehnapeten Profit of the dTnamio eoono^r or ths 
profits of th@ innovator soerue also heoaase of th« 
entrepreneur undertaking riskjr Tenturss* The final 
purification of profit had to await Frank H, Knight 
whose theoiy we now proeted to study* 
CBAPTSR THESE 
THE rmczmAwn THEORI cr PBOFIT 
E«oiiqiii«ti hWB referred to i l i ^ and uneert&inty as 
an saqilanatlan of profit »ine« the vaiy early days. Bat Wit 
proto-t/pa of thaa« wjltorf wa« the oapltallst'-ownsr of 
anterprtsa atid thay did not olaarly dls t ingul^ li«tv«3n 
Intarast and profit* Both S«xth and Bloerdo rafe? to risk 
at a basis of tha o^itaXlst tnalnassnan's rewavds, but ^ 
rlitic tli@y aean tha rlak of loss of oapital. T«i>«HlXX 
dlstlngul^<ii tiatwa^n lnt(^ <rr3»t mA %M paya^nt for bearing 
rl»ka» bat tad also U s i t s this eonoapt to xlak of loss of 
9*pitmU^ 
I t vat not untlU von Thunan's Oar laollrta itaat thmt 
a dlstlnation was oada batvuam Insa^kbla risks and*oa t»ln 
risks, aspseially ^an$as In Taluts and tha eha?iea of failure 
of tha whola Qiitarprisa, vhlah eannot bs Insured a?alnst». 
H,V» itongoldt dealt vlth tho sams point In a aora sshaustl^a 
aann^ r^, laeli^lng in profits a prealum on those rlaks w^iich| 
dttij to tbr«lr nittarsy eoald not b« trmnsfarr^ by insuranoa 
and had to ba borne )af the sntrapr^nour Masalf.^ Th s^e 
soonomists, hoir«V€r» Ineluded lit profits ^laaants oth^T 
thm pi^ fa^nt for r l ^ taking, Thasa al«m«}nts vara va;as 
of aana^^aant and various kinds of r@nt« 
mmmmmmmmmmm'mmmmmmmaiHmmmmimitiim mitiimmmmmmm n i i n » — « — • » — • • — i i i i. m i i — w — i ii • 
t . Maa Sa l^j IHt . ^ ^ t ^ 9t ^h%i9m$ p.W|David Eiaardo, 
8. J.£».HIU« rUMlBlfif Vol. I , pp. 389-92. 
s . 7ida F,H,gBiihtt^a,gti, %OTrtatety mi yigft,lfPtM 
4« IMd, p« 8i« 
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A basic departure from t h i s appiroaeh was made by F.B, 
Rawley who saw in the * r i s k s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ' of 
business the e s s e n t i a l function of en te rpr i se Which he 
regarded as the only productive fac tor , land, labour and 
c a p i t a l being mere neans of production.^ Risks and 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s being the essence of en t e rp r i s e , p ro f i t s — 
defined as the residue a f t e r payment of wages, i n t e r e s t end 
rent to the fac tors hired or supplied by the entrepreneur — 
were the rewaid of t h i s function only. ' P r o f i t i s simply 
the pr ice paid by society for the assumption of business 
2 
r i s k s ' . 'Every business man's subject ive valuat ion of a 
r i s k I s : ;reater than h i s a c t u a r i a l va lua t ion of the same 
r i s k ' ^ because the assumption of r i s k i s iricsoae, and gives 
r i s e to t roub le , anx ie t i e s and d i s - u t i l i t i e s of various 
k inds . These oust be rewarded by a paqrment over and above 
the a c t u a r i a l value of r i s k . 
Though Hawley dis t inguished between insurable and 
non-insurabla r i s k s , he did not d i s t inguish between teeir 
compensations* Both were rewarded by p r o f i t s accruing to 
the entrepreneur, pa r t of the p r o f i t s being passed over 
t o the Insurer in ease of insured r i s k s . 
1. P,B» Hawley qpioted by Knight, o p . c i t . , p . 41 
2 . F.B.Kawleyt'The Risk Theoiy of P r o f i t ' in '^art&rpr 
imifi^l .9t %9?19BlO» July tS93, quoted by J.P.Beddyj 
P r o f i t s , p,84 Hodges Fl?5is and Co.I>ublin,1940. 
3 . Ib id . 
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A c loser exarainatton of r i s k and uncer ta in ty i s due to 
A.H.Wlllet, He showed t h a t Risk i s estimated lay applying 
the laws of chance t o the accumilated r e s u l t of pas t experienc 
I t i s an objective concept. Risk bearing c a r r i e s no extra 
reward over and above \diat i s j u s t su f f i c ien t to cofvsr the 
ac tua l losses involved. He d i s t ingu i shes uncer ta inty froa 
r i s k , uncer ta in ty being subjeotif* l a na tu re , ^ t i t i s 
c a p i t a l t h a t i s ac tua l ly involved in business unce r t a in t i e s , 
and cofflpensaticm for u n c e r t a i n ^ bearing sftiould be regarded 
as par t of I n t e r e s t , accruing t o th» orniaT of c a p i t a l . He 
1 
a l so Showed how u n c e r t a l n t i e t could be reduced by combination, 
Hawley held , however, t h a t no signif icance attached 
to a d i s t i n c t i o n between r i sk and uncer ta in ty as one could 
not ex i s t without the other and a l l u n c e r t a i n t i e s resulted in 
r i s k s , ^ In d is t inguishing between insurable and iK>n-lnsurable 
r i s k s Hawley noted t h a t the former could be known whereas 
the latdir were not subject to ca l cu l a t i ons . But he did not 
go beyond t h i s point t o consider why scaae r i sks could not be 
known and vhat was the t h e o r e t i c a l i apor t of t h i s absenoe 
of knowladge. He confines b iase l f to the conclusion that 
such unknown r i sks had t o be borne by the entreprenivr 
hifiiself who proceeded on the basis of soae est imates he 
himself made. He has some subject ive valuat ion even of the 
unknown r i s k s which form the bas i s of h i s ac t ion ,^ 
1, ? lde James P, Bcddyi Prof i t^ , pp.9S*96 
2 , I b i d , , p , 92, 
3, Tide F , H , K n l ^ t , o p . c i t , , pp.42;4A, 
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KMiaHT'S APPROACH 
This I s the point of daparture between Prank H.Knight 
aisl the Risk t h e o r i s t s vhose views \m havd br ie f ly •xanslned 
above. Knight c i l t l c i s e s these aeonoals ts for having fai led 
t o focus t h e i r a t tent lo i i cm the essence of the whole matters 
the fac t t h a t some r i s k s were indeterselnate and tmaeasarable. 
They were not known and could not be foreseen by the 
entrepreneur or aqyl^ody elS6» This absence of knowledge 
did not aecoimt only t>r the fact t h a t they could not be 
Insured against o r be reduced 1^ coabinat lan. I t gave to 
en te rp r i se i t s specia l nature fimd assigned t o the enterprineur 
h i s e s s e n t i a l funct ion. This , and no ottier element In bus i -
ness en te rpr i se was the sine caia n<m of p r o f i t s . Bearing 
neasureabla r i s k s becomes a routine ftmctlon rewarded 
according to eost caleulatl<:Mns« I t could not ola ln *th« 
uncer ta in residue ' ttiat p r o f i t s were, nor could the function 
I t s e l f he character ised as e n t e r p r i s e . I t was t rue uncertalnt 
— as K n l ^ t defined uniaeasur-^able unforeseen r i sks — \Alch 
gave r i s e to res idua l Incomes lAilch could accrue t o those 
whose function lay In bearing uncer ta in ty . 
This chapter w i l l be devoted t o an examination of 
Knight ' s views. We asay note here in passing tha t Wlllet 
came c loser to t h i s pos i t ion when he ascribed unce r t a in t i e s 
to chances Involving lack of knowledge. But he then 
confused the I s a i e by re la t ing uncer ta in ty bearing with 
c a p i t a l aaa looking a t a pa r t of In t e r e s t as Itt^ compensation. 
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For the fact rwaaini tha t no cowponsatlon 1» posalbl* for 
what I s neither knovct nor unknowable. Furtheiaore,treating 
coapensatlon of «ac©rtalntyh©arlng as a part of in te res t 
on capi tal lapl ies the concept of a definite and regular 
s t r e w of ineoBS **** & 4:K>neept to vhleh prof i ts do not 
oonfofBU 
fhms we find that thonghy like the dynamic theories 
revlswed ea r l i e r , the Risk theories of profit brought the 
dlsottssion OB the subjeet into the area to wMc^ i t belonged 
I t s t i l l remained to disentai^le I t form a nunbor of 
elrouBStanees not geooinely related with i t* 
In presenting Knight's theory and reviewing i t , otir 
s tar t ing point Is a closer examination of the ritks involved 
In enterprise. Our proto-type i s the basinssaman who hires 
a l l productive services other than his own entrepreneurial 
a b i l i t i e s on the basis of definite contracts stipulating 
fixed pajnients to tha owners of these services* These 
iK>mmitments along with the cost of raw material add up to a 
defini te amount which wi l l be the to ta l costs he wi l l incur 
before he brings h is product in the maxket for sale* The 
product wil l be sold at the price then ruling in the 
(competitive) market* ^y their sale he will realise some 
amount as his t o t a l revenue* Depending on whether and to 
what extent the t o t a l revenue exceeds or fa l l s adiort of the 
t o t a l costs the entrepreneur wi l l earn profi ts or incur losses. 
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There are a otuiber of clreufflstancos attandlng upon 
the e n t e r p r i s e . F i r s t of a l l there are the tech ' i ica l 
aspects of production requir ing combination of r a r l ms means 
of producticsi in su i t ab le proport ions for obtaining the 
desired product Kith the desired i jaal l ty, in the da sired 
quant i ty , a t the desired point of time, deneral ly the 
entrepreneur w i l l have auiaquate knowledge In these respec ts , 
or w i l l have hired the services of men who possess the 
necessary know-how* An elesent of uncer ta in ty enters in 
re lying upon h i s own capacity to d i r e c t production or in 
s e l e c t ! g the proper man to do so* lileaents of uncertainty 
increase i f the production process Involves soae innovation. 
I f a new jood i s being produced, or a new method of producing 
soaething has been adopted, or the old, well t r i ed out 
processes have been modlfldd to a i^ ex ten t , the r-^sults beeoiae 
uncertain* The physical output of the new teehrdque may 
or may not be what the entrepreneur es t ina ted i t to be. The 
entrepreneur I s producing in the l i gh t of def ic ien t 
knowledge* There I s uncer ta in ty , and he i s taking the r i sk 
of the physical outcome of production turning out to be 
l e s s than what he expects i t to be* 
Secondly thera i s a danger t h a t f i r e or soae other 
aeoidant may destroy or daaage soae of the asse t s of the 
e n t e r p r i s e . Certain i n d u s t r i e s l ike g la s s works, crockery 
aanufac turers , e t c . , face the p o s s i b i l i t y of breakage of 
scm^ finished goods or goods in process . There i s no method 
of ascer ta in ing whether such accidents w i l l take place or not , 
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and I f thdjT take pXaee wliat w i l l he the exact aaount of 
danage th©/ would causa* But the entrepreneur has ni-vertha-
l e s s to take such p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n to account while es t l aa t in ' , 
h i s expected t o t a l revenuei and aaking f inancia l co^smltments 
t o the contract ing pa r t i e s* 
Last i s the uncer ta in ty attached t o the prlca at wMdft 
the product w i l l s e l l vfeen i t i s b r o u ^ t i n the market. This 
pr ice w i l l be decisive^along with the t o t a l volume of s a l e s , 
I n dQteralnlng the gross revenue of the enterprisa* While 
there I s no way of knowing what exact ly t h i s pr ice wil l be, 
the antrepreneur aus t make scMie est imate of th« future price 
of the goods \^ose production he i s undertaking* For i t i s 
only in the l l i h t of h i s an t ic ipa ted revenue t h a t he can 
plan h i s e n t e r p r i s e , lB»r?ain with the owners of productive 
serv ices and make d e f i n i t e f inanc ia l ccxnaltments to them. 
The process of productlcai extends over t ime, find the only 
p r ices whicfii he can know with ce r t a iu ty are the past ones and 
those rul ing i n the prssent* In case of new i?oods av«n th i s 
much guidance i s not avai lable* Whatever guidance there i s 
does n#i help much as the c o n d l t i t ^ t of demand and supply 
deteiiEilnlBg the pr ice ajle subject to change* 
Thare are also a number of other circumstances lltai 
^he u n c e r t a i n t i e s regarding pr ices of the raw mate r ia l s , or 
some of those productive services which are not hired on 
long term b a s i s , which make the magnitude of t o t a l cost 
uncertain* But these and the o ther re levant clrcimstances 
can eas i ly be subsumed under one of the three types mentioned 
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above and do not pose any new t h e o r e t i c a l prolalem jns t i l y ing 
separate conslde r a t i can* (^r purposes are adequately served 
lay a review of the three typ ica l ol ream stances l i s t e d above. 
Star t lT^ with the second type of uncar ta ln t l a s i t 
can eas i ly be seen t h a t t h e i r imture ada l t s of e l la ina t ion 
lay consolidat ion e i t h e r toy an i n s u r e r , as In casa of loss 
due t o f i r e , ar by the Qntraprsneur himself, as in case of 
breakage of crockery, etc* S t a t i s t i c a l probabi l i ty 
ca lcu la t ions de te ' t i ine , on the bas i s of past .records, 
with a f a i r degree of accuracy, the chances of such events 
taking p lace .^ I t eaa never be predicted whether a 
p a r t i c u l a r plant w i l l be destroyed by f i r e in a pa r t i cu l a r 
yea r , ye t ths insurer can know how aany p lan t s out of the 
very large number of s imi la r p lants he i s insuring are 
l i k e l y to be affected, and the aiaigin of e r ror in t h i s l i k e -
lihood can be ca lcu la ted . S t a t i s t i c a l p robaMll ty 
ca lcu la t ions are possible where a su f f i c i en t ly large nimber 
of s imi lar ins tances ar€ ava i l ab l e . After some st^^y to 
ensure tha t the present Instance shares a good nccibar of 
fea tures with the ins tances comprising the past records t h i s 
one i s then counted as one amongst many cons t i tu t ing a large 
group in which the incidence of f i r e or oth^r accidents can be 
1, F.H. Knight, o p . d t . , pp. 249-252. 
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calcula ted aad the cictent of tha resu l t ing losses assessed. 
This ia the a d a n t l f l c \m.sis for Hrssurance' whid^, dealing 
with larga groups caa taka over the r i sk of a pa r t i cu la r 
accident taking place in a p a r t i c u l a r firm, in return for 
some compensation which together with s i a d l a r coapenuaticms 
obtained from others would co tcr the losses of thostj ffismbers 
of the group i4ko are a c tua l : ^ afi acted and lea re the insurer 
h i s rewards as well* Sometines such groi;qping i s possible 
for the entrepreneur h i a s e l f as in case of r i sk ox loss due 
to breakage, on the bas is of past esqperience, f luc tua t ions 
i n ac tua l incidence being taken care of by a fund set aside 
for tills purpose* The essence of such ins tances i s th t , 
though the outcome for one individual of the grot^ in 
unce r t a in , for the whole group of ins tances i t beoooes cer ta in 
and can be known* As a resu l t the uncer ta inty due to t h i s 
circumstance i s eliminated and the r i s k s involved mat by 
incuring a de f in i t e cost* 
The type of uncertainIqr l a s t aentioned i s , however, 
e n t i r e l y d i f f e r n t in nature* No s t a t i s t i c a l probabi l i ty 
ca lcu la t ions are possible as regards what the market pr ice 
of a commodity sha l l be a t a future date* Conditions on i^ ieh 
the determination of t h a t p r ice depends include such changing 
circumstances as the incomes and t a s t e s oi the ccmsumers, 
p r i ce s of competitive and complementary goods, t o t a l supply 
of the coi^odi ty in the market and such macro*e<K3nomlc 
v a r i a b l e s as the supply of aoiay, the ra te of i n t e r e s t , tha 
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l eve l of na t iona l incoma and aiaploTiaent, e t c . I t I s not 
poss ib le to foPBSes what the Ijaharlour of these va r i ab les 
w i l l be and corapare i t with s l a l l a r s - t of clrctuBStances in 
ths pas t . Bach market s i t ua t ion i s unique and no grcwplcg i s 
poss ib l e . The entTepreneux'» own past sxpar ierca , tiVan i f i t 
re la ted t o the production of ths sama coamodity, wi l l f a i l , 
un les s s t a t i c condit ions are assumed, to sarve as a gUide 
in view of the ehangiag c i rcuaatanoes , ''so insurer can take 
over the r i sk Involved in tha antrspranaur* s axpactatlons 
ro yarding future pr ice as he would not g«t a su f f ic ien t ly 
la rge niMBbar of s i n i l a r r i s k - s i t u a t i o n s to foira a group. 
S t a t i s t i c a l p robab i l i ty ca lcu la t ions are possible only when 
a large grtsup of hoo|||ip|ieou8 or near hooiogenaous oases are 
ava i l ab l e . Such homogeneity i s not ava i lab le In pr ice 
expectation phase of business ^ i t e r p r i s s . 
The sane i s t rue of the uncer ta in ty surrounding 
innovations in production. Past experience i s not a 
suf f ic ien t ?uide to ac t ion ^ e n naw a at hods of production 
arfl bglng t r i e d . Ths r i sk t h a t the physical outcome of the 
new method a l ^ t be l e s s than what the innovator eicpects 
i t to b<=? cannot by eliminated by consolidaticRi as no -jrouplng 
i s poss l ' j l s , aach act of innovation bglng unices . 
I n cer ta in spee l f ie i n d u s t r i e s p r i ce forccaat 
s i t u a t i o n s aa / a d a l t , to soi^ ex tent , of e l in lna t ion of 
anoar ta in ty through groupiq^ ^ ^ *^**^ est imat ion, beeause 
t h e i r na ture makers t ^ e i r pas t reeord more helpful than i s 
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the ease \d.th other indust i los . But tMs I s neither 
generally ths case with econcaalc anterprlsa nor vsry 
yelevant to a study of profit* Follorwlng Kni^Jht, therefore, 
ve shall only hote the possibi l i ty and th» role that 
'prcKnoters* and specRilator* play in th i s regard, ' and pass 
on to consider tha oore Important probl^n of the l ap l l ca t i a i s 
of true uncertainty ii^c& cannot be eligdnated* 
Knight reserves th« term *tinc€rtainty* for such 
s i tua t ions , ch&racterislnis! as r isks a l l those uncartalr t les 
which can be ell#lBated by consolidation or speciallp.v t ' m 
and thus transformed into ' c e r t a i n t i e s ' so far as the 
individual entrepreneur i s concerned* The econoialc 
significance of th i s dist inction l i a s in the fact that 
r i sks can be borne by Inouring a definite cost and do not 
ca l l for exercise of judgement involTin* assunption of 
responsi l l l t y of the consequences, whereas truly uncertain 
s i tuat ions necessitate exercise of Judgsiaent involving 
responsibil i ty of consequences which are v i t a l for the 
in te res t s of tha ai trspraneur* Oniy the l a t t e r are really 
iBportant for thB entropr^neur and ralove-nt to the theory of 
profit* Hisk baailng stwids at the samo footing as the 
procureisint of capital and otiier productive services on 
contractual basis and i s therefore a problem ftar maaiag eiaent 
acKi not ^ntripreneurship. I t i s therefore into the n&turt 
of uncertainty that vs must probe further* 
1* F*H*KnlShtt op.Olt*, pp* 256*260* 
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IWlTimE; OF tmCBHTAINTI 
I t follows fioa the above d iseass lon t h a t InvolVGinent 
of future I s a necaasaiy condition for uncer ta in ty to a r i s e . 
The present ean t» known — ag far as himan knowlodfje can 
go. I t I s only the processes axtending over time Into the 
future that: e r aa t s s i t ua t i ons wh^re knowledge I s al>Sdnt 
or def le lent* 
The second necessary feature of uncer ta in s i t ua t ions 
I s (ftiange» I f the future was a m&f r epe t i t i on or perpetua-
tion of the present no unce r t a in t t e s would a r i se .knowledge 
of the present would be applied t o the events to be in future 
and act ion taken accordingly. 
I t i s also neeessaiy ^ a t the change Is m t known. 
For a known change would only c a l l for c e r t a in adaptations 
in present behaviour. A knowledge of the laws foveming 
the change does the same as the knowledge of the change 
I t s e l f . Uncertainty requi res jftgli qt )mgvlS^«fl regarding 
the change and ttie laws governing the ehaaga* 
A fourth feature of tmcertaln s i tua t ions i s tha t the 
type of changes taking place are unique in the s n»e of 
not being Iden t i ca l with or veiy s t e l l a r to those which 
have taken place in the p a s t . I t I s t h i s feature which 
ru l e s out e l l i j lnat ion of uncer ta in ty bgr grouping and 
def ies probabi l i ty ca l cu l a t i ons . All uncer ta in s i tua t ion 
need no t , howeveri be per fec t ly unique. The degrae of 
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unlqiueness Yariea tiweraely with the txtent of similarity 
and the degrae of uncertalnlqr depends on the degree of 
uaiqaeness. 
Lastly, an utieertala situation can remain uncertain 
only i f i t i s not aantrol lable. I f the entrepreneur can 
control the auteome of an event, even though i t i s uncertain, 
he wil l do so,thus peaovin? a l l unceptaintiea. 
These flTe features of futur i ty , diangs, absence of 
knowledge, uniqueness and une(mtroll&bility a ^ e an event 
t ru ly uncertain* And a l l t ru ly uncertain events eihibl t 
each ons of these features* Of these the feature of 
uniqueness i s of special significance as i t i s the one 
distinguishing uncertain situations froia risky situations* 
We have noted above that an uncertain event may be less 
than perfectly toklepic* Vf« may further note that the degree 
of uniq[ueness of an event i s also subject to some Banl-
pulation through specialisation in handling stt<ai events and 
through handling then in large eoablnations. Though they 
are not subject to probability calculations, Intui t ion, 
in te l l igen t guess and experience gained through t r i a l and 
error do play an iaq;>ortant role in nee ting sudh si tuat ions. 
To the extent the imique situaticHis ^ a t an entrepreneur 
ffieets exhibit some s i a i l a r i t y with other unique situations 
that he has already come accross, he i s able to make further 
progress in reducing tiie uncertainty involved. Large scala 
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badness entarprises^ Qspeoially those with a long past 
aad great store of acciwulated experience, are In a better 
position to do 80* Modern eecmaray has produced ins t l tu t iwis 
which specialise in dealing with such situations lay taking 
over the task of deal i t^ with t h ^ froa a large nunbftr of 
entrepreneurs, thus enjoying th« advantage of dealing with 
a large number of unique yet to soae extent s in i l a r , 
s i tuat ions . The ac t iv i t i s s of the speculators, especially 
the hed?in? corttract, the taking over of the function of 
aariceting, and the business of promotion «ay be cited in 
th i s connection,' Iliase inst l tut icais , though different in 
2 
nature from the ins t i tu t ion of insurance, enable the 
entrepreneur to transfer some uncertainties to be met by 
experts, thus reducing at a definite cost the uncertainties 
Which he himself wil l have to Bset. Two points arust, however, 
be noted here. F i rs t ly ttiat th i s transfer i s i t s e l f a 
judgaaent in face of uncertainty and the cost involved has 
to be balanced e^ainst the consequ^ces of bearing these 
uncertaint ies d i rect ly . In a ccwpetltlve enterpriss th is i s 
an laportant consideration* Secondly the scope of transferring 
uncertaint ies in t ids '.aanner i s , a t best, limited, and there 
remain soae other t ruly uncertain situations which the 
entrepreneur must handle di rect ly . 
1, F.H, Knight, o p . d t . , po. 2»5-28«, 
2, Ib id . , p ), 298-209. 
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In wbat follovs we shall consider these untransferable 
uneertalnties and ignore the rest in the taie aanner in 
vhleh ve have decided to ignore r i sks . Our entrepreneur has, 
thereforei to face sueh uncertainties which besides the 
features l i s ted above, have the additional feature of not 
lieing transferable to spec ia l i s t s . 
KSiiTIIIQ UJfCEBTAI^ Tt 
To a persons who wants to aalce HKme/ two alternatives 
are available in a CfMipetitive eeonoaqri either he se l l s his 
services in the aaxi^et or he assumes the role of an ontre" 
preneur* la preferring the l a t t e r over the former alternative 
the entrepreneur deliber&teljr foregoes a certain income in 
favour of an uncertain one. This In^olvds exercise of 
Judgement regarding h is own a b i l i t i e s and the raaiket 
opportimitie*! e tc; Implies a degree of self-confidence and 
courage and mafeas the entreprensrtir l iable to loss in case 
the actual earnings frcm enterprise are less than the price 
of Ms services in the aarlcet* The decision taken, he has 
to choose between vapiotts l ines of act ivi ty and plan h i s 
project with respect to t i oe , place, scale of operation etc. 
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kXl these deolsiona are direeted towards the one obJeetiTe 
of BaxlBislni his net revaauei are based on soae expeetatlans 
and have a l l the features of uaeertaiiity listed above, 
generalXjf speaking* 
HaTing passed through these in i t i a l stages and 
started upMi the aetnal t a ^ of oi^anising; production the 
antreprenenr i s now faee to faoe with the type of elreuns-
tanoes deseribed earlier* For analysing the meeting of 
uncertainties \^ the entrepreneur ve shall pidc up an 
instance f^oa out of these eircttmstanodS rather than those 
mentioned in the aboT« paragrai^ beoause these are more 
typieal* In essence al l unsartain situations exhibiting 
the features of uiiL(|aeness and unti^nsferability pose the 
same type of probl^s and an analysis of I^v one situatioa 
i s handled applied to a l l the other situations* 
The incoae of the entrepreneur i s the difference 
between total revenue and t^tal costs* We have seen above 
how teehnieal uneertalntles (those relating to the 
plqrslcal product and belonging to the process of production) 
and market uncertainties (those relating to the future price 
of the product and volume of sale) attand upcm the entre-
prenaur's effort to orjfcanise his enterprise with a vi™w to 
maximising this revenue* Concentrating our attention on the 
uncertainty attaching to the future price of the product, 
we have noted that the entrepreneur omst make «»me estimate 
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rtgardlng i t td Ira abXa to laaice flnanelal ooamltaents to 
tiM ovnars of th i prodootlve »errlc«s h» I s hiring* Th« 
proble« beferQ ut aov l s ( in doing so what exactly Is ha 
doing and how does h« do i t ? 
Th© only way we can describe %*iat the entPcpreneur 
does in making an estimate of the futurs mailcet price of 
h i s product i s that he cxerelsas h i s judgeaenfc* He has no 
ground to apply probability ealoiaations. Ha has a 
knowledge of the present price, and the conditions of 
supply and demand datdrminii^ i t* He also knows how the 
price has behaired in ths past and how t h i s behaviour has 
been a rasultssit of changes in supply and demand and other 
relevant variables* But ha does not know j^w these 
variables are going to diange between the present and the 
time his products w i l l enter the market* Ha can at best 
make a guess* Perhaps the past indicates the range of 
fluctuaticma in the future* May be i t goes beyond that 
range* drawing i^on a l l h i s experiences, benefitting 
fKHi i^atever additional guidance i s available from other 
quarters, exercising h i s imagination, consulting his 
intuit ion coid lAiat not, ha nevertheless does make an 
estimate* 
How does ha do so? Can we analyse the workii^ of the 
eatrtjpfanaur's mind in spacifyiug the expected future price? 
And i s i t imparative or even proper for QContMiic theory 
to do so? 
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The las t OB0 i f a t l ek l l sh question, to bt considered 
at a l a ter 8tag«» A a to the main ciaestlan Knigl t does not 
go beyond making aoiie general obsarratioas, but later 
eontrlbations have gima s a ^ deeper into the problem, \U 
shall note thfl oontxlbittlais of l.L.S«Shackl« said others in 
the iiffxt eha|>ter« 
In spaoliying as the future price of Ms product a 
definite value, he has to re^eot alternative bypotheaes 
which suggested themselves as possible as t iaates . Soma 
of t h s sa night have appeared aore proatlslng In viev of the 
cost astlauitaf basod on the max^et price of the productive 
servieas to bs hired* But perhaps they are unlikely to 
aaterla l l sa* Some other hypothataa would have bean 
safer to assuoe but they would have hardly l e f t enough 
aai^ln, In view of the present eost est lBatas , to give hia 
sone Incentive to action* Thus the actual est iaate i s 
a result of balancing between the likelihood and attractive-
ness of the possible astiaates* 'Henea i t i s oorr^et to 
treat a l l Instances of eoonomle uncertainty as cases of 
choice between.mailer reward aore confidently and a lai^e 
one l e s s confidently anticipated',^ 
Hen di f fer In temperament, and t h i s ciholce w i l l be 
aade by each <me according to his taste* Wo rules can 
be laid down as regards the balancing of likelihood and 
1* f,H, Knight, op .e l t* , p* 23T. 
7T 
attractiYeness ty Qntrspraneurs, as eadh individual wi l l 
have h i s ovn incl inations which aay, and do, d i f fer widely 
from those of the others* 
Once a definite est inate i s made about the future 
price of th« product, t h i s , along with similar est inates 
of other unoartaia variables sueh as the VO1UB@ of sa le , 
w i l l c learly define the expected to ta l revenue. The 
prices of the productive services , as also those of the 
raw material, are, for tha individual entrepreneur, fixed 
in a eonpetitive aarket* The entrepreneur w i l l a)ntinu!i 
h i s a c t i v i t i e s i f he finds the difference between the 
expected tota l revenue and the Imoim t o t a l cost worth it« 
This Introduces the other iaportant aspect of Beeting 
uncertainty, besides the exercise of judgment described 
above! assumption of rasponsibll l ty,^ The sntrepraneur 
assun^es tha responsibl l i l^ of the eonsac|aences of the 
actual t o t a l reveime turning out to be l e s s than expected. 
The items of cost are a l l def in i te ly fixed and their payaent 
to the contracting part ies guaranteed* Thase obligations 
have to be aet whatever the outgone of the enterprise* The 
entrepreneur w i l l have to bear losses in ease the tota l 
TBwmwBk& actually turns out to be l e s s ^ a n these fixed 
contractual payaents* I t i s th i s responsibi l i ty which he 
1« F.H* K n l ^ t , op .e i t* , p* 276* 
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assRimes* Exsreise of Judgemeat in an uoeertali i s i t uu t lon , 
which means in t h i s case estimating an uncertain va lue , i s 
l i a b l e to e r r o r , and the entrepreneur baeones rasponsible 
for t h i oonsecfaences of s u ^ a n error* 
I t i s a responsihiXitjr ifiich only the entrepr-neur 
eo'ild asmuBd due t o h i s s t r a t e g i c pos i t ion in en t r ep r i sa 
Of the two elements of a a e t i i ^ uneertaintgr "^ jud^emant 
and re8p4ns ih i l i t f — i t i s the assumption of respons ib i l i ty 
which i s of c ruc i a l importanee. I t s importance i s based on 
two f a c t s . F i r s t l y , whereas the exercise of judgement can be 
delegated %gr the entrepreneur to a saladed manager or some 
hired agency, the a smapt ida of i ^ spons ib i l i t y cannot be 
so de]£ ?,ated. Secondly, with the l i a b i l i t y t o losses ^oes 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of earning p r o f i t s — the special incoiM 
of the entrepreneur* Both these foots recfuir© careful 
considera t ion. 
JTJDGiliJHT AKD RESPOlTSlBILITy 
The two e laoents of meeting uncer ta in ty d i f fe r in 
t h e i r nature* While exercise of Judgement requires ons set 
of a b i l i t i e s and q u a l i t i e s , assumption of respons ib i l i ty 
r equ i res not only self-confidence and wl l l i r^nass but a lso 
the eapaoity to assume l i a b i l i t y to losses* I t requires 
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• • a n s t o Be«t ob l iga t ions i n eaa« of Xossat or f a i l u r e . 
Hesponsibil i ty eannot be asmimed without ownership,^ 
Beeause of t h i s dafference in na tur , i t i s 
poss ible t o separate thera. Taking decis ions in un-
c e r t a i n s i t uaUons becomes separated as control of enterpr ise 
while the assusiption of r e spons ib i l i t y c l ings to the owner-
entrepreneur* The decision-maker-COntroler exercises 
Judgements imd makes est imates regarding; uncertain values 
but asauass no r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , Th«i ert^epreneur i s l i ab l e 
to loss due t o e r r o r s in judgement by the mana^.er t o whon 
cont ro l has been delegated. This does not , however, mean 
t h a t the entrepreneur exerc ises no judgement at a l l . His 
decision to delegate cont ro l , based as i t i s on h i s es t ioa te 
t h a t the manager i s a b e t t e r judge, or/and can devote nore 
t i » e to the problen, i s i t s e l f a najor decision in face 
of uncerti^inty. Knight has elaborated a t soae length upon 
the theme t h a t en t repreneur ia l judgements are mainly 
jud^e»:ients ra^a iling seleeticm of other men t o make 
2 
j udgment s . The assumption of u l t imate r e spons ib i l i ty 
which i s the •ssence of tiie function of entrepreneur i s , 
t he re fo re , ina l ienably coupled with exercise of judgemant 
in face of uncer ta in ty , 
1, Knight, o p . c i t , , p , 309 and pp, e90{S06, 
2 , Knl?ht, o p . c i t , , pp 291-92 and pp,310-11, 
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HATtJRE OF PHOPIT A!ID LOSS 
While an examlaatlcoi of %rtiat fac tors oor^tribut? 
towards an onterpr lse resu l t ing In p ro f i t or loss shal l be 
taken up l a t e r , i t i s now c l ea r how they a r i s e , *^ e have 
seen in the previous chapter how coinpstltlve forces would 
equal ise cos ts with revenues i f uncer ta in ty was ahsen% 
tUM the scene. Pr ices of ths productive services would 
than be ecjual to t h e i r known mai^lnal revenue p roduc t iv i t i e s 
leaving no res idue, A residue occurs only because absence 
of knowledge ru les out such a p o s s i b i l i t y , low we nay 
fur ther note tha t losses a r i se due to the entrepreneur 
erroneously aaking a h i t h e r estimate of the t o t a l revenue 
than i t ac tua l ly turns out to be, S l a l l a r l y , p ro f i t s accrue 
because of the correc tness of h i s estimate that th^ t o t a l 
revenue w i l l be higher than the t o t a l c o s t . But for such 
an estiJMte he would n e i t h e r have ^indertaken the enterpr ise 
nor assumed the r e spons ib i l i t y of l o s s . The p o s s i b i l i t y of 
p r o f i t or l o s s , t he re fo re , i s due t o the existence of 
unce r t a in ty . Their ac tua l accrual t o him i s due to the 
fact tha t the antrapreneur bears t h i s uncer ta in ty . How far 
t h e i r magnitude depends on the way he bears i t , we sha l l 
see l a t e r . 
I t i s to the entrepreneur tha t parofits accrue, Bf 
t h i s we mean thu t hs finds himself in possession of e 
Kirplus in ease the ac tua l revenue i s more than the cos t s 
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ha had Ineurredi* I t I s the saae with l o s s e s . I t i s a lef t-
over, pos i t ive or nega t ive , frcM out of the t o t a l revenue 
a f t e r a l l eont rae tual elaims have been met. 
sirccEss IV HiimK^ jmiEmnmn 
The entr«pr»3neur l a regarded as having bean successful 
I n meeting uncer ta in ty If h i s t o t a l revenue tu rns out to 
be l a z i e r than t o t a l cos t s . He i s regarded as having 
fa i led i f the case i s othervlsa* His ac tua l behsnriour in 
carrying cm the production process i s based on the an t ic ipa-
t ion tha t revenue w i l l be l a rge r than cos ts ; but he I s not 
qui te c e r t a in as to hov much l a rge r i t w i l l be* I t i s 
reasonable t o assume tha t ejq;>ectation of larg^^r and la rger 
1 
gains are held v i t h vaa l l e r and smaller degrees of confidence, 
The degree of suoeese can be measured by the magnitude of 
the gain but very la rge gains or 3ASS«S having been very 
l i t t l e expected should, properly speaking, be c lass i f ied as 
windfa l l s , ind ica t ing fo r tu i tous circumstances ra the r than 
exceptional ingenuity or i t s lack on the par t of the 
1» Knight, op . c i t * , p . 237. 
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«ntraprenaur* Windfall gains or losses can hardly be 
treated as an Index of entpepreneurtal ability in aeetlng 
tttieertaiaty* 
This provides a elue to the faetors contrilmting 
towards suoeess in uaeertainty bearing* Tha foreaost 
aaons these are l^ose qualities of heart and mind n^i^ 
make for better Judgements in uncertain sitaatlcms. 
Knowledge, experience, imagination and foresightjcapacity 
of taking decisions and executing them and the capacity 
to do i t <piiokly$ and sk i l l in interpreting the circumstances 
and adapting aeti<:Hi to suit thaa| are some of these 
qualities* A suitable tempraaent, confidence in one's 
own Jud ,^em8nt| ability to assume responsibility and the 
villingness to do so are also of crucial importance. The 
more talented the entrepreneur i s in these respects the 
more successful he i s likely to be,' 
Bat i t i s not only the absolute degree of these 
attributes in the indiTldual entrepreneur that matters. 
His relat i ts position v i s a v is the other competing 
entrepreneurs i s what i s really important. Enterprise i s 
a competitive affair, and one*s success in a competltiye 
eeoacMsy depends on the abi l i t ies of others too. CHaly the 
one with a high degree of entrepreneurial abi l i t ies can 
1. F.H. Knight, op .c i t . , pp. 240~43, 
2. Ibid. , p. 281. 
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aehl«re saec«ss If otiier entroprsneurs are also highly 
gifted. Where others have relat ively less foresight and 
inferior faculty of jadgaisent eren the nedlocre nay excell. 
I f the eeonoBjy i s rich in entrepreneurs with a high degree 
of entrepreneurial a b i l i t i e t the demands of success are far 
mora exsusting than in the c^positc ease, Vftiosi there i s a 
dearth of sen with ideas and in i t i a t ive and sound Judgment, 
tha road to sue^ ess I s easier , 
The individual entrepreneur i s not ooapetini with 
the oiHiT entrepreneurs only. Prices of productive 
services are fixed in the mai^iet hy 1>argaining between 
entrepreneurs and owners of the productive services. In 
d^Eianding productive services entrepreneurs «re guided 
by their estimates about the marginal revenue productivities 
of t t^se services^ while the owners of these services are 
guided \3sr the i r own estimates of what the entrepreneurs can 
pay. If the general e l inate i s too optiadst ic the marginal 
anticipation of entrepreneurs as a group of these revenue-
products wi l l be h i ^ fixing high prices on productive 
services,^ If the level of expectations i s aore r e a l i s t i c , 
prices offered wil l be eoaparatively lower. The estimates 
made by the owners of productive services involve the i r 
faculty of forecasting uncertaiB values, and wil l be closer 
to or farther r^aoved from the actual values of the objects 
1. F.H, Knisht, op#ci t , , pp.873-t6 and p, 309, 
2^ , I b id , , p, 885, 
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of forecast dep«ndlng upon the i r a b i l i t i e s . 
As the prices of productive services are deterained 
in the market, l ike any other pr ices , ly demand and 
sopply, the relat ive strength of denand for and supply of 
productive services playa an important role, along with 
the a b i l i t i e s in foreaasting and the level of expectations 
discussed above* 
With referwiee to aay given estimate of the future 
prices of his products by the entrepreneur, the chances 
of success are greater the lower the mallet prices of the 
productive services, The factors entering into the 
determination of these prices have, therefore, a direct 
bearing upon the success of the entrepreneur in meeting 
uncertainty, Yet these factors are not at the sarae footing 
as the entrepreneurial a b i l i t i e s i n t he i r contribution 
tovards sueeess. These factors provide more favourable or 
l e ss favourable conditions and the entrepreneurial ab i l i t i e s 
are exercised in these conditions, (Viven the relative 
strength of demand for and supply of productive services cmd 
the a b i l i t i e s of the owners of these services, as also of t l» 
r iva l entrepreneurs, i t i s the individual entr preneur's own 
powers and facult ies t^deh make for success or fai lure. 
Lastly we must mention luck or sheer chance as a factor 
1 
accounting for success or fai lure in ^ t e r p r i s e , ^o analysis 
1, F.H, Knii^ht, op»cit», pp.asao'SS, 
as 
of this factor i s possible* but the evldenee In favour of 
Its inportanee i s too oTervhelaing to be Ignored, Luck najr 
rectliy errors of jadgemeat, or lead aen to hit at the right 
targets In vays which are not alvajTS imderstandable* 
Once tha entrepreneur bas aade an estlaats of the 
fatnre prices of his product ( or of bl« total reventie) his 
saeeess depends on lAiat this price ( ot total reYeniis) 
actually turns out to be, fhe factors deteradnlng the 
actual magnitudes of the forecasted values night seem, 
therefore, to be relevant to our discussion. But t h i s 
Is not true* I t i s these veiy factors %rhose behaviour 
the entrepreneur tr ies to foresee* What i s relevant for 
us i s h is ability to foresee thea correctly, not the 
factors as such. They would be (|aite unimportant were i t 
possible to forecast them with certainty. For competition 
would then bring costs into e<iaalitr witai prices. It i s 
only the inability of the entrepreneurs and the owners of 
productive services to foresee them correctly that gives 
rise to profits and losses. 
THE MAQNITUDE OF PBOFITS 
Tlie entrepreneur's Income being of the nature of 
a 'residual* or * left-over* after contractual payments 
are mwie out of the actual reveme, an encpiiry into what 
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detemlnes i t s magziiiude ean prooead only indlreetly 
*\iy iaqalring into the forces which determine the fixed 
Incoaes in relatlOTi to the whole product of an enterprise 
or of society'*^ The essence of Knight's analysis of these 
forces has already been presented above* I t remains to see 
how he applies the supply and demand apparatus to the 
detezTslnatlon of the magnitude of profits ^ f irst studying 
the detenlnatlon of the prices of productive services* 
These prices are determined Isgr demaiid and supply,the 
demanders being the entrepreneurs* *^he demasid for a 
productive service depends upon the steepness of the curve 
of dlBlnlshln^ returns frcMi Increasing amounts of other 
kinds of xervloet applied to the l l r s t ••• there Is 
evidently a lav of dlalnlshlng returns governing the 
combination of productive services with entrepreneurs* It 
Is based on the fact already stated of l iaitatlon In the 
space range of foresight and executive capadLty* The 
greater the magnitude of operatlcms whl^ a^ y sln^ l^e Individ-
ual atterfipts to dlreet the less effective in general he will 
be — • beyond a certain point*, as In other eases of the 
law« The demand for entrepreneurs, a^aln, like that for 
any productive agency, depends directly upon the supply of 
other agencies** Speaking of t^e * supply of entrepreneuis' 
1. F.H* Knight, op*cit*, p. SdO* 
2» Ibid*, p* t82« 
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on i^ioh thB denani for produetlv* services depands, Knight 
Mentions a b i l i t y , wil l ingness and s e l f corfldenee, e t c . , us 
the aleaents involved, fhen he concludes that 'The eonditlcn 
foi large profits i s a narrowly l i a i t ed supply of high grade 
ab i l i ty with a low general level of i n i t i a t i v e as well as 
abi l i ty'*^ And thats *fhe divis ion of social ineoae between 
prof i ts and contractual ineoae then depends on the supply of 
entrepreneurial ab i l i t y in tb& society and the rapidity of 
diminishing returns froa (other fMtors applied to ) i t , the 
s ize of the profit share increasing as ths supply of abi l i ty 
i s saal l and as the returns diainish aore rapidly'. 
As prof i ts depend on what the prices of the productive 
services are, «id these are detenained by demand and supply, 
we can, interpreting the supply of productive services as 
the deaand for entrepreneurs oad the deaand for productive 
services as the supply of entrepreneurs^ say that profits 
are deterained by the supply of and domand for entrepeneurs. 
The nature of t^is a n s l / s i s demands t^at the thing date mined 
i s , l ike a l l prices determined by demand and supply, a unifora 
rate applicable to a l l entrepreneurs* Knight h iase l f speaks 
of the 'general rate of profit' in t h i s context. But he 
i s quite unambiguous i n laying down that different 
1, I b i d . , p. 284, 
2 . I b i d . , pp, 284*85, 
3 . I b i d . , pp. 282-*83. 
4 , I b i d , , p, 284, 
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tntrepreneurs earn different Inooaes dep«tiiilng upon their 
a b l l i t i e * and the r«latiT« learclty or ateundance of entrepre-
neurs in the •eon<»gr*^ The v^Tf nature of pxx>fits as an 
uncertain residue excludes the poss iMl i ty of a unifom rate 
being established. This i s why the va l id i ty of applying 
the supply and demand analysis to the determination of 
prof i t s has been challanged by coapetent c r i t i c s , as VB 
shal l note below* Knight does not discuss the contradiction 
irarolved in h i s analysis* He i s , however, on surer grounds 
when he generalises regarding the share of profit or i t « 
sise^ as in the passage (|tiot«d above. 
To obtain ttie rate of profit percent per time unit , 
relating the residue to the funds invested in the enterprise 
and taking the t ine period involved into account,is j u s t i f L ^ 
in view of the relation tSiese two factors — funds imrestad 
and time -— bear to uncertainty* It i s reasonable to assuiae 
that the more distant the date for which forecasts are nade 
2 
the greater w i l l be the uncertainty involved* Then as the 
aain object of forecast i s the price per unit of the product 
ai^ deviaticxi of i t s actual fr<»i the estlaated value w i l l 
get BRiltiplied by the to ta l product before the tota l 
difference between the actual and estimated revenue i s 
obtainwl* The s ize of the residue i s therefore related 
1* Ibid*, p* 283* 
S* Ibid*, pp* S4S and 288* 
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dlraet ly with the «ise of tdia enterpil«« as measured by the 
fimds lavasted. This aecouatf for the elgnlflcanca of the 
rate of prof i t . But, for the type of theory under considera-
t i o n th is significaaee can at best be Hal ted . For It would 
be wrong to make t h i s rate the object of the competitive 
process and infer therefrom a tendency for the rats of 
prof i t in the eoonoay to equality. The idea of a unlfora 
and unlTersally applicable rate of profit does not f i t into 
the uncertainty theory, tJnfortunately Knight does not 
analyse t h i s aspect of the profit problem very thoroughly, 
and ve must postpone further coments for a later stage of 
th is study* 
P^FITS CH mn. C0RP0BAT3 SNTEBPiaSE 
The analysis of profit based on individual owner-
entrepreneur needs sane modification before i t Is applied 
to the dominant form of enterprise in the present day econ<Miy 
— t h e corporate enterprise. The distinguishing feature of 
1 
th i s foxB i s an apparent separation of ownership and control 
and diffusion of responsibi l i ty »id uncertainty-bearing. 
1, F.H, Knighti op ,c i t« , pp. 294| 298, 
90 
Actual eontrol i s In the hands of the salaried aanaggrs 
who take the major daeisions but do not own the corporation. 
The eonBequenoas of tha decisions they take in ttncertain 
si tuations ara, therefore, not direct ly home hy them but 
by the holders of the eomon stock whose dividends these 
deoislons affect* The corporation i s owned by these aiiulty 
holders in proportion to thei r holdings, they share the 
profi ts but the i r l i a b i l i t y in case of failure i s Halted 
to the axtent of the i r holdings. 
Knight explains how the shar«;holdar, by alacting the 
directors who appoint the aanagers and aake a few basic 
policy decisions, do exercise sons control. He aakas the 
point that control consists mainly in selecting someone 
else to do the control l ing. ' in tills sense lK>th the ul t iaa te 
control and ultimate responsibility vest in saiie agency 
•— the itfxareholders. 
The dividends the coaaon shareholders receive are 
against the uncertainty they bear by exposing themselves 
to the risk of loss of the capi tal Invested. Their decision 
to Invest in one corporation rather than the other, and to 
continue holding i t s stocks, Is a decision in face of 
uncertainty, being based on their axpactations regarding the 
p ro f i t ab i l i ty , etc, of ttiat corporation in coapaflson with 
1. Ib id . , p . 291. 
91 
th« others. Closer exaalnation further reveals that i t i s 
they who really bsar ths uncertainties as the i r 'resources 
are placed in an exposed position with regard to losses in 
the business and so guarantee the owners of the n^aining 
' land, labouri and capi ta l ' against failure to receive 
the i r ful l oontractual renuieration'• 
The actual s ta te of affairs i s far too ecmplicated, 
there i s a *eoBplicated division or diffusion of entrepreneur 
« ^ l p distrilmted in the t^ypical aodem lousiness organisation 
by a hierarcl^ of security issues eariyin? eveiy conceivable 
gradation and eoabiaation of r ights to control and to 
2 . 
freedom from uncertainty as to income and vested capital*. 
However, uncertain income and a degree of control always 
go together. 
mfCERCAIHTIjPBOFIT AHD ASSET TALUSS 
In a later contribution Knight maintains that un-
certainty enters enterprise mainly through inventories and 
approoiation of capital assets, not through future values, 
* — — — * — ™ — * — — ~ * " * — — • > — — — - • ' ^ T -- •, II T i r - - I. v. lit • II' |[ II 1^  ]I,I.I|---Il H l M . II.IIUI,IH •ILLI 11 •IIIB "I 
1« Ib id . , p . 299 
2. Ib id . , p . 300 
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He feels that the theory outlined in his «ain contribution 
on the subject needs to be reworited in the l ight of th i s 
idea. He writesi 
•The theory of profi t developed in my book on Risk, 
and UwieTtalnty res t s upon the general view of the 
entrepreneur or the business unit buying productive services 
'now* and selling the products in future, and the theory needs 
to be entirely reworked •«• The eruoial element in the 
profi t problem in a society in I fh i^ eapital i s enployed has 
t o do with asset values* I t i s a question of (expenditures 
and receipts of) the re la t ive value of assets at the beglunlni; 
and at the end of the aecountlng period . . . 
•The main point for emphasis i s that ths outlays and 
returns compared to determine profi ts are not separated by 
any t ine Interval , but belong to the same accounting period, 
however short i t may be. For any outlays in business or 
production the corresponding returns i s not in the future but 
eo!it<aapo ary* Time and uncertainty enter into profit in a 
different way altogether — nsraely, through the capital 
account, or specifleally, through inventories and depreciation, 
But capi ta l i t s e l f i s always a matter of ant ie ipat i m into 
the in f in i t e future* .^ 
1. ?,H. Knighti 'Professor Hayek and the Theory of Invest-
ment* , 
on pp. 
, Eqoaflmio Joumal^ 7ol* XLV, Hareh 1935, footnote 
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The r«VMrklngy however, would not a f fee t tha substance 
of the theory, which would r ^ a l n e s a e a t l a l l y unchanged. 
Knight himsalf makes t h i s point in a preface t o the 19S7 
r e p r i n t of h i s c lass ic* He wrl tes i 
*One ana ly t i ca l defect in the trsatsiant has been 
Bent ion ed — the 'production period' f a l l acy , ifhen the 
hook was wri t ten I did not see t h a t every productive act 
BUSt y ie ld I t s value — r e s u l t I n s t a n t l y , e i t h e r as product 
ready for eonsiiBpUon ( in the case of a se rv ice , ins t an t ly 
eonfiiBed) or an accretlcRi to c ap i t a l ( otherwise no 
production has occured.) This i s the p r inc ipa l change tha t 
would be made i f the book were being wr i t ten now* With the 
exception t h a t the theory of en te rpr i se and prof i t would not 
be e s s e n t i a l l y R a n g e d ' * ' 
P r o f i t s would s t i U be shown a s a r i s ing due to 
e r r o r s in forecast ing (what the asse t values wcmld be a t the 
end of the accountin? per iod) whi<^ are caused by uncertainty, 
Ins tead of cosparLng tki^ eon tmetua l coamltBents now, at the 
beginning of the process of production, with the %xp@eted 
t o t a l re turns a t the end of the period of procbction 'Aim the 
produce i s aarketed , the entrepreneur would be seen coaparing 
the a s se t va lues tA the beginning with the asse t values a t thi 
end of the accounting per iod, however b r ie f i t may be. The 
1» F.H. Knlrjht, Preface t o the r ep r in t of 19e7.pp. LIX - LX, | l l f c . \ ^«3Emn\Y m^ fgfttUt Kelly and HlllBsn I n c . 
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essrantlal ©Irouiastanoes characterising business enterpri»e 
whi h nake the thing foreeastad uncertain wi l l not ehan?« 
because of a chan j^e in what that* thing* i s — asset Talues 
or future maricet values of the produce* Profit would s t i l l 
be the difference between the ffa^ante value whi^ formed 
the basis ef the contractual c«ai i taents aoid the ^aBltSU&, 
•alue ^ i c h i s actually realised (or could be realised 
i f the entrepreneur so desired)* 
Howsoever slgntficant the removal of this •analytical 
defect* i n treatment might have ap eared to Knight, exponents 
of the uncertainty theory who have la ter restated i t or 
1 
incorporated i t into a broader framework, l ike J.P.Weston 
and B.S*Keirstead»^ have not thought i t important enough to 
take up the reworking th^iaselves* Fifteen y iars after t)M 
need for reworking was enphasised by I&ii^t we find >teston 
ignoring the issue in h i s generalised version of the 
uncertainty theory, and, o a l l ^ upon to take a standi, 
contenting h iase l f with a aere advice by rosarkin^ that'the 
role of asset value changes in profit theory (the l ine of 
modification adverted to by Knight) nay deserve greater 
enphasls than i t has hitherto received' ,^ 
1* and 2« These contributions ar^ discussed at soma length 
in chapters ft>ur and Five* 
3* J*F,Westoni »A Generalised Theory of Prof i t ' , Aaerican 
SoonoMie Ravicw>YQl.XLyMareh 1950, pp. 40-60. 
4* Ibid*, 'Rejoinder to conaent by J.A.Stockfish^Aieri.csn 
g$UaU2&l£uSfi2dUX»7ol.XLX,March 19St, p. 178. 
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Further dsTdlopsoRt of the uncertainty theoiy has, 
instead, taken entirely new routes as ahall be exaained in 
the folloving ehapter* Meanwhile l e t us note some points 
in e r i t i c i f B of the theozy soanarised above. 
SOME POIHTS IH GHETICISM 
The Tiew that prof i t s are unimputed value residues 
arising due to uncertainty of future iralues and accruing 
to the ent eprensur beeause of h i s assuaing the ul t ioate 
responsibi l i ty of errors in forecagting has, in essence, 
found favour with the majority of later eeonomists* &ren 
t i l l date the essence of the theory has not been suocessfally 
ehallanged. Wevertheless the theory has been subjected to 
c r i t i e i m in soae of i t s d e t a i l s , and sone eoonooiists have 
even ehallanged I t s claiM of being a 'theory* of prof i t . 
Knight's application of the mpply and denand 
apparatus to the detenaination of prof i ts has beon severely 
c r i t i c i s e d . Nothing i s wrong with the broad s tat^ant that 
the gross ratums to enterprise depend on the prices or 
productive services lAich are determined by supply and detrand. 
But to speak of supply and doaand of entrepreneurs determin-
ing the rate of profit i s stretching the point too far. It 
i s not val id because, in thS f i r s t instance, entrepreneurs are 
M 
not a hotaogenaous l o t . The u n i t s i n wMeb entrepTeneurlal 
a b i l i t y I s supplied are indHvialble and hetrogeneous. Those 
who, taking UieiT eaa troa Knight^ have construe ted a 
continuous supply curve for entrap re naurshlp are ignoring 
not only the i n d i v i s i b i l i t y and lack of hoaogeneity bnt 
a lso the fact t ha t the thing so detersdned cannot, by 
na tura l 1» a unifora pr ice for entrepreneurship. The very 
concept of p rof i t a s an uncer ta in residue alahors unifomaity, 
Sohoapetsr has r i ^ t l y warned ai^ainst such ccmstructlons 
s t r e s s ing t h a t even to speak of ' supply of Iwslness a b i l l l y ' 
i s fraught with danger,^ Gordon decr ies such att^aapts on the 
f a n l l i a r ground t h a t the entrepreneurs , to a great extent , 
c rea te t h e i r own domand. They increase th« supply of 
productive senr lces — land, c a p i t a l and s k i l l . Thus what 
Knight c i iaracter ises as the demand for entrepreneurs no 
longer remains independent of i t s supply, and the supply-
demand iu>paratus becomes Inappl icab le . 
Though J.F.Weston, r e s t a t i ng th»^ u n c e r t a i n ^ th^oiy 
t h i r t y years a f t e r i t s c l a s s i c formulation \v Knight, s t i l l 
f inds i t poss ible to s t a t e *as a f i r s t approxia t t ion ' t ha t 
• the re turn t o unhired fac to r s depends upon the r e l a t i v e 
demand for and supply of luihired f a c t o r s ' , Kni:?ht h i a se l f 
1, J.A.Seh\ttipeteri History of Econanic Analysis .p. 897. 
2 . R.Oordonf S a t e r p r i s e , P rof i t and the Modem Corporation, 
p. 308 4n lijaatorft^ itiiia to ^•aagalgf.^^-jLgawdiiU Main^ co., 
Inc . 1936* 
S. J.F.WtiSton,*A "lenteralised Theory of Profit* yAaarloan 
' HavleWf Vol.XL, March 1980, p . 47. 
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seaas to hava ifeoognlsed the weight of t h i s objection as he 
f e s l s i t neeessary to s t r e s s in M s l a t a s t pronouncaae'^t on 
the subject the fact t h a t antwiprenoupship i s not atasureabla 
in th« sens© the o ther fao tors of production ap©, nor i s i t 
subject to varying proportions and oapginal Inputat ion,^ 
P r o f i t s being uncer ta in res idues , and t h e i r magnitude 
in each case depending on the success of the Individual 
entrepreneur in meeting uncer ta in ty the questicai ' ow p ro f i t s 
i n the eeonoay as a whole are datf-rmined can be answered 
only a t the macroaconcxnic lavel» Kni:^ht approaches t h i s 
l eve l wl»n he seiks *to eaMsire the entrrpreneur* s incoac 
i n d i r e c t l y , by inq^uiring in to forces which determine the 
fixed incomes, ir* relaticai to the %»hole product of an 
2 
en te rp r i se or a socie ty*. But he f a i l s to purme the point 
in the r i ^h t directicaa applying the supply-d^iand analysis 
to the det6Z«iination of ti% r a t a of p ro f i t ins tead . The 
r e s u l t i s tha t \AiB.t coiald open e n t i r e l y new v i s t a s in 
p r o f i t theory only served to force i t i n t o the s t r a i t * 
jacket of the supply-dffioand apparatus whidi i t could 
never f i t in« 
•Hie view has been expressed t h a t while tht« entrepreneur 
c rea tes p r o f i t s , the approprli^tlon of p r o f i t by i t s rec ip iant i 
1. F.H. Knight, Preface to the r ep r in t of 1957, ^ a ^ 
IMcartaintv and P ra f^ | ( a th iBpression,1987) ,pTlJl . 
£• I b i d . , p . 880, 
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l 8 iQs t l t u t l oya l l y datexnin«d| t h a t separate theor ies aust 
be QVolTed t o explain tlm o r ig in of p r o f i t s and t h e i r sharing 
out»^ This view i s based on the finding t h a t par t of the 
p r o f i t s aotuaXly a r i s ing pass on t o the c a p i t a l i s t s and to 
tb« owners of o ther productive se rv ices . Thus the very 
de f in i t i on of p r o f i t vdth which the uncer ta in ty theory s t a r t s 
— a re;5ldu9 raaaining over a f t e r a l l cont rac tua l claims 
are met — i s da si red to be <riianged. For I t i s only 
prof i t defined I s seme other manner t h a t can be said t o 
b© shared logr entrepreneurs with othersf while the uncertainty 
theory e:iplalns only *pare' p r o f i t s accruing to the antr-s* 
prenaurs . There i s t r u t h , however, i n Trifxln*s observation 
thut Knight*8 theory envisages a specif ic i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
s i tua t ions there i s separation of ownership from day to dssf 
cont ro l but the owner r e t a i n s a large element of control lay 
always keeping the r i gh t of dismissing the sa la r ied manager 
a t w i l l , ^ In T r i f f l n ' s terminology i t I s a mixed case 
dis t inguished from the extreme cases of tbe proper ty- less 
contr»prencur and the entrcpreneur-ownfir. In other 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l s i t ua t i ons e i t h e r the aharing of p rof i t or 
i t s very notion w i l l be dlfffirent» 
1. Ian Livingstones ' J^e Theoiy of P-nofltj A ^Jote. '!;,^ ,s 
'anuary 196Sf and 
Chil ton Co. ,Bi l ladelphla ,1W8 a^ ll ,^ordon,«SnterprIse 
Prof i t and the Modem Corporation* in Bxa2^rations in 
gcongmicfy p. 315« 
riobert Trlfiins| |aR9i>oUgU9 ffMBflUUgB tag ^'SQifftl 
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At a eXar l l^ca t ioa i r a the r than e r l t l e l s B of th« 
theory I t has heen s t ressad t h a t though p r o f i t s a r i se dua 
t o uneex>taltity they cannot be regard ad as a reward, oompensa'* 
t l o n or payment for xmcartainty bearing. The obvious 
reason i s t h a t uncer ta in ty i s borne a lso by those entx^preneur 
who ac tua l ly suffer l o s s e s . This a l a r i f i c a t i o n I s nscess l -
ta tod by tha pers is tanca of the wrong nat ion in the 
l l tara turs . t '^ Hacsntly Knight himsolf has unequivocally 
rajactod t h i s vlaw for vftiich the raadars of liiak Uncertainty 
and Prof i t might have found aaae 3?ooni for ecpiivocati'jn, 
'Uncerta inty explains p r o f i t and l o s s , but p r o f i t , wh^n i t 
occurs , i s not properly spuaking a 'reward for r i sk t a k i n g ' , 
th.ough the eapectat ion of gain i s the incentive for assualng 
the entiepr^sneurial ro le* . 
1. J . F . Westoni'The Prof i t Concept and Theoryi A S^statyBi^nt' 
?mm^l 9t Potlllgai ^rmr* ^oi. XLII,April i9»4,p*i8«ri 
Paul Strefltefij'Ths Thsory of Prof i t .The IJfln^aaJtai: 
Mml Qt Mmmsnii ana iftffi^ Ji. gtf^lsg,voi«3cni,i949, 
p p . f T ^ 280| 
pp,aS2'-268» Canbridg® TJolverslty Press , 1981. 
2 . AEong those vffiio hold the view o r l t i d s a d above aay be 
l i s t e d : 
J.P.Beddy* P r o f i t s , pp.125*20. 
F,Lavin5ton* *An Approach t o the theory of Business 
Risk!' %^piliS-l2SiIBai»Vol.XX]0r, 1 « » , p .1f2 , 
F.H.HahBJ A note on Prof i t and TTncertainty* rEcon>aMlcaf 
1947, p .211 . 
A.C.Pl^ou a lso regards uncj i ' ta ia ty ba£.rir'.g to be c. d i s -
u t i l i t y to be coBpensated by p r o f i t s . 7ide Seonoaiea of 
Welfarey pp.771-78.Maomlllan and Co. ,liondon,l9<1. As 
regards the t e x t book exposi t ions of the uncer ta in ty theory 
thsy geadi-aXly ejq^ound the wrong idea . 
3 . F,H,Knights Preface t o the r ep r in t of 1967,©p.cit, ,p.LIX. 
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Knlflit** lAwTp dlstinoUon b0tir9%(i risk and iitoertAlittfy 
ateilMni th& «aexf9nee of pfofitt •xeltitivsir to ths l«t ar, 
hm» %X*o l e f t sone •ocmonitts imoomrlnodd. T^t T,^ «iHok«^ 
i t not tatlsflfld vith Ms aneoimToalstxts tr€a%tt#iit of 
• Miasiuni1il.e 7islct*» prssiaawUr ^eatts^ tli« tefder Unt 
tratveen th^ Bdamri^I^ a fid i»iR9ft«iir@|iI« cffi^ s i s dla and 
sblftlnst* Dfeatcm* on feh« oth^r beid, » ks to re plats 
Kiii?;ht»s ci«»£lflcation Igr «i witiPteiy difff^rent ons wW J^ 
w>uld eaalca r i ^ a subset of uiio«rtain^ and esiplmsisa tbs 
tapimafosiaalsilltjr or oth*}ivl»s of risks and uncertainties 
as th« f«iitur© ortMial. for profit thaoiy. i^ arhaps yest-^^'i 
r«forsRa»tlofi to nhioh wa i^ali r e ^ m later, wlil satisfy 
Hieiis vitfetmt aamlng disapi»roval froa Knight* 
Art tii« «ntrspr«ti«iiriaX astismtss r^^garSint future 
prieas or th« valUiis of ot!i©r varialilas single valuad and 
uni^a or in the tiatura of a rsm*f>^ of vfatt«s? !tRi^t 
•^•Ittad thm ol^ar poM&tdli^ ^ ragardod tha f irst i^a 
tha iHittar *ssiSi]ption» •tressing at tht Sana tisit th^t to 
aa«its« tha sa«3nd would not affaot his aonolusion* Sons 
aoonoMistSi hotfav^r^ insist OB tha saoond asmmptioo and 
1 , J.a,Biolt«s*flia Th«ofy of llaoartaifity axA Profit* 
^ao«<Milea^ VoUXX,M«|r 1981, p* tV i . 
2, J'.F.Westcmi *4 ^^eraliatd Uaeartainty Theory of Profit*, 
l^ailflin i iW9iit J t f l«irfyoi*jg«» ttso, p» 43 
5* Ohi^t^r f'MTm 
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c l a i a t h a t I t would aodify^ soae of the cono lus lona j Among 
2 
recent exposi tors of th« theory Shackle s t i l l regards 
entrQprenourlal eapscta t lons to be s ingle valued pro jec t l ms 
and 3*S,Kelrst<9a<l proeseds vltK the saa^ assuaptlon.'^ 
Thessi hoveyer, are po in t s re la ted to the d e t a i l s 
of the theory* A ser ious a t tack on the very bas i s of the 
theojy comes froa Anatol J^ iurad who contends thats 'An 
uncer ta in ly theory of p rof i t I s no theory of prof i t at 
a l l* I t merely e leva tes to the postticm of explanation 
02 ra ther de f in i t ion a mere a t t r i b u t e of p r o i l t — un-
c e r t a i n t y ' . * hurad th inks t h a t the theory s t a r t s with a 
de f in i t ion of p rof i t which I t s e l f i a p l i e s th<i Whole of the 
theory , hence I t I s a mere tautology* Furthersiore 
imcer ta ln ty i s important only a t the slcroeeoncMalc l eve l , 
from the viewpoint of the Individual f inn . A genuine 
thsory of prof i t niust explain th<? sources of a»^r8f5at<i 
p ro f i t i n the ec nomy specifying the condit ions und^r which 
they ar ise* The l i s t of questions se t by hlii for a th-ory 
of prof i t to answer nakes I t quite c l ea r t ha t to get H s 
6 
approval the theory of p rof i t nnist he mac re economic in nature . 
1* Armen a Aichlani*Oneertalaty Bvolution and Econoalc 
Th-scry; Journ&l of P o l i t i c a l Cccaoiay, 19^0, p; ,2 t l -21 
2 . G.L.S.Shacldfeci ^a,gt|ft^<a^.,.,l.^ ,|g;?yiffll1fg» p .28 . Cambridge 
UalV K. ri»l ty ?r©an, 19S2. 
3 . B.S.E£lr£tead: AR JiJSftY Ift fe§,,y,l^^ft?.Y 8^ P i^a tg , ftflfl 
iMISm, .H9%lVsMm »P.25, Oxford. Basi l Blackwell,1957. 
4. Anatol Kurad;'Aii 0ii e r t a l a t y theory of P r o f i t — a Coiment' 
AB^|1,^§& ^9Bgiaig %Tl<^Htyol*XLr*Mar6h 1951, p . 168. 
5* I b i d . 
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J.Fred WesteWf i^o»© restatement of uncer ta inty 
theoiy was th« InMdlatd t a r g e t of Mmrad's a t t ack , eor rac t ly 
po in t s oat t ha t Hurad aeeaa t o hold the accountltif. vlzv of 
profi t , '* fhe imeertaintsr theory axplaioa the emergence of 
pure p r o f i t s , a^f other iaeoBja not deserving the nane as 
Knight has so eowrinelngly argued. I t I s not a tautology 
as p r o f i t s are f i r s t deiined as u n l a p u t ^ residues and l a t e r 
shown to be a r i s ing due to uoca r t s in ty . As regains the 
need for a maeroeeonomlc thtioiy of p r o f i t , evaiybody i s 
agreed on i t | Imt t l i l s dovis not necGSsitata thro*»'i?i^ the 
ffiicroeeon<;»ilc tneory of p r o i l t in to the dustbin, what i s 
Headed i s t o In t eg ra t e the mioro and Quorotheorles 3o as to 
Bake the p r inc ip le forauiated in one consis tent v l th tha t 
underlying the o ther . 
Among tha few wr i t e r s who deny imcertainty being 
the cause of proJE3.t8 i s .Tames P.Baddy whose book: on Prof i t s 
appeared In 19-^* He writes* 
'Our conclusion has been t h a t uncer ta inty bearln'i I s not 
the cause of p r o f i t s , nor does any port ion of prof i t s reward 
u n c e r t a l n t y b a a r l n ? , which lts<»lf i s simply ona of a nusber 
of r e s l s t - nce s upon whio^i costs of prodactlon r e s t , and i s , 
ther ' - fore , rewarded in the saae VBf as other cos t s of 
3 product:' o n ' . 
1. J.F.Wastori 'A iCejolnd^r' Aa. r l can Keononle Rt^Y^dy^^oinJ 
i -a 'Ch 1«»51, p . 177. 
2 . I b i d . 
3 . J . P. Beddy, i B a i i i i f F.130. 
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This reward ooms at an ln«tr«a8€ in th« rata of 
Interaat on rlaky lavaataenta, ^ 
Baddy ftirthar eonteads that the concept of uncertainty 
i s so Tague, so wlda, and so d i f f i cu l t t o judge that It 
cannot he aada tha key concept In a sc i ent i f i c theory of 
prof i t . 
I t I s surely a alstmdarstandlng of Klnght»s position 
regarding prof i t s being a reward of uncertainty bearing 
which aakes Baddy reaaifc that * I f the theory was correct 
we itoould expect to find big profits where there vas a 
2 
wide range of uncertainty and Ti^ff*t§raftii Baddy's cm, 
theoiy, w h i ^ regards prof i ts a return to acquired 
advantages hardly inpressad anybody* 
Gordon, reviewing the state of profit t*teory in 
193«' noted the failure of the uncertainty theory to 
explain profits in functional t e i o s . I t also suffered 
froffl the defect of t a c i t l y identifying the owner with tha 
entrepreneur thus •leaving out of tha picture tim active 
and ^^sn ic ^treprenaurlal function involved in baslnass 
leadership** He therefore s tresses the need of foratilatlng 
1* Xlktd, p. 126, 
2 . Ibid, ,p«UO. 
3« R.lordoni'Enterprise Profit and Modern Corporatloii in 
tratiqns In leonoaiaa. The issay i s included in tha 
If, .f ;T, n sf I' IB r»n_4 yjgit 
American Sconoaic Assooiatlon* 
4* Ibid*, p. 313. 
fory 9t iMoag MitrilyttUoat published 
i c ssooiatl 
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separate theories to eiqiXain tbe inooaie and function of 
enterprise and the ineoae and fUnotion of ownership* This 
need has arisen aainlr *«« *o *^e J l^»« o^ corporate 
enterprise as the raala form of basiness in modem times* 
Gordon finds l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t / in accepting the 
explanation of pure profit in t e n s of change, uaeertainty 
and f r i c t i o n , * tet then Iw gives a definit ion of pure 
profit® willch i s not the saiie as that giv«n by Knight or 
more recently by Veston* Gordon's t s say , therefore, 
i s hardly an endorsement of the imcsrtainty theory} i t I s 
ej5)l ic lt in i t » c a l l for the formulation of a i»w theory 
whose e s sent ia l s i t seeks to out l ine . 
^ e eontlmiel emphasis on pure profits lay the 
uncertainty theorists^ the emphasis on purity increasing 
with the passage of time, produced in many minds serious 
dmibts about the realism and usefulness of the theoxy i t s e l f . 
That such a real isation i s not foreign to the champions of 
the theory i s manifest in Weston*s declaration that *vhat i s 
loose ly called profit theory i s a concept or definition' • 
1. I b i d . , p. 816. 
2 . I b i d . , p* S1&. 
3 . Ibid*, p. 315* 
4« J.F.Weston, 'Profit Concept and Theoxyi A He statement^, 
IflMrnftl gI,,^^9UtUaJi ^gQawiyt ^oi . xxi , Apxii i9S4, 
p. lit. 
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Others coxHA be hardly ax^eeted to TesalR contented with a 
aere definltioa In a field of tncpiiry %tt.leh had long engaged 
the attention of the best alnda* Furtheimors they pointed 
out that profits s© defined no longer conformed to * a t 
buslnes8--«en actually refognised as their profits. Pure 
profits are un-Identifiable In reality. 
This vl6ir Is strongly held by Paul Streetan who 
declares that »The Isolation of pure profit i s a wil l 0' the 
wlsp',^ He rejects tim elala of the uncertainty theory to 
be a theoiy of profit as I t aaounted merely to the self-
evident proposition that 'lAere there i s uncertainty th«=r6 
i s the opportunity for profit and the danger of loss»,^ 
Over the last oac century or so, the once aeaningful and 
potent ccHcicept of profit has suffered a process of 'purificat-
ion*. Fiom J.S.Millis concept of profit as coaprlslng 
interesti we^es of managecent and reward for risk bearing, 
the slements of interest and wages were f irs t separated, 
only to be followed by the purge of the reward for risk 
bearing, thus learing a sere rasidue which was not 
associated wit3i ai^ productive fanetlon at a l l . The present 
purified concept was that of accidental gains arising from 
successful market operations %rhlch defy a l l analysis. This 
1. Paul Streetenf 'The "meory of Profit*, "• • ** 
achoQl of Bconoalc and Social Stfnd^as, Vol.Xpi, 
pp.sM'-sdd. " 
2. Ibid., p. 282. 
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i s agnostieim in the reaXa of toiantifle analysis and 
'Agnostlelaa i s not a theoiy of profit*. Streeten, therefore, 
registers a stroia^ plea for a return to the study of ?ross 
profits — a& aggregate of various t y p o of Incoaes clearly 
related to well knoim productive ftmetions,1 
Despite these erltlelSBs the theo^ry eontintied to 
attract atteation and quite a few nlnds devoted themselves 
to i t s farther rafin«Bent* The next ohapter steadies ths 
aain contriliutions in t*ils respeet* 
1« Ibid., p. 1S7. 
CHAPTBB FOaR 
FURTHER ©BrSLOPMEIffS IH fHS imCEHEACTTS: THSORI 
Th« ld<a that uncertainty i s the main source of 
profit arising in an entei^nse aconcoor has appealed to a 
Xaxie nUM^r of noted eeonaailsts leading to a nmber of 
oontrLbutlons to the theory after Rnlght gare it i t s 
elassio foraulation* done of these eontrlbations are 
essentially elarlflcations said further refinement of the 
key concepts, Another d recti on in whi^ di the theory's 
development can be traced i s the att«ipt to analyse the 
process of deolsion-saklng In face of uncertainty* 
Besides, the uncertainty theory has been incorporated into 
a broader frame%ioife by B.S.KalBStead utiose theoxy of profit 
»eek» to ^rnthealse the Sehumpeterian and Knightean 
theories with the releruit implications of the Keyneslan 
•aoroeooncKales and notiopollstie eoB^etitlon theories, 
HeserTlng t^e diseussion of Kelrstead's theory for a 
subsequent chapter va shall^ in ^ a t follows, briefly note 
some of the main contributioiis made to the th^ry after 
Knight. 
HICKS* APPRSCIATICH 
A decade after the publication of MSk Ohoertaj nty 
aM PrQftiit ^.H.Bl<^a, while affixmlng that *that voik has 
laid securely the flret foundation on which any future theory 
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of pfoflt Bttst p«st , '^ fe l t that the theoiy could not be 
eoBplete un t i l I t was made olsar *vliat ezaetly profit I t 
and what are the eanses that determine i t s magnitude* • 
Ha vas not satisfied vi th Knight*8 treateaent of these 
issaesy and proaeaded to formulate his own analysis. The 
a t teapt , howeveri i s not very fruitful* The only dis t inct 
eonelusioB tSiat anerges i s that uneertalnty i s not l ikely 
to affsat tha magnltttda of aggregate profi ts — the 
share of Kational Dlviderjid going to entraprenaurs. I t 
would only affeot i t s distribution anongst individuals* 
*Maqy of tha groups of persons and resources with 
\ikiteh we ara concerned In the theoiy of distr ibution seam 
to ba large enough for nearly a l l the n ^ s they bear to 
eaneel out in a node rate period of time* Uncertainty of 
return wil l usually not affect the to t a l lnoc»ie of, or 
ratum t o , a group (however smoh i t »ay affeet Individuals) 
unlasa tha supply of resoureas and eonsequently the t ems 
offerad for them I s affeeted by the presence of uncertainty 
• • . . The iaportaat excepUon to th i s rule does not happen 
to be the ease of unaaaaarable r i s k s * . ' 
1. J.R.Hickst The Theory of Uacertetnty and Profit* 
Ifiaaaaisai Voi.n, May itsi, p. no. 
2. Ib id , , pp* 170-^1. 
3. Ibid*, p« 1S?« 
10§ 
Hielts t h l ^ i that In the long run aggregate prof i t i 
aceroliig due to imcertalnty tend to be aero or negative, 
•those liho draw their reaaneration In the torn 
of profit wil l receive a t o t a l return that in pT>oportJ on 
to the serr ioet perforaed 1» hardly aore, and possibly 
1 
l e s s , than that recelTed by the Investor! in safe concerns'. 
This i s not fery different from the position taken 
by Knight, who holds that aggregate profits wil l be posit ive, 
negative or zero, depending up<m the pattern of espeotatians 
forced in attempts to forecast the txipredlctable shifts 
in demand and supply which take p l a c e . ' Sntrepreneurs as a 
?raup wi l l real ise a positive profit If they underestidiate 
the prospects of t^e l r business re la t i fe ly to their dis* 
poslticHi to venture* I f t b ^ overestiaate the i r prospects 
they willy i n the aggregate, suffer losses "If the estltjates 
are a a a t t e r of pure chance i t would s^ em l^at the v riation 
in the two dlrectl(ms wi l l be equal, the average correct, 
and the general level of pure profit zero«*^ Knight tiiinks 
i t i s not possible to arrive at a clear <»noluslon on 
inductive grounds, but he i s 's trongly of the opinion tiiat 
business as a whole suffer a loss '*^ 
U Ibid*, p . 183. 
2* F.H.Knlght, op , c l t , , pp, 363-M5. 
9* Ib id . , p* 364. 
4* Ibid*, p« 908* 
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This, hovev«r| only goes to eonfim the '^law that 
the uncertaittty theory i» essential ly a Bicroecononic 
theory and loses I t s slgniUcanee \Aken appllsd at the 
aaeroeconool© l e r e l , and in the long run. The same i s 
true of the ooneept of piire prof i t s . 
DlMissing Knight's sharp dis t inct ion between risk 
and unoertainty as too tmoon^roBilslTi? atri finding h i s 
treatonent of uncertainty unsatisfactory, Hicks proceeds 
t o classify in^estaant schsnes according to the r isk schemes 
thay offer, the irarestor's b<*avioar Iwing e result of the 
reaotion to these sflSaoaas of his ovn a t t i tudes toward 
lanoertainty* The return to inrestment thus studied i s a 
gross raturn including in teres t and othe? elements, not the 
pure profi ts of th^ uncertainty theory, Otian^es in un-
certainty schemes v i l l necessitate ehsnges in the dea&nd 
foretold supply of prc«luetiye services, and the jl^nal 
e(|uilibrliui position oust take these changes into account* 
V^ile studying the effscts of a chaise in the 
ehanoos of reward on tJie supply of resources for a given 
enployiteut. Hicks rejects the notion of mathematical 
enqHictationt He finds the eaphasis on noney returns only 
to be unsatisfactory and thinks that t^e Tarious un-
certainty sehertes aust be coapared on the basis of the 
'expectation of subjeotive satisfaction'*^ A taste for 
1, J«E,Hicks, dp ,e l t* | p . ISO, 
I l l 
gwbXiiig Is also relGTaat In th i s context. Irfhlla no 
daflni ts conclusions are arrivad a t , I t i s noted that thera 
I s »a definite relation between any given uncertainty 
scheme and tlie (|a«itltgr of the factor of production that 
wi l l he el ic i ted by it* J 
Hlcka eacanlnes the various wsgrs of dealing with 
uncertainty as Knight Iwd done ea r l i e r . I t mainly takes 
the fona of adjus^sents in the • scale and tech^l(jae' of 
production, but the poss ib i l i t i e s open to a firm in th i s 
rs.iard are obviously limited. Soma r isks are transferred 
to outside par t ies such as the insurers. The reaialning are 
borne by the partlelpalNts in the production process. These 
f a l l into two aate?orlesi those who get a reiaimeratiaei 
depending on the firm's miccess; and those who receive 
contractually fixed payrasats like ¥§ges, interest and rent. 
The second group also bears part of the nidc, ' in particular 
the r i sk that when the sarvlc-. has bean performed, the 
payment will not be raede*. The difference between the 
types of uncertainty borne by the two groups i s explained 
I'tith the help of frequency curves. The supply of the 
sarv'ces comirg from the two groups is influenced by the 
difference in the i r exposition to r i sk . 
1, J.I^Hicks, op.Cit , , p, 182, 
2, Ib id , , p . t n . 
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AiatrsiiB TOB DBcasicF-iaKim PHXSSS 
Despite Hicks' deununciation of 'metaphysics and 
psyelhology' fojaning the basis of th« theory of p ro f i t 
one of the «ain offshoots of the uncer ta in ty theory was 
a g rea te r i n t e r e s t i n the analysis of doclsion-aakiBg in 
uncurtain s i t u a t i o n s . The claims of such analysis to be an 
e s s e n t i a l p a r t of p ro f i t theory a rc , how^^er, highly doubtful. 
The theory of imrestwent behaviour or dsei si on-making i s 
d i s t i n c t from the theoTf of p r o f i t , 7h^ l a t t e r explains 
p r o f i t s on the bas i s of unca r t s nty whose natu o i s described 
and prssene© explained to the extant I t i s necessary to 
show how value residues a r l s a , Sxaetly how the antrapreneur 
takes a decision i s not re lavant . I t i s suf f ic i sn t to point 
out t h a t the decis ions taker ml^ht »^ot be correct ex post fact 
'Tevartheleas, a reference to these developaents i s 
J u s t i f i e d on the ground t h a t by deawnstrating tha cont ras t 
between the deeislon-fflaklng processes in ca r t a ln and un-
c e r t a i n s i t ua t i ons such an analys is further c l a r i f i e s the 
n Cf,W,FelllWjriDistortion of subject ive P robab i l i t i a s as a 
Reaction to g n c i r t a i n t y \ t e r ^ § x X f Iff^tHl^l OJT ¥>Pllgilff8U^o3.. 
I.3ay,TTo.4, Vty^mhsT 1961,p»68«, 
Sidney ¥intraub,4a Apgygftgh tQ .%M tk^QU flC iQ f^flBg ^mM" 
Jaj|isaiP»200 fn,and Paul Streaten o p . e i t , p*884. That Knlgh' 
h l a se l f did not l i ke to add t h i s dinansion to the theory of 
p r o f i t i s obvious in the 11 ^ t of hi a ramaiics in the preface 
to the 1997 rep r in t of h i s il3fc.<?ttfsgtftt,ntY . ^ IrTQftt* 
He wr i t e s thi. t i f the book was t o be rewrltteffl'no aore 
e laborate theoiy of uae^rtainlgr would be offered . t h a t would 
recp i re a t r e a t i s e on epls t inelogy and science* I t i s s t i l l 
iBy content ioa tha t contlogeacy or chance i s an unanalysabla 
fac t of aat i i re*, p« liX. • 
lis 
natnx* of uncer ta in ty and the emargance of th« consequent 
value residues* 
Attempts t o analyse the process of deelsioR-naking 
in uncer ta in s i t ua t i ons hare been genera l ly based on ' subject-
ive nuaer ica l probab l i t y ' • %e ind iv idua l , af tor l i s t i n g 
in M s mind tJie whole se t of possible outoomes tha t he can 
conceive of, assigns to saeh one of them BOTSQ proper 
f rac t ion wtiicd^ i are so chosen t h a t they sum to un i ty , each 
represent ing ths probabi l i ty of the outooius in question 
turning out to be the ti-uth. A choice the rea f te r i s not 
d i f f i c u l t though a commonly agreed solut ion i s not ava i lab le . 
But having defined uncer ta in ty s i t u a t i o n s in a msraner which 
excludes any roeEsuremcnts, such an approach can hardly 
be accoBBBOdated by the micer ta lnty theory . Most of the 
problems facing the deeis ion-aaker are iciique, in the sense 
th-^t no s imilar problems have ar isen i n the pas t . In the 
abseiica of suf f ic ien t s imilar Instances to allow grouping, 
the fr^^qu^noy d l s t r l b a t l o n s wMch could form the basis of 
p robab i l i ty o a l c i l a t i m s are simply not available* Mceov^r, 
' t h e a p j l i c a t i o n of frequency r a t i o s only makes sense i f the 
ind iv idua l can fee l sure tJiat th-sve w i l l be nar^r r e p e t i t i o n s , 
t h a t %h--Tn w i l l he a d i v i s i b l e experlaaent In which the 
iMmedit - a c t , .\d.th which he i s now concerned, wi l l be swallow 
2 
nd r ip. ' Manj of the t ru ly uncer ta in s i t ua t ions cal l ing for 
I " "» I I I " • II » I • imini i i »iiii.i.iiii. .1 m l • i i i i i i n I n I . 1 I .1 I, 
1. a . L.S, Shackle J ^3i.afff1r&t1,a?il in .^fgT^gglgs, chapter n i . 
8 , 3*Ii.S,Shacklei ITncertalnty i n Boonomie^, p . 7 , Cambridge 
Universi ty Press , 1956, 
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deal8ion are, besides being unlquei also crucial , in the 
Sense that the outeixae of the deelslon wil l affect the 
ent ire future oareer of the deeislon-aaker by Irreversibly 
destzoying some clreuiTistances essent ial to the si tuat ion, 
thus eliialnating the possibi l i ty of the same situation 
arising again*. I t I s obviously absurd to apply probability 
calculations to siMh si tuat ions. The subiective nuaerlcal 
probability approach i s certainly r t i evant to a large number 
of si tuations rs^arding deelslon* Biit i t i s not these 
si tuations in idileh the theory of profit i s intarestad. 
Anoldier iMportant reason i<hy the above mentl csned 
approach aust be abondoned in favour of a waT& suitable 
one is the failure of the probability aeagures correctly 
to depict the state of mind of the deelsion-maker In face 
of uncertainty. The mind i s charting the poss ib i l i t i es of 
oCGurMme* of various hypothetical outcomes of any eosirse of 
action ( i f ^ e ^ of naaor courses of act ion) , Many outcomes 
appear possible, but some appear aol^e possible than others. 
The diff icul ty Is that •Probability cannot discriminate or 
express degrees of possibility**^ A namber of outcomes 
•ay a l l apptar to be perfectly possible. But the probability 
teeitnl(^e cannot aeeoanodate th i s idea. Anyone of the masQr 
perfectly possible outcomes cannot be assigned a probability 
1. Q,i*.s.aha«iae$ i?|g|^ta^Qr|sT mi XtM% in Wmm 
Affair?, p. 76, Cambridge University Frese, %M\* 
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eeofflelftttt of on6| for th« obrious reason that there are 
manjr svLdh oXalmaats* Fractions would neither eaarey the 
Idea of perfect possibility nor dlstlngulA these froa less 
than perfectly possible hypotheses* Bven i f there was 
only one perfectly possible hypothesis a unity probabilltr 
would eonvey the entirely different Idea of perfect 
certainty. 
The truth of the natter i s that probability, whether 
obJeetlYe or 8ubJecM.Te» i s a means of organising the 
'Knowledge* liferent in the situation, and i t i s no use 
calling It into service where there i s no knowledge at a l l . 
SHACKLE* S C»IITRIBim01f 
An altarnatlve approach has been dereloped by l .L.S. 
Sha<^le w1»> i s oonTlnced that *Men*s Iraotf ledge and insight 
do not usually enable theia to specliy narrowly what i s 
positirely probable, but only to discountenance what i s 
iBplausitae or far fetched**^ Accordingly he has evolved 
1* l.L.S«siiaeic:lei Jlffflrlf^RtiY ,lB ififf8BQliffg» P« 3* 
11« 
th« eoBcept of potent ial surprise — an in?«no(mB device to 
aeasuTQ, lndir«otly, a peraon'i dagrea of belief in a 
hypothesis coming t rue . There are degrees of possibi l i ty 
and there are degrees of aurprlf t . The two are inversely 
related. The less possible ve regard an outeoae the more 
surprisad ws would feel i f i t ease t rue , and ir^^a-varsa. 
We would not at a l l feel surprised i f sooe thing regarded 
perfectly possible by us aetually coaes t rue . Tlias »surprise 
provides us %dth a aeans of knowing how strongly we doubted 
the possibi l i ty of a given happening or a given outooaa of 
soae aet of our own*.^ A n the iaagined outeoaes of a 
oourse of aetlon can be assigned posit ons on a seale of 
belief by f i r s t assigning to each the degree of surprise 
2 
the person would feel If the outeoae were to coas t rue . 
An entrepreneur takii% a deeision in a situation 
^arae te r i sed by uncertainty ezerelses his intui t ion, 
in te l l igent guess^ete. l i s t ing the various al ternative 
courses of action open to hiB« and formli^s various ^potheses 
regarding the outcomes of eaeh course of actiem. Each such 
hypothesis has two asptetsi the else of gainCor loss) 
anticipated and tite degree of potential surprise associated 
wLth i t . The power of a hypothesis to s t imulate ' the 
u Ibid., figfligiQa,ar49r ^  ^1B§ 1B BmiBAJTfflxit P««3. 
2. Ib id . , Bxpsata Ions In Beonoaics. pp.lCVII. 
IpaSi i f i i f P»43» This power i s l a t e r termed*atcendan^* 
of tha hypotheslsCaflfiJLiiqBiQrtgr ^j T i i i l o IlMfta Affll£.f, 
p* tea). 
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individual Into action i s an inereaaing function of th« 
desirmMIity of the outeoa@(vhieh depends on the size of the 
gain or loss , b€lns negative in the l a t t e r case) and a 
decreasing function of the associated potential sarprise« 
The dain^hypotheses a t t r a e t | and the Loss^h^rpotheses repel, 
bat the i r power to do so depends not only on the slxe of the 
anticipated gain or los , Imt also on their degree of 
poss ib i l i ty , oaawired through potential surprise. 
Out of the various gain-hypotheses relating to anyone 
course of action there are some, at least one, \diose degree 
of potential surprlso i s n i l — the individual would not at 
a l l be surprised i f i t o«Bie true as he regards i t to be 
perfectly possible* There are others Involving soae positive 
degree of potential surprise, yet others involving higher 
degrees of potential surprise and so on, t i l l we reach 
hypotheses which the individual regards to be alaost iapossi" 
ble* Theso carry the absolute oaxiauB of potential surprise. 
tfhilo the hypotheses in the inner range of sero potential 
surprise aay differ with respect to the size of gain mitleipat' 
ed i t i s assuaed that outside t h i s range the degree of 
potential surprise increases with the increase in the size 
of the gain anticipated. 
S la i la r i s the case with the loss*hypotheses. Now 
out of a l l the gain-hypotheses the one with the greatest 
power ( to a t t r ac t ) wi l l focus the attention of the individual.. 
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SlMllarXy thsr« wil l be one loss-hjrpotheais which will 
focai hl8 at tention having th« greatest power<to det rac t ) . 
These are the foeua-galn and foeue-loas hypotheeee. The 
foons-saln a t t r ae t s the individual towards the course of 
action concernedi the focus-loss detracts hl« svayi t ^ 
decision depending on which of the two i s aore powerful. 
There are many alternative courses of action* A 
pair of focus values would be obtained for each alternative 
In the manner described above* A choice I s then made In 
favour of that course of aetlon w ose focus-gain* s power to 
a t t r ac t In relation to the power to detract of I t s focus-loss 
I s more than I t i s In case of other pa i r s of foci . 
This may appear to be rather difficult* t a c k l e , how-
ever, has a ready device a t h s ^ * fhese 'prlmaiy' focus 
values are f i r s t converted into*standardised* focus values* 
The standardised value of a primary focus-gain I s such as 
to exercise e(]ual power (ascendancy) bat carrying ssero 
potent ial surprise* *We shall suppose the indlvldmal to 
atic himself In regard to each hypothesis of the pair? What 
hypothesis carrying n i l potential surprise would have 
exactly ecjaal power to stimulate his in teres t and would 
afford him the ssuae degree of enjoyment (or d is t ress) by 
antldpatioB**^ This makes the task of comparing various 
— I — II < — — » . « I m i i i i i i n < iiiiiiiirii M i l II II I Ill II I • II iiiiin 1 II 
u Ibid,, ^mafl^ Mttgaa in ^auoiigg* P*13« 
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pairs of foci very ea»y. As a l l standardised fael carry n i l 
potent ial surprise vs ar« l«f t only \A.th the gain or loss 
aagnittjdes nhteh are directly ooaparable. Choice i s 
explained 1^ Shaekle with the help of an indifference sap 
of uncertaint ies! which he ca l l s the 'Saabler-prefsrence 
eurres ' • 
standardised 
focus ^ain 
f/6. 3 
Standaidi^ed 
•foeus ioss 
8ach point on the indifference curve indicates a 
coBibination of standardised focus-gain and focus-loss irhich 
i s equally stimulating for the individual. These curves 
slope upward from le f t to r ight , greater gain being required 
to balance the increasing loss as we taove towards left* 
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The point 0 a t th« oi^ln indicates aero focus-gain and 
zero focus-loss, and the same Is tnie of a l l points on 
the 00 curve. Any on« eoursa of action would be represented 
on ta^ls Bap as a point on one of the curves. Out of my 
t w courses of action the one whose focus values l i e above 
and to the l e f t of the curve dwitalning the other wil l 
bs preferred. Thus a choice hctween several al ternatives 
wi l l be made in favour of the one whose foci are situated 
highest on the left-most curve. 
The atiape of the aap ref lects an individual 's at t i tude 
towards uncertainty at my time and will d i f fer from person 
to person and frc»n tiiae to t i a c . 
As an ladividoal cannot venture to lose more ttian his 
entire fortune^ choice i s also bounded ^ a perpendicular 
err«ot«d on the loss axis a t a point Measuring his enti ia 
fortune. 
The various focus outcqiaes indicate the individual 's 
estpectations a t present. But he ndght cjqject a change in 
his own expectation with the passage of tlisa.1 $\XQii changes 
are expected in response to news — new infbwation having a 
bearing on the action scheme open to the individual. Shackle 
has studied th i s aspect of ti^c problem in some de ta i l s . 
1. Sea Shai^let ,§affi4tt§tloni iB Sy?tt?alfiJ» Chapter I I , 
Appendix B and chapter I I I , and JBflfitgj.gn.Qrdtr,init TjH, 
chi^ters XXI? and XXST. ^ 
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But wt tMnk the «tMae« of Shaekla's atiaiysls of eboioe 
In face of uaeertalnty I s iufflclently represented ly ^^ 
brief auaaaiy giyeti abflve* 
Shadcle*8 analysis underlines the unraeasurabl l i t y of 
the outcomes of uncertain ventares, and the role of iaa<»ina-
t ion and loportanoa of the individual 's t as tes and teiapara-
sent (his gambler preference) In talcing decision in face of 
uncertainty. As the entire process, froa iaagining hypotheli-
eal cRitoomes and gauging the i r degrees of possibi l i ty , to the 
construction of the gambler'-preferenee n«p i s purely 
subjective, the departure of the actual ejtpost (mtoome from 
the one which foxned the basis of action I s seen in i t s 
true l ight and Seems to be ({ultc natural . As we have already 
rfflaaxiced I t i s In highlighting these aspects of the process, 
rather than In describing the dec!sion-making process that 
t a c k l e * s contribution to the uncerbilnty theory of profit 
l ies* 
CKIflCS (F SHAGKLS'S APPROACH 
Shackle's ai|^;aoks on the 'orthodox* approach and Ms 
contention that the probability caleulatl(xis do not apply 
to situatlcHUs Characterised by true uncertainty has m>t gcmc 
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unchallangad. There I s no need for us , however, to go in to 
the d e t a i l s of t h i s controverjiy, I t s i lghtfUl place being 
the theory of deciaton-aaklng. I t would, hovavsr, be 
i n t e r e s t i ng to note that J .^en detaonstrates tha t the r a a l 
bas is of th« non app l l eab lUty of probabi l i ty ca lcu la t ions 
to c ruc i a l events I s the endlass charac ter of the se r ias 
of a l temat lvQS aiKi not the c ruc i a l natui-s of the event, ' ' 
Professor Pen th inks t h a t deaoUshing the orthodox view i s 
not necessary for Shackle ' s theory which i s r ea l ly relevant 
t o a spec ia l case* VedicstQln,^ \ftio f inds Shackle 's views 
•persuasive but not correct* contends t h a t the cjncept of 
l og ica l p robab i l i ty as dev^oped by Camap i s (juite suited 
for unique events* He a lso regards i t an exaggratlon to 
oonteM, as t a c k l e does , t h a t the events faced by 
entrepreneurs are generally unique in nature* 
C*F*Carter docs not accept Shackle 's proposi t ion that a 
number of'P®'^^®®*-^ possible* Iqrpotheses a l l carry sero 
p o t e n t i a l surprise**' He also poses the p o s s i b i l i t y of niore 
1* I .Pen quoted froa a review i n the Dutch language in 
•Be Sconoaiist», 1956. i n J h a c k l e i MMlflQB^Qyj^jr m 
!SJLM§ P*90* I n chapter XI of t h i s book Shackle seeks to 
answer a imBbor of h i s c r i t i c s such as J .Puthueeary. 
Wilhelffi Kerele, l e r a l d Ciould,M,B.?ficholson and C.F.Cartsr . 
2 . E,S.Week8t«ini HevlcW of Shackle 's »Eatpectatlons in 
Boon<»iCS'pp*81-24 Agerican Bconoalc Review,VQI.XL!T,Jimft, 
1988 and *0n the Use of the Theory of Probabi l i ty in 
Bconofflics', Review of Bconoaic Studies,. Vol. tX, 1952-53, 
pp.191-198, 
5* C.F.Cartert 'A Revised 1?h€ory of Ejqpcctaticm* 3;conQ«ie 
iseurnXf^oUl^m^ Decemb r 1953, T}*818,For S h a ^ l e ' s 
eosEiCBts see ftffttalQB '^UU mA ,Tla,i» pp.86-89. 
18S 
tbAQ two foeus values for the same course of aetlaci*' 
Carter i s , nevertheless, highly Sfopathetie to Shayckle* s 
InnovatlQii and proeaeds to suggest sone sodlfications 
vhlch vould remove some of the defects he discovers in 
Shackle's theorf* Another alternative Is suggested bjr 
James W» Angel* lAille e i l t l ca l of t a c k l e ' s deseription 
of ho¥ focus values are arrived at | he i s , on the ^ o l e , in 
agreement vlth Ms erft^ieism of t^e orthodox approach* His 
own seheiM vould measure likelihood directly instead of 
measuring i t through surprise, take notice of the time period 
imolvad in various investment sehesMis as^ pzovida for a 
different method of comparing focus outcomes* Carter thinks 
that diMsrete values are more real is t ic than the continuous 
variables used for potential surprise and gainsCand losses) bj 
Shackle* The mental pieiwr* of tha daoision maker that bs 
builds up ooiQirises a aaabsr of stepS| each signifying a degree 
of belief and aeeoamedatlng a oumber of hjrpothetleal outcomes 
dafisring in their attractiveness* Choice wil l b« effected bjr 
eoBparisoii amongst the most attractlvt outcomes one from each 
step, the degrees of belief contending vith the degrees of 
attraeti vene ss* ^  
t* James IT* Angit 'Vneertainty. Likelihood and Investment 
Decisions* Quarterly Journal of Eoonoaies, Vol* IV, February 
1960, pp» 1*88* 
2* C*F* Carter, op*cit*, p* Q1V* 
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The aodifKiatlon sought in Eteaokl*** theory, would 
not affaet i t s essantial nattira. I t ahouLd, howwer, he 
noted that In replacing the probability approach by his own 
Shackle has not abaolYed the Individual of a l l mental 
ealeulatlons. To assign degrees of potential surprise to 
various liypothatioal outooauks of a mLniber ot possible 
courses of action, to discover the focus-outeomes and eonvett 
them into standardised foiais and thus to construct the 
entlre»gaabler-preference aap* requires a degree of consciousnei 
suWilety of ^udg^eat and laaginatllreness that i s ordinarily 
lacking. All these vexed qaesticms have been raised, vith 
the rider that this brill iant solution i s after a l l as 
tricky as the one i t rejects.^ Bat what i s really significant 
i s not praotieaX feasibil i ty but piQrehological realism and 
logical consistency. The practical businessman may be 
as innocent vith respect to the 9 funotioB and gambler-
preference map as he i s of the subjective numiirical 
probabilities or Camap's 'posits*, but his mental process 
i s certainly closer to Shackle's picture than to the image 
built by the probability approadi« 
Shackle's contribution has been fUlly endorsed Iqr en 
Important conttltwttor to profit theory in the recent times 
•— B«S»Xelrstead, as we shall ha^e occasion to mention later, 
1, J,F, Weston, *The Profit Concept and Theory i A Restatement* 
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SHACKiiE cai ms, mTtms OF PHOFIT 
Besides analysing t^e process of deeislon^iiklng In 
uoe^itain sitmatlons Shaekle seeks further to olarlfy 
the profit concapt and theory. He emphasises the need 
of having tvo d is t inc t concepts of profi t ar.d of clearly 
distin^tULshing batveen the® tbroug out an/ discussion on 
th« nature, role and signifieaaet of prof i t . One concept 
of profit re la tes to the thing imagined, that which i s the 
ob;]30t of expectations a^d forms the basis of decisions. 
The othor concept relates to the thing actually realised. 
The f i r s t i s related to a future interval of tiH!*=, vi th a 
decisive lapact on the present aonent, the ^noaent in bein;* 
or the ' so l i t a ry noaent* in lAiich decision i s actually taken, ' 
The second i s an actuali ty in the past* I t only detarmiaes 
the size of the fund at the entrepreneur's disposal for any 
future enterprise and influences his future coursG of actlOTi, 
waking hia nora self roliant^ op t ia i s t l c or otherwise. 
The f i r s t , the exaate profit Is by nature not a unique 
suaj but a set of hypotheses — iaa^ined outeoaes of 
a l te inat ive courses of aotic»i» Eadh hypothesis has two 
dlmensionst the size of galnCor loss) and the degree of 
possiM Llty of i t s rea l isa t ion. In rae t ing uncertainty 
U a,2;.S,^aaklei Oeoisioti^Order and Tiae in Huaaa Affairs. 
chapter I I I , 
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lay taking a d«olsion the eBtrepreneiir I s rewarded, s laul-
tanaouslyi by enjoyment or suffering in iaaglnation due to 
the anticipated gain or loss . This Qnjoymant lay anMoipation 
of the expected gain i s the only coapensation for the 
d i s t ress by anticipation of the loss feared. Decision 
presupposes that tShe for«er prevails orar ths l a t t e r , in 
the alternative chosen, 
the actually realised prof i t s , howsoerer WQ define 
them, are imiquc sums of money — a one dimensional 
varlaltle -~ and c^ n^ he regarded a reward for aiQatln^ 
uncertainty only In a spectal sense*^ 
Working with two different concepts of profit has I t s 
inplications for the t rad i t iona l auudalsation principle. 
I t i s hard to conceive how i t can he applied to the two-
dioensional set of hypotheses w!ilch i s the f i r s t concept 
of p rof i t . I f i t i s aK>ll«d to the jasaSi realised 
prof i ts i t I s , once again, In a very special and l ia i ted 
sensc. 
Shackle distinguishes between a number of typ^s of 
expost profi ts whose econoolc roles differ fros one another. 
These are i 
1, Ib id , , pp. 2«2-^8* 
2. I b id . , Chapter XX7III. 
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1« Profits ralatlng to th« outooMS of laypothaseB 
oarrfiag x«7o potential 8arprls«(l»e*t thote 
regarded at parfaetly possible). Thsss are 
•xpsotod profits* 
2* Profits rsXatlog to tfai oateones of hnothsses 
earxying aore tbaa ssro bat less than the absolute 
•axiaoi of potential surprise* (Which vere 
oharaeterised as lass than perfeetly possible bat 
not i^^ssible)* 
The dlfferenoe in the siagnitudes of t and 2 oan be 
looked npon as windfalls* They aay be regarded 
rewards of speoial Icnovledge and ticill in the power 
of foreeasting, as ths e3Q)eeted profits are* 
S* Profits related to the hypotheses earxring the 
absolute oaxiBai of potential 8nrprisevl*e*| those 
regarded to be inpossible)* These areidndfalls due 
to pure luek and speoially favourable dreoBStanees. 
To the )est of the present writer's Imowledge, Shaekle 
i s the f irst eoonomist to give a olear definition of profits 
ascribable to pure lueky as distinguiahed froa expeotad 
profits uid windfalls in the ordinary sense of the tei«« 
Ataekle also tries to distinguish between the 
different measures whleh ami be applied to the iuufij^ 
profits. The standardised foeas*gain of a liypothesis, 
and the galn-eqiuiTalent of a policy Measured lay the 
interoept of the relevant indlfferenee curve on the X axis 
of the gaabler^preferenoe map, are the two absolute 
•easures* CorreSiX>nding to these are two differential 
1* Ibid*, p* 2§0* 
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•easuret yleM«d W » eo«parl»oii of the policy under 
consideration with the a«3Ct be i t , or with any other poUcy. 
By def ln l t ioa th is type of profit la sosething l a p l l d t in 
the person^ axpeetatlcms exi»tln? at a single location of 
h i s viewpoint. Thla 1» in * a r p contrast with tha ^sfiijt 
profit which I s soaething arising froa the passage of the 
Tiewpolnt through aoae t l ae IntatYal,^ 
The econofflle role of deelsion-making and uncertainty-
bearing I s played by aen to get the prise of profits in 
2 the eXante sense discussed above* 
Shaekle also evolves the concept of 'dynaale Increment 
of gain-equivalent' which restats frcm e<»parison of gain-
equivalent of a policy with the gain-equivalent of another 
(or the same) policy called for \fy a revision of the 
Individual expectations based on new Infoziaatlan aade 
available by passage of h is viewpoint over a short 
Interval of tlae* In e f f ec t , i t Is the result of a 
comparison between the person* s exyi^t^ and exposlf views of 
the short t lae Interval separating the two locations of his 
view point* Shackle's view of the factors Influencing 
businessaen's expectations and resulting in dynamic 
incrasients of gain-equivalents leads to the inference 
that i t i s mainly the behaviour of macroeconoaic variables 
whi<di i s involved* 
1. Ibid*, p. 295. 
2 . Ibid*, p* 263* 
3 . Ibid*, pp« 264-66« 
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Shackle*» work has, In tbe pr-sent v r i t e r s view, 
serf94 to strangthea the elaia of uneartainty theory of being 
the theory of profi t (at the mlepoeconomie leve l ) . I t has 
done so by refining the key coneepts and taking a clearer 
position on setae of the probl^is posed ty the c r i t i c s of the 
theoiy# The sane has been attempted by John Fred Weston, 
A BESTATEMaNT M WESTON 
J .F , Weston res ta tes the uncertainty theory of profit 
in a generalised Banner, renoving a number of als* 
understandings and answering sone e r i t i e a l cjaestions.^ 
He tniphaslses the fact that t^e chief contribution of the 
theoxy was to clarify the concept of econcwlc profit and 
distinguish I t frcM other incones, sutfh as vages, rents 
and capital gain. I t explained how milaputed value surpluses 
arose, at the nicroecononle level , because of errors of 
1. J.F.Westoni'A 3e»eralised Theory of ProfitlA| 
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prediction whleh were due to the oxl stance of ttiieart«lnty» 
Profi t i s the difference between j jMift an* cJCPQgt re turns . ' 
Weston reexamines the concepts of r isk and uncertainty, 
finds Knight*8 classif icat ion unsatisfactory, and concludes 
that ' the relevant dis t inct ion for profi t theoiy is not 
between risk and uncertainty Imt between transfomable riifes 
and nontransforaable risks*.^ He adopts C.O.Hardy*s 
definit ion that * risk exists whan uncertainty i s associated 
with an undesirable outcooe.** What Knight ca l l s rlrtt a ^ 
a©re infomatively be referred to as transforaablg 
uncertainty,* 
A nuaber of false notions attributed to the 
uncertainty theory are examined and discarded. Thus i t i s 
wrong to t r e a t uncert^1qr*bearing as a factor of production 
as Plgou does,* Iter does uncertainty-be a rin? ini^lve a 
d i s u t i l i t y ec»pensated by prof i t . The proper subject for 
study by the theory i s not profi ts in the accounting sense, 
which are a congloaeration of Tarious types of inccMie 
1* Ib id . , AtMdi^ ftB ,g^9?IBlt<l ,i:^n^>ft ^ol.XI., p . 46 
2, I b i d , , p , 43 
3, Ib id , , p . 43,quoting C.O.Hardyj Rlsl^ and Risk* 
bearing> Chicago University Press, 1951, 
4* I b i d . , J<mro§3. Qt ?ftJ•i^l^f^A B<s9qi9iy» P * I B 8 
5, A.C.Pigoui Ih^ fggflQWtfg gf ¥^U%Tn$ Appendix I . 
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but th« pure prof i t s , as defined Igr uncertainty theory, 
beoause of their analytical s ignif icance. With thg non-
pure concepts of prcrfit goes the view that profit motive i s 
the major economic incentive. In fact I t i s their incomes 
which the economic agents seek to maximise. In a competitive 
economy Income maximisation along with the price mechanism 
plays the al loeat lve role which some theor is t s wrongly 
ascribe to the profit motive. Moreover,'to attribute a 
central role to profit tutxlmlsatl m In s t a t i c , e ^ l l b r l u m 
analysis must lead to eonfusicm because s ta t i c analysis 
abstracts from the veiy conditions which give rf.s« to 
econcmilc prof i t . Profit I s therefore a concept which must 
be analysed In a framework of drynamic analysis*.^ The 
maximisation principle cannot be applied to uncertain residues, 
This however daQS not Impl^ that rational behaviour wil l not 
be possible or e f fec t ive , because Hmitatlon, adaptation, 
and Innovation are a l l exsmples of rational behaviour in 
face of uaeertalrty' .^ A further emise(|ueBCe of tearing 
profit apart from the context of competitive equllibriiai 
I s the rejection of the ccmcept of noimal prof i t .^ 
He convincingly argues that the charge that uncertainty 
theoiy f a l l s to explain profit as the income of a dist inct 
socia l c lass i s based on a misconception. Profit i s not a 
d l s t i lbut lve share at par with wages or intarest . It Is a 
non*functional income, such uncertain income foivt a part 
1. J.F.W(iston,Affitll?faJfg?Wffil9 ^TJff tep*dt»t ?•»•• 
2. Ibid., JftBnml Qf P934iU<?§3i f^lBOBTt o p . d t . , p. 109, 
3. Ibid. , laftrlfiiB .fwaaiifi ^gTigft op .e i t . , p. ss . 
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of the Ineone of a l l fac tors of production. 
Weston finds very close l i a i l a r l t l e s in the prof i t 
t h e o r i e s of Knight and Sdiunpater, Innovating a c t i v i t y 
i s both a source and a product of unce r t a in ty . By ada l t t lng 
tha t innovation i t s e l f I s being reduced t o routine^ Sdiuapeter 
has cose c loser to Knight ' s pos i t ion t h a t entrepreneur ship 
i s bas ica l ly a judg^aent of men whUe innovation and other 
a c t i v i t i e s can be delegated to the hlrdd aanager. Despite 
t h i s and otherpoints of agreeaent the two econoalsts ' 
concepts of p ro f i t d i f f e r i n iapor tan t r e spec t s . *The 
uncer ta in ty theory of prof i t regards the incoae froa the 
exercise of innovating fuaction as wage or sa lary type of 
funct ional return^ The teaporary d i f f e r e n t i a l re turn secured 
by tha successful Innovator i s a (Marshalliaa (juasi rent} 
peraaneut d i f f e r e n t i a l s are monopoly revenues or taken as 
. 2 
c a p i t a l ^ains*« 
I n eisfflining the challange to the tmcertainty theory 
posed by the r i s e of aaeroeeoncHBlesVfoston subal ts t h a t the 
scope of the uncer ta in ty theory i s H a l t e d but s t r e s ses 
i t s usefulness in defining eeonoaic p r o f i t . He does not 
find the maeroeconoaic theor ies of Kaleckl and Bouldlng 
sat lsfaetozyy t u t recognises the need of such a theory 
U J.A.achui[q;>eteri fiiBlttlJait ^9g4ftA4ja, ^0^ PfiBflrtCy 
p«132, "ieorga Allen and uavln l*td*,Xmndcii, 1990. 
2 . J .y .Weaton ,^egj^aa JgQB9llg ^Vrl^WtOP»clt. , p . 4S. 
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whieh would sappXeaent ra ther than replace the uncer ta inty 
theory* ' 
Brief referencea t o a iackle show tha t Weston i s 
n e i t h e r l a p r e s s ^ W h i s new teehnlcjae nor convinced Tagr 
h i s a t tack on the conrant lonal approach. But h i s remark 
t h a t ' I f the deelsion-maker c a ^ t aasl^in probabi l i ty valuee 
to a l t e r n a t i v e outcomes, i t i s d i f f i a u l t t o ureiarstand 
how h» oan a r i l v e a t degrees of po t en t i a l aurpriae*^ l a 
olsvioualy proitq^ted by a f a l lu ra t o apprscla ta ttie raaln 
reasons of Shackle 's a t t ack on the appl ica t ion of 
p robab i l i ty Judgements to u n c e r t a i n ^ a i t u a t l o n s , Weston 
continues to believe in the appl ica t ion of probabi l i ty 
theory to uncer ta in s i tua t lona despi ta wamln? th t 
Knii^ht'a theoiy would lose BUCh of i t s contents i f t h i s I s 
d o n e , ' Weston however f inds the probleas involved to be 
too d i f f i c u l t for Shadlcle* s approach to deal with 
s a t i s f a c t o r i l y * 
WIIHTBAUB'S SMPHASIS Oil COTfTBACTS 
Xet another cont r ibut ion to the uncer ta in ty thaor^f of 
1* Ibld.yj^qttjrufig .oS fQlX%l<i%l ^ffBflgytOP'Cit,, p . 109 and . „ ,, } i ^gBaay tOP ' i t p.1«9 ai 
Aaeilcaa EoonoBie BaviaXtVoUXLI,March m t , p , 1 f « 
2« J.F,We3ton,a?:(aini^I Of PQUUVftl ,4f9aaMrtOP«Qlt,,p«1»4, 
3« J«A«8tookflsht*Aa ITnoertainty theory of Profit ,Consent ' 
^l^rtgftB ^anffitt^g ^flTl^yt ^ol.Ja«I,March 1M1 | p,1««« 
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profi t that deserves aention I s that of Sidney Weintraub 
whose 'analysis Imllds cai tha work: of Knight and paral le ls 
a more recant eontrlbutlon Igr Weston* #^  Though ths macro-
eeonoBlc nature of V/elntraub's theory of profit necessitates 
the postpcMraent of I t s detailed consideration to a la t r 
chapter, sone of the points relevant to title theme of th i s 
chapter wil l be noted below. 
Welntraub emphasises the contraetaal basis of 
modem enterprise as the main cause, along wlt^ the 
o 
presence of uncertainty, of the emei^encs of profi t . 
•Contracts usually provide for a n ? i d temporal 
payment plan, regardlsss of economic changes| bankruptcje 
courts, mutual consent, or exj^lry dates provide the only 
escape routes. I t Is t h i s fact , therefore, of the r igidi ty 
of the payment sequence despite sconomle change, which 
permits a profit concept to be forged'.* 
This, tfelntraub thinks,cal ls for elevating the 
existence of contracts to the status of a source of prof i ts . 
I t I s just i f ied to do so because the existence of contracts 
Inevitably leads to the emergence of profi ts or losses. 
1. Sidney ^'elntraubi^AB Aafigaft^ r^  \Q t^ Q Th§glT QX lUQQm 
Distribution, p.I»^ 
£. I b id . , p. I ? ; and pp. 191-195. 
3. Ib id . , p . 19£. 
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*Once contraots appear in the econongr a profit, t r a i l 
i s a laos t iner i tabXe. Any ohan^sa in aeononlc condit on from 
the expectation on lAiioh the eon t rae t s were haaed wi l l 
e s t a b l i s h acme devia t ion between Imputed values and 
con t rac tua l ea iMngt and i t i s t h i s discrepancy which 
c r e a t s s p r o f i t s or losses**^ 
This s t r e s s on the contractual base serves an 
important purpose in Weintraub*s tdieory. I t explains tha 
permanence of a p ro f i t element in incoae be t t e r than tha 
uncer ta in ty fac tor l e f t alone cwild do,^ Uncertainty r e l i e s 
on chronic change and lagging adjustments for explaining 
the perpetual existence of prof i t s* The new explanation 
does not lean so heavi ly an t h i s eleaent of change because 
'whether change i s continuous o r merely in t=»Bl t tent and 
occas iona l , so long as agreements are wr i t t en with change 
imperfectly foreseen, then p r o f i t s w i l l always be i n t e r -
spersed among f i r a s in the econony and w i l l cons t i tu te 
one of tha enduring inoone ca tegor ies of real i ty** 
The uaeex^n ty theory as formulated by Knight c lear ly 
recognised the cont rac tua l bas is of modam enterpr i se and 
i t s r o l e in casaing p r o f i t s to omeT^Q, But, conplains 
v^eintraub, ttie t r a d i t i o n following h i a has perpetuated the 
U I b i d . , p . 194, 
2* I b i d . , pp. 195 and 19d. 
3 . i M d . , p. 198. 
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be l i e f th&t imaxpeoted ehanges cons t i t u t e the course of 
p r o f i t s and that they are «oi)Oded through fa ther rapid 
equil ibrium adaptatloB,"* Ee spec ia l ly charges Keirate 4 of 
having neftleeted t h i s Inportant altunent In the theory. But 
3 h i s o r l t l a l sm of Weston for having described nrofl ts as the 
difference between exna-t and exante r e tu rn s , presumably 
because of Weston's f a i l u re to msntlcn cont rac ts while 
asking t h i s s tatement . I s based on a ml sunder standing. For 
Weston, l i k e Knight, always proceeds on ttie assumption that 
competitive condit ions ensure t ha t contractual pagrments 
( including payment for own fac to r s ) tend to be equal to the 
eip^nta (expected) re turns* 
While conceding h i s point regarding the important 
r o l e of contrac ts i t can be pointed out that uncer ta inty 
s t i l l remains t^e u l t imate source of p r o f i t s . For, as he 
himself recognises , i t i s uacer ta ln ty which neces s i t a t e s the 
cont rac tua l base. 
* Business a c t i v i t y requi res the cont rac tua l base In 
order to cope with the uncer ta in ty at tendent tm economic 
change*« 
mmmmmmmmMmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmtmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm 
1. I b i d . , p . 807 
2 . I b i d . , p . 192 fn. 
3 . I b i d . , p» 206 fn« 
4* I b i d . , p . t92. 
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And 'DiTsrs t ty of fo r t eas t and r i s k svsralon t*ius account 
for cont rac tua l modss of h i r e , ' ^ 
Welatrattb agrees with tha o ther uncer ta inty t h e o r i s t s 
i n r e j ec t ing tha conoept of noiaal p r o f i t s . ^ ^ t then he 
prooeods to a t tack a concept long cherished in Uiat 
t r a d i t i o n , t h a t of pure prof i t s* This has beooioe, in h i s 
• lew, »the »08t barren p i l l of a l l » . ^ For one thing i t s 
magnitude (In the aggregate) i s always tending to be sero* 
Then h«3 wondars why there should be pure p ro f i t s and no 
pure wages or pure (|aasi r en t , and points out that a l l Incones 
9ie l i k e l y t o bear the impact of uaeigiiietsd events . But 
the concept was aeant to guard against the aecotaitlng Tlew 
of p ro f i t and the uncer ta in ty t h e o r i s t s can Jus t i f i ab ly 
point out tha t the need t o do so has not dioinished by 
Weintraub' s o%rat t rea tnent of the «ibjeet« 
Weintraub has no sya|>at]:^ for Shackle* s po ten t i a l 
surpr i se approach* In fac t as the whole topic 'borders 
on the psychological and the idiilosophicaX* ,^ economists 
alone can hardly a r r ive a t any conclusion* 
1, I b i d , , p* t9St 
2, I b i d , , p , 19U 
3* I b i d . , p . t 9 t , 
4 . I b i d . , p . 20J fn. 
ayiortaitiit of th« uaetrtalnty theory has, hovcrar, 
been coBmim to a l l theso oontiltetoTs* Thtir different 
appfoa^ea only wrf to ihed light on tha difftrent 
aapeets of the theory* This was proof suffieleat that 
the emx of tint thaory had stood the teat of the tlaos 
and BO ftttnrt theory of profit ootild afford to nagleot 
i t* But ftirther darelopaeatsi in estlrely new direetioas, 
s t i l l airaited the stadent of profit theory* 
CHAPTBR FIVE 
HBW DS^niiOPMSKTS IN SCO!r(»CCS ASD TH3IR IMPACT 
0 1 THU THSORY OF PROFIT 
Th« Or«at !>«pr«88lon of 19ao<» distorted the iaage 
of a self adjusting oo«petitiv« isrstem with vhioh nothing 
eouXd be wrong for Terf long* >ftiat ooaqpelXed naiiy to 
doubt the traditional thinking was the staxk reality 
that alaost arery thing was wrong with the systea and 
i t e:idiibited no signs of return to noraaley unless saaething 
was done about i t* The rethinking thus forced r e s u l t s 
in great ehmges in the views handed doim to the eeonoaists 
by the elassieal tradition on; money and prieeSiem^loyvent 
and output I savings aad investaent, wages and interest and 
the theory of ralue and distribution in general, besides 
the radieal changes whioh ensued in such fields as fiscal 
policy and state participation in aeonoaic aotiTlty. 
This i s not to suggest that the eeoncHie theories 
of John Haynard Keynes and Edward Hastings Ghaaberlin owed 
thenselTes directly to the depression. The genesis of the 
Bdw ideas can no doubt be traced back to the thinking of 
their authors and others folng back to a period earlier 
than 1929* But the foraulatlon these ideas got and the 
wide acceptance they received were greatly the result of 
the changed conditions* 
Th3B theories of monopolistic competition and 
the *new coonoiics* of J*M. Karnes were the two outstanding 
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deveXopaeatf eC tim th lrt ios . These theories touched tbe 
•ezy faadamentals in eeononles and^ taken one with the 
other, eaXltfd tor a revision of thinlcing on erer^ r sabjeet 
of S0B6 iaportanee* In this study our Interest in theo i s , 
hoverer, Ilalted« We shall note vhat these eoononlsts have 
to say on the snbjeot of profit, direetly as well as by 
iaplieation, and t^at lapaet ttiey aetaally had on the 
theoi^ of profit* 
A - MOWOJPOUSTIC C0KP3TITIOH THS0i€[5S 
Writing a» early a» 1»2« Plero Sraffa hadtiotad 
thati 'Bvery day «xperl«nea *hoir« that a very large 
tamher of undtrtaking* — and th« majority of thosa 
which product manuf aeturad con»aaer«' goods — work 
under conditioaa of inaivid*ra dlniniahing eoeta • , . . 
The chief obatade against which they hare to contend 
when they want gradually to Inerease their production 
does mt l i e in the cost of production-^ which, indeed 
generally favours thea in that direction — hut in the 
difficulty of selling the larger quantity of goods without 
reducing the price, or withcmt having to face increased 
•arket expenses* • ^ 
This i s a far ezy indeed fron t^e idea of a 
eoapetitiye equillbriua with f lms at the footsteps 
of iaereasing costs and perfectly elastic demand curres 
for the flna's produce, there heing no difficulty of 
selling and no need to faee increase market expenses. 
But, like Marshall's ohli<|ue references earlier, the 
article reaained neglected t i l l the point was taken up 
in the early thirt ies hy i t s powerful eaiponents* 
1 • Piero Sraffat 'The Itaws of Return under CaipetitiTe Conditions: jiasa4fi-£2aEa8i»^oi.xxxyi, 
Deeemher 1986, p« 943* 
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perfectly eoopetltlye •qallibrl^Hi (F,H. Knight). In sach 
a state of th@ eeonoqy froa vhldi nonopol/ vas assumed 
avay IB the f irst instance aod later introdueed as a spaeial 
ease to ^ treated separatelf and in Isolation froa the 
rest of the system| tlM ooapatltlxre foroes ensured a 
distribatlon of the product of industry among the 
eooperatlns factors of produetion according to their 
Marginal produetlvities* By aarglnal prcduetiTlty of a 
factor vas meant the value of I t s aarginal product and 
i t was demonstrated that, utuler certain restrictive 
assmptions, the total product was just exhausted 1^ the 
factorial rewards leaving no surplus and causing no 
deficit . Led lay Marshall, the English tradition dCalt 
with the prohlea of dlstiihutlon at the industry level 
adopting partial e(|UilibnuB technique as contrasted to 
the Walarasian general equilibrlua teehniqiue i^ hich dealt 
with the econoiqy as a vhole seen as comprising individual 
firms anSi households. The conclusionS| however, w«re not 
dissimilar. An industxy comprised Individual firms, small 
in relatlcm to the market and competing with one another, 
Ifo single firm exercised any control over the prieef the 
damand for flisi's product was perfectly elastic at the 
going market price, as a l l taie firms in one Industry 
produced the same product. There was no occasion for 
sell ing a e t i v l ^ as there was no difficulty in marketing 
the output of a firm, that output heing the greatest the 
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Central iBportaOiOO amongst wmopoXlstle competition 
theories oust be attached to the oontpltmtion of B,R, 
Chsnberlln iriioee Tl^ a Theory of ItottQBQlistlc Comet!tioB 
appeared In 1953. This In no way heUttle^the eontrlbutlon 
of Mrs* Joan Robinson whose B^onoBies ^f laperfeet 
qpMieti tton appeared slauXtaneoasIy* Bat Chaab@rlltt*s 
theory has had sore to do vifh the smbseq o^ent Ispaet on 
the prof i t theory* Another oontrlbation made soon after 
Is that.the derman eoonosist R*7on Staekelberg*' Pareto's 
Ify^aal had dealt with the sabjeot aaeh earlier bat partly 
due to his failure to fully emphasise aenopolistie 
eoipetition as distinguished from monopoly« and largely due 
to the predcNslnanee of the partioular e^illbrium 
approaeh of Alfred Marshall the swing in farour of the 
new theory had to await the new eontributions in the 
thirt ies . 
I t has been noted above that a l l the theories 
of profit propounded hitherto started from the position 
that there was a certain state of the economy in which 
profits in the sense of uniespated surpluses did not exist. 
This state was variously described ^ the terms General 
SqutUbrium (!.« Walras)^Static state (J.B. Clark), 
Circular Flow of f^ oonosiie Life(J.A«Sehui9eter) and the 
U H.Von 3ta<*elbergt MftrfctrXm. imj Qlfl^gt¥3i<lltt 
wein uHd Berlin, 1934. 
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flTm found It profltabXa in th« light of i t s inteznal 
conditions to produce. At or near oquilibiliaB output 
the f i m vas fadod with a rising eost curve v;hieh served 
as a Mraks on further expansion. 
This pieture was nade real ist ie by alloving for 
divergent condition! surroiaiding individual producers, by 
adaitting indivis ihiI i t ieS | iomobilities and inelastic 
supply of certain factors which accounted for surpluses 
in the nature of rents loid quasi*rents. Tha enterpriser 
was rewarded by *nonial profits' which were generally 
explalnsd in tems of opportunity eost — the highest 
reward whidi the organiser of producticxi in one Industiy 
could expect in any other employnent or enterprise 
outside the industiy. Hetrogcneity amongst individual 
entrepreneurs was locked after by rent of abil i ty. 
Profits proper were then shown to arise from 
dynaaie changes, innovation, and uncertainty bearing 
(largely attendent upon change and development). Th« 
argufflent awst by now be too familiar to bear repetition. 
As noted above acm^oly appeared on the sc^e as 
an isolated case. ?he monopolist exercised a degree of 
control on supply which enabled him to cdiarge a price 
us 
higher than eoaq^etltlY* eonditions vould panit* Monopoly 
position was held Intaet lif keeplngoot ooap«titoyt ^ 
artlflelalXf ereated seareltles where aatmral ones were 
lacking. Though loosely described a» profit! i t was 
recognised that the penanent incoaie of the monopolist 
was of the nature of rent to be ispnted baek to the 
eearee factors* 
THE IMPEiffBCSf MAMET 
the entire argnaant was controverted hy the new 
theory w>loh destroyed the very laage of the eoonoisy on 
the basis of which i t proceeded. To begin with, the 
idea of a perfectly eoapetltlTe system was declared 
as not only nnraalistle bat theoretically ina^iss ib le . 
Modem econosiKy did not consist of industries eoaprlslng 
firas producing hono^eneous products* Th^rproduced goods 
^ I d i w?re close but less than perfect substitutss for 
one another* The product of an Industry was not 
homogeneous, i t was differentiated. As a result the deaand 
curve for each Individual producer was not ft^rigoata^ 
U S.H. Chaaberllni The II^ Q^gy af HORggOllalilfl 
^aiBgUUfflt p#t1,Harvard,nsQ* 
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but dovmrard sloping* Baeh single sel ler was In a 
position to Banlpulate Ms sales Toluae bgr changing 
bis price* Than i t was rewarding to persuade the 
eustoaers by Indulging la selling activity to belleifa 
that the f im*s product was superior to that being 
offered by i t s olose eonpetltors* This new picture 
of dosaly competing aonopollsts vas entirely different 
both f?<» that of pure coapetltioB and of pure monopoly* 
I t envisaged a new significance for the problea of 
Interdependence of -various firms* The moiber of flras 
within an Industty and the relatlva size of these firms 
eaae In for special consideration because of their 
direct bearing on tlw issue of interdependence* 
With ssllini; costs as a means to manipulate 
demtfid so as to increase the total revenue^ profit 
meiximlsatlQn aould no Icm^er be interpreted as a matter 
only of prloe*output adjustment* An yet another dU.menslon 
to this problem was added with the concept of product as a 
•axlable* Product varLationy with price constant, was a 
new subject for m^ixlmlsatlon principle to q^ply* ^ ^ s 
there were at least four variables which had to be considered 
in studying t ^ firm's beharlour In maximising i t s profit. 
They were pnce , product, output and selling cost* Needless 
to point out that the traditional analysis was seriously 
handicapped by limiting I tse l f to a study of prlocoa^mt 
relatlosis only* 
147 
The eoneept of product differentiation a3.8o 
at ruck at thi irary roots of the concept of industry. 
With homogeneity of product gon«, t h i s concept lost 
i t s analytical l i ^o r t . Chaahsrlin sought to replace i t 
137 a group of f i ras producing close subst i tu tes . Bat 
i t vas soon realised^ and l a t e r exponents l ike Triffln 
vere (]uick to point out that the cr i ter ion of close 
suhs t i t a tab i l i ty , t ^ e l d both by Mrs. Bobinson and 
Chamberlin, cuts aoross the oonTentional industries* 
Chaaberlin suggested the additional eri texlon of 
technological s i a i l a r l t y . But even t h i s cr i ter ion i s not 
very suitable vhere sharp differentiation of product 
exis ts and'has only a very indirect «id distant bearing 
OR the oQAparison of the i r demand curves • • • • . . ' There 
may be keener coiapetition between sudi d i ss in i la r 
commodities as radio sets and bi<^cles than between two 
aakes of the same eomodity l ike aotor ear. The 
theoretical problea i s that of general coipetitiveness 
between goods, and no groupings are ussfUl idiere 
subs t i tu tabl l i ty i s ia^erfeet a l l along the l ine . 
Differentiation of the product being th« rule 
rather than the exception the new theory discarded the 
idea of a no ^profit s ta te of the econoaqr. Widespread 
preTalence of oonopol^ eleiaents in the circular flow 
or the s t a t i c state vas established beyond doubt, due to 
1. Bobert Tziffint a«if>iaMfttfijffflaBflUttQaj.aai gtaaiyfiJl 
,^ p* S5« 
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dlff«7«ntlatlon of prodnet and the tneoarageaent to soiling 
aettvity thu» affoTdod*^ Boenonle sarplaiaa followed the 
prasenee of Bumopolistio elements in the eoonoo^ In the aanner 
desorllMd holov* 
Origan the usual V shaped average eost ourve i t i s not 
possible for a dovgward sloplti^ average rovaaua(l«e«ydemand) 
eurre to he tangent to i t at th€ point of alnisROi average oost« 
I t has to out i t | or to be tangent to i t , at sove point higher 
than, and to t^e le f t of, the position of slniisuB eost. The 
aciuilihriua output of the f l m Is Indieatod hy the interseetion 
of th« Marginal rerenua euxve asd the sarginal eost eurre, for 
only then w i l l total profits of the f i m he naxlntui* Aud 'no 
Matter in vhat position the d«Baand eurve Is drawn, i t s negative 
slops wil l define aaxlBRiai profits at a point further to ^ e left 
S 
than i f i t wore horisontal, as under pure eo«petltion, * Whether 
the demand ourve i s tangent to the <»st eurve at the e(|ailibntaiEi 
point or outs i t above that point depends on the noaber of close 
eoapetltors in the group and i s linked i^ with the probl^ of 
* entry* into the groi^i whi^ we shall discuss below. 
But aa ecpillibriua to the le f t of the bottoa 
of the 17 aaans daoreasing oosts as output i s expanded. 
There are Inoreaslng returns to s<»ile and i t w i l l require 
sore than the total produet to reward a l l factors with ths 
U E,H*aha«berlinf Tgyigag ft Jag9 9mX^ ttlflftfY flf yjtoti 
1 p, 815, Oxford trnivarsity Press, Hew ferk,19S7i 
aim j 
pp« f t -
2« S.H. Chambarlini J ^ th^^Xt 9^ %aMlgUmi <fglBi1?lliiBt 
7-78, 
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Talus* of their marginal products* It follows that 
factorial rewards cannot sq^al the values of their 
aarginttl products. At best they can be i^ lvcn rawards 
ec|ual to their aarglnal rmQXxiim products, which In tMa 
ease are necessarily l ess than the faluisof their marginal 
products. 
If the deffisad curve i s not tmigent to the cost 
eurre hut cuts I t froa above, t^e firm i s earning 
supemomal profltSf and the Ineone of the hired factors 
may rise above their marginal revenue productivities* 
The rise wi l l depend on the bargaining strength of the 
factors conoemedy and i t i s Halted bgr the extent of the 
aonofioly profits belii« eained* In any ease, the reward 
i s always less than the value of the aarginal product of 
the factor* 
I t i s possible to force m agent of production 
to accept a reward less than i t s marginal revetsie 
productivity i f there i s aonopsony in the factor aarket — 
thotr^ being only one buyer of that factor* The analysis 
of aonopsony ows i t s e l f priaarily to Mrs, Joan Robinson.^ 
Thus, in so far as i t was s t i l l applicable, the 
marginal pix>ductivlty theory cane to be refoiraulated in 
tewis of marginal revenue productivity, and the 
1. Ibid,, pp* t81*89, 
2- fl^aa Boblttsont | h | fi^TOWigS 9S iMP^rfigl f^Wttttt^ VWf Chapter 86* Hacaillan and Co.,London 19S0* 
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p o s s i b i l i t y of aonopoly profits was established in a l l 
oas6S other than those of tangancy of deaaad curve with 
th« cost c^irre. The rejection of f^^ j^^ n^X "flkkm 
productivity theory was farther necessitated by the fact 
that i t fai led to eagjlain the income of the factors 
engaged in se l l ing sc t lTl ty . 
PHCFITS AKD OBSTAGLSS TO SMtM 
The leve l of profit in the individual firm 
within a groi;^ of fin&s producing c lose ly eonpsting 
goods depends on two factors! 
a) the conditions surrounding the Individual 
f l m date mining the i^ape and position of 
i t s eoa»t curve} ^nd 
b) the tmaber of f i ins in the group. 
I f we asaiae individual cost carves to be identical 
in idiapc and posit ion ( as Chaaberlln does, as an 
ezposltl<^al device) we are l e f t witii only <we factor. 
1« S.H, Chaaberllnt gfefl Ift^flTy Ol IfaBOBQll^tlff 
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If the produe«rf in on* g oop ar« Gaming profits that 
aro higher than an outsider can expeet anywhere e lse , tha 
enterprise will a t t r ae t new f l ras irtilc!- wi l l enter the 
group and shar. th« existing demand with the existing firms, 
thus shifting their dsaand ounres to the lef t t i l l they 
are tangent to the afere^e oost corves. This wil l leave 
a l l firms onlf the co!q;>etltive level of nowal profi ts — 
defined as tlie opportunity oost of antdrprlse in the 
eeonooy, Xf| on the other hand, those Inslds the group 
are eamli^K less than they feel they can get else^wherd, 
sane firms will leave the groupy thus laaklng i t possible 
for the reaalnlng fixes to expand thei r sales and reaeh 
the eoapctltive level of pxtifits* But a l l th is happens 
when there are no obstacles t© entry into and exit fro« 
the group* Oiven such olbstaeXes, whether natural or van 
aade, the insiders aay continue earning supenu^rmal profi ts 
or incurring lossess for soaetiae* The * obstacles to 
entry are an ins t i tu t iona l datum, Incapable of being 
1 detemined by deductive theor i^ng,* In rea l i ty deaand 
curves within the group are not adjusted uniforaly to a 
position of tangency to the cost curves. As a result of 
various obstacles to entry* some ( or a l l ) of the curves 
U Robtojyt I r i f f ins op . c i t , , p, 162, 
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ma^' l i e at various dlst&Bess to the vlght of th« point 
of tangaaoy, Xoavli^ sKMaopoXy profi ts throughout th« 
group and throiaghout the price systm** 
Th« k«y eoiiotpt la th« 'entry theory of p ro f i t ' , 
as TrlfflB n g h t l y ^^* l t» i s that of th« 'g»omp». m% 
the eoneapt i s not vaXldi as ve have seen above, 
Dlffereatlatioii of prodaet with the degree of fln®nes» 
observed l a laodem eooaoaiy, wid the fa«t tha t goods 
vMoh are physloally veiy dissimilar way yet bo close 
sabst l tutes of one another in the eyes of tho consum-r, 
knoek the bottoa off t h i s oonoept* 
Chaaberlin realised th i s veaimess and has sines 
Bodlfled the theory pres^inted abore. The tiodlfled varsloc 
does away with the concept of group or Industry and does 
not refer to »entiy ' . Writing In I t i f he observesi 
•Ihe ea^c^Tient of large prof i ts by any part icular 
flxn i s evidently an Indleatlon ^ a t others \i^ producing 
close substi tutes nay be able to ooapete some of them aviqr* 
The result say be ^rery slaply described vlthout any concept 
of freedom or res t r ic t ion of «ntry/v/ithout even the concept 
of an * industry'J soae firms in the eeon'Xilc system earn 
1. E.H.Chamb-jrlini Bl^ X^qoyy,,,qt,?fft^ ft,TOU§tl<; <?qaB9Utti9Bt 
p« 113* 
2* S»H,whamber 11 ns 'Monopolistic or Imperfect Competition', 
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no profi t ifi sxcftss of the ralniBea eountod as costs , 
others earn aore tlian th i s and In various degrees*. 
Once the eoneapt of gitjup or industry i s shorn 
of thaors t ica l slgnifleanea the eaphasLs on res+riction 
to entxy in tho 9t9lmM^m. of profi ts foeoomes pointless. 
Triff in r ightly points out tha t these profi ts sh(»ild ha 
laput«i back to those aecncmle factors Vhich are respocisibla 
for t ha i r aecTual* f)Mn he also points out that thesa 
surpluses may not aoarua to tha antrapreneurs, or aay not 
b« long retained lagr th€« In case they approptlrata thasa 
surpluses lu the f i r s t instanea*' 
Thus the BonopolistiG ooapetition theor is t s ha?e 
failed to produee a d is t lne t theory of profi t , hesides 
uoderliidns tha widespraad asistenaa of certain surpluses 
(of the nature of aonqpoly rent) in the systsa. 
THtPJIN« S mAWkTI ON 
Hobert t r i f f in^ evaluating these theories in 
1941, t r i e s to spell out the salient features of the 
profi t theoiy as I t eiaerges af ter the iapaoi oX the 
U Robert Trlffin, epvclt*, pp. 163 and 173. 
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nw Qontxlbutionfi. He «:i^ ffl!lii«« Chaaterl tn 's •entry theory' 
and finds l i t t l e aoibstaace in it> onoe the ccncispt of 
Industry Is discarded, Froa -Sehuapeter* s emphasis on 
Innorations also only a t r a i l of rents I s lef t In the 
sy£t€ffl». I t I s in the imeartainty aecoopoyrtng dynasilc 
diangss that the r sa l explanation of genuine profi ts l i e s . 
But th i s eatplains only the ewergence of profi t . I t s 
shari!^ out or accrual I s detarained by the Inst i tu t ional 
•rrang^Qsnts in the eecexoay. 
'The dlstrlliiutloB of profit among the ©ntreprcne^ip 
and the owner varies in a«oh ease .dith the ins t i tu t iona l 
set up governing the i r natual relationship and und^r ^lieh 
production Is taMng place*,"' 
Triffln proceeds to •xamln© the typical ownar-
entrapreneur rttlati<»ishlps. Of these the cass of t^e 
owner-ent^eprsneur Is ohvloas. The property-less antreproneur 
on the other hand, who controls, tmt does not own the 
ent«rpricc, rece'vos 'wages* which contain a dlffsrent ial 
element T(*>lch can he charactertsed as a part of the 
profits of enterprise. Of greater in teres t are the alxsd 
oases eoaiblrtiras owi»rshlp and control In Tarious degrees. 
Among thesf? eases he plad«s Knight"s entrepreneur — the 
kay concept of his profit theory — who delegates control 
t . I b i d , , p, n 9 . 
%M 
lA l«®»S AJW^rmca 
41^ m»t £^4 «o44 no% pr#r« th« •xi«t«fi«« in ^ « wfi^tm of 
• mw kind of pmf i t or«r «id Abovti ^os« oigtlalnod ly t )» 
tttte«rt«ifi%|r tlt^oi^'* k aQuopdUttio foalt on i t tofromiitd 
tgr «Bie«ftaiitlr te^^ in i^* <MP#&tiQii aod i t * o^nUnauMc* 
flMfv iSf for oxMpUf tli« famy of ftoili «iitfy aai of 
•liai^«s tn yiViOJ* po3lioi«o» t^o* f ^ oasMmoivftl profits 
«n|0f«4l ia tliio oftoo «*« oaq^ iAifiOd ^ tlk« •Xas«ii% of 
sao«pt£«iMl|r« flio WIN>1Q aoti^polr «l.»«at in profits oo 
r^««lo« Igr tHn nov onoj^oio * i i oi^itilisotS t^^n otto^rtaifiiy 
^ • • t to oA «Qdi <aofo m iM9B)f mA io«« in ^m t&m of • 
•ofiitftl. ioiii to tiM oi*i$iii«l. vmmw 1^0 te?« th« wmmtt&intf* • 
' ** ' * - ' ' "~* ' ' ' '~~~- '^- ' '~~~" '" ' "-^  •— " T-~-t \—"• It ir-r-- ' —T-|iirmii - I |- i • H I n 
8« it»r*8orfOii piff l iyl l I t l i r t i P»tMt^oaiiiU^n «ii4 
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Harrod eonoladsa that 'sonopolr profit I s not a aeparata 
ani additional eloaant In the sfstm^ but one part of the 
global reward in the eeonoBQr for uneertalnty beaiing*. 
Both Harrod anfi Trlffin agree, therefore, tha t th« 
theories of l^porfeot competition do not aff«ot the theory 
that pi^f l ta ar ise due to macertfeintjr, Ho'^ ^ ths sarpluses 
wnich arlBi! dna to monopolistic oonpytlt oi are to be 
chariieterised i s a p2^ h^l«flt oa ^ I d i dlff-rant approachas 
ar® poss ib ly On our p£«.rt vie prefer K:0ip3tedd*5 approaeii 
who axplains theo by the uncertainty l^Acrent in aa 
iaperfectly coapetitive ai tuat ion. 
RES&C^im OF THH MAHMISATIOi H^YPOTHESIS 
Ons of the offshoots of the discussion on snail 
nufflbsrs, interdopendenee aaongst competing firws and 
rtifferontiation oi prodnets, was a m^f ^phas i s on 
l l ial tat ions of thsi profit zsaxiiilsatiar! hypothesis. 
Interdependence aaotjg a small nw»b«r of flnns was seen 
!^ sjhtsaberlin as putting a res t ra in t upon the pursuit of 
\m Ib id* , 
p., B.S.K€irsteadt Aa,^p^gg i^%hn Ihflftgy ftt FTOmi 
18"? 
profit tqr the f irai beoausa of the possible reaetlon 
of rivals to sach & polic]f« In such a situation oth«r 
obJeetiTes like stability and ssourity gain in iaportanoe. 
With the inoraase in size bigness i t s e l f beeoaes an 
objeotive, sise being a souree of prestige. Tarlous rule 
of the thmb prineiples replaee the imxiaisation principle, 
•ordinary* ©r •reasonable* profits and Pull Cost Pricing 
being anongst then* 
Joan EobLason*s analysis in the SfiOTIWtt'fff "^ 
ijya^gfaal} gan|i^ ^ ,^tJQii prooeeds strict ly in accordance 
with the aaxiaisation principle, each fir« equating 
Marginal revenue to marginal cost* Writing as recently 
as 1960 she s t i l l regards this assunption a useful starting 
pointf there being no better alternative*^ At the sane 
time she deolares that *the struggle of a fira to suTVive 
and grow cannot be ejq;>ressed in teims of aazivising any 
precise quantity at a certain Moment of tiae'«^ 
In his Cqapetitioa Among the Few Feliner definitely 
rejects the simple vdrsion of maximisation of profit in 
favour of maximising 'safety margins' — so far as 
n B.H.Oiaaberlintlfe^ X^99n 9 t HOTlgBgUfflU gglMUt 
" lai~ pp, 108-lOd, and <2iafflberlii liflflgaX tmosr a^ Ytiittf» i 
2. Joan Robinsont GftU§ft}f4 g^O^ilfi ?iB^r,f,Vol.II,p*226, 
Basill Blaelnrell, Oxford, I960. 
3 . Ibid. , p. 238. 
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oligopolistic f lms are eonoemed* This he finds 
neeassaijr beeauss * profit aaxialsatlon In ths usual 
sense Is not always the aost effeetl^e way of aetlng 
uoder tha aoonoMle Incentives' • Safety aax^ns are 
defined as 'the aarslns hy which the oatcome of a venture 
aay fa l l short of the bast guess*. The f l m seeks to 
•axialse these sarglns whl(^ turn out to be Its actual 
profits If I t s best guess coaes true. At the same t lae , 
l a attopting to BaxiJd.se profits I t tries to equate Its 
expected aarglnal rereiiQe with i t s e jected eost | expected 
hare aaaaln; that relating to tha best guess *-* a iragua 
form of the aost probable* Actual behaviour of the flra 
I s a coaproalsc betwaaa aaxlalslng safety aarglns atid 
aaxialsing best guess profits*^ 
Attacking the saac problea In t ^ 9 Bauaol ocxieludes 
that the buslnessaan*s desire to Inci^ase his profit lends 
I t se l f to a translation lute a desire to expand the firm . 
Ha thinks that *tha typical oligopolist's objective can 
usefully be eharaeterlsed| i^proxlaatelyi as sales 
aaxlalsatlon subject to a alnlaua profit constraint. . . . '^ 
n WliUaa Fcllnert CfliBfll1,H«\ ,%aai tbt FflWtP^I^* 
Alfred A.KBopf.1949, Vow tork* 
2. Ibid., p. 192. 
3 . I | l d . , pp. 146-194. 
4. WUllaa i*BMWOi^ ^BiMyteiff|Jg&iffitaiHg«ftill« » ^ ^^Wth 
p« a«^ x n « f i w n i x 4 » x a a ^ 
5. Ibid, , p« 49* 
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Tlifl dvflnitl^fi 9f this BinlaoB iSg hovcnr«r, a trlelgr 
problsa« Bamiol*! oonelusioa does not differ aaeh froa 
that of others* *Iii praetieoy the dstemination of a 
• i t i i n a aeceptahla profit XoTel probably eoaas dova to so 
•ora than a rough attaapt, again partly W rul® of thumb, 
to prerida ooflq^atitively aodaptabXa earnings ta stock 
holders vhila leaving enoiigh oyer f&r inrastnent in 
future output ex|>anslon at t^e aaxiMiw rate vhieh tha 
•anag«ient eonsiders to be reasonably safely aazicetable* • 
commmsiass m HAcEWPfMm AM) mwms* 
Subseqiuent diseussicm on the aubjeet of profit 
sbovs that the new ideas propounded bf the theory of 
•onopolistic ooBpetitlon found their way into theory 
of profit in a maber of vays« Soae aoonoaists lay the 
aain eaphasis on the el^aent of aenopoly and eontliBte to 
relata profits to obstaoles to entry aiui to aoBopolistic 
praotiees by produoers* The oontributlons of Frits Maehlup 
F.H.Haha and Jean Marehal ean be sttidied in this oontext, 
« — " — — I M l " " i » - I « • I • » III I I ,1 III II I I II II — — » — » 
1« Ibid*) p* S9* 
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others havo triad to Incorporate la a broader fi-aaework, 
largely based on the uaieTtalnty approaoh, the p«eaXiar 
rents to whi^ Jjiperfeot coapetltiofi gives rise. This 
i^proaeh i s represanted fay B,S» Kfllrstead whose theoiy 
wi l l be taken up In the nsxt ohapter* Then there are the 
ecleotlc writers who Identlfsr yarlotts tjrpss of profits 
explained bf sp««lfle e«nseS| one of lAloh continues to be 
the eleaents of Monopoly whldi has now gained In clarity 
of sapositlon and also In eai^asls. 
1 
According to Mac l^iip accrual of si^emoreial profit 
Is caused by absence of perfect KLlopoljri l . e , possibility 
of entry* dlven perfect pllo|oly profits will be normal. 
The chief obstacle to entry Is offered by Iwobl l l ty , 
IndlTlAlblllty of certain factors of production and un-
certainty* Machlup discusses the three separately, studies 
thdlr Interaction and notes tbslr wide^read exlsteiice In 
the aystea* 
Hot profits are defined as the surplus reaainlng 
after a l l e^ortunity costs of i l l factors owned or hired 
arc cohered* A special probl«n Is posed by fixed resources 
who e^ opportunity costs are n i l and» thereforci t^ose 
earnings are cpiasi rents to the flrssi, ' I f the quasi rent 
i s exactly suff ldeat to cover a l l opportunity costs of 
1, Fritz Ka i^i^ i 'gaiBtU||.oai fiim^lf Mi l?yggU* 
r,.-r?n?-T! » i r ^ 
1i1 
a l l fixed r«»Ottrces (ownad OP hlrad) ^Ich would b« 
noedod to astabllA tho entorprlsd If i t did not exist 
then tlie c^asi rent Is called *iioi<Bal*« This normal 
raaainder after oovdring ths dlrsot costi i s often ealled 
the noraal profit of the iddnstry*."* It i s equal to zero 
profit in the econaadc 8«2ns«» 
The effeet of imoertaintjr i s to aake entrepreneurs 
hesitant* This lovers the deaand for produetive serrices 
and the aosts of produQtl<m fall* *Wlt^  the outooae 
unoertaln entrepreneurs ealeulate with safety margins* 
they ht^ ^^ ^^ 3Pe reaouroes ^Oj at prices v h i ^ sua up to 
flsi amount that fa l l s short, ligr a safety aargin, of the 
«3Q^«ted gross reoeipts *••* I f gross reoelpts happen to 
eome exactly up to ejqpaetations, they wi l l not only eoTer 
a l l costs of &11 resources, Tariable and fixed, hired and 
outied, Init fSiey wil l lea^e a reaainder equal to the safety 
aargini eeon<»sie profit*.^ 
Indivisibil ity aak@s entxy into an enterprise 
impossible despite the attraoticm of b l ^ profits, with 
the result that the insiders continue to earn supemoiwal 
profits* Seeondly i t aay operate indirectly through un-
certainty which i s enormously increased If indi/islble 
3 
factors peieiit industrial expansion in JUJBQIS cmly. 
1* Ibid*, p* 11, 
2* Ibid*, p* 16* 
3* IbAd*, p* td* 
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T!ieii ^ eanalr^ l«i!15«r Iwestaent recpilr^ H'^ rrfcs IndiTlsiblU^ 
may ag^Tarate thB eff«et «Mch uncsrtalntjr of any given 
d@gT«g la apt to ha:v3« And Hn a<3taal praetlcs, i«perfeet 
dlvlalMllty of certain f«otops<nat«i»al,hi»Ban or man made) 
Is aff^etl'ra In alaost a l l in<3\istrles, tradas and pTofesslom 
and ptwbably raore affectlr« than uocePtalnty•» 
The af feet of limaolsilllty la to give rlae to 
•oaopoly rents lay effeetlvely differentiating reaoarces 
uhleh would othezitlse be hoBogenoua and pefietly a^ibatltat-
able Ibr one anothar*^ 
Haoblaf ^en pifoeeeds to examine the iipaet of 
u»eertalft|y en pllopoly and Its eonsequeneea In t^ ^ma of 
aeeraal of profits aid r^ita* Throtighoat the dlaeusalon 
he eaphaalsas the point that different eoncepta of profit 
are needed for handling different probleas* Also the 
entlo(A:a on pi^flt of the eeonoiilati tha Insider and the 
oatsld<l:Vlll be different fro« one another* 
St^emornal profits are ellalnated by fresh entiy 
into the Industiy, They are eaased by IndlTlslbil lt les 
and imoartalntles rastrletlng entry* *Vlth pll<^oly absent, 
pura profitS| nonopo^ ljr rents stoA exeeaslva faetor prices 
arise and last over extended periods* All three are 
earnings In excess of opportunity eost , '^ ^ « three talma 
1* IMd*, p* t«8* 
2* Ibid*, p# 21. 
S* Ibid*I p* 168* 
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togathyr couatltute th« gross profi ts of enterprise. 
Dssplta dQ0 saphasls on uneartalnty In defining 
pure profi ts smd on «an and a seairoltles in defining 
Bonopoly rents , the eentz^l emphasis In Maehlti^ * s the017 
reaains on pXlopoly — possibi l i ty of nntiy. The Inpact 
of Chamberlln Is obvious, though Maohlup's contribution 
i s Bore ecMi^rehenstve than the theories of ttonopoXlstie 
ooapetltiott ¥ould warranty I t Is an atterapt to reformulate 
the profit concept and theory in the l ight of isonopollstle 
conp«titicfn theories vhlXe stlXX assigning the definitional 
role to the imcertalnty theoiy* 
The sane Is true of F,H«H^n as well. Market 
laiperfeetlons are seen as Increasing imcertalnty and 
uncertainty makes entry more difficult* Indeed *one of 
the resu l t s of Isperfeetlons In the maiket Is to offer new 
opportunity for undertaking uncertainty and thus for earning 
the reward for i t»»^ Competition for entry* and ' the 
undertaking of the danger of simultaneous entzy* are 
mentioned as the new dimensions of the problem vhlch haye a 
bearing on t^e nattuie of t)M profi ts earned*^ 
1, F.H.Ealins 'A note on Profit and Uncertalrtyi 
laaaaalfiA, Vol. xrr^ \uf, pp.211-229. 
2. Ib id . , p . 219. 
S* Ib id . , pp. 221-224. 
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That the new iaj^act did not resul t in an 
enttraly new theory of pro t l t I s onc« again ddwinstrated 
hf th@S€ attamptt. Ona of I t s reasons, hovsver, must oa 
tha deep imprassion made on the aeonoalsts' odml ^ tha 
eonoapt of para profit In the ssnsa of unlaputed surplus, 
as dlstlngulshad fnaa rents and sjaasl-rants. HowtTar auch 
the aleaiaBts of laon^oly are aaphaslsed, thay ars powarless 
hefore th i s daflnlt lon of prof i t s . The surpluses they 
eraata can always, at least in the long run, he iaputad to 
soBie faators, natural or a r t i f ic ia l* 
This vas olaarly reeo^lsad l3gr sons who declared 
i t neeassary to re J set the definition i t s e l f for t\» 
constxuotlon of a r e a l i s t i c theory of prof i t . Such i s ttie 
theory of Jaan Marchal* who re la tes prof i ts to predatory 
Bttmopolistie practices* Piaaissing *net profi ts*, vagss 
of sjanageaiant, tmd lBter«3St on the entrepreneur's ovn capital 
as tha invention of ivory tover econofld.'sts corresponding 
t o nothing rea l , he stresses that gross profits are the 
prDper oh;Seet of study* That i s the incoas category 
basinsssnen ca l l profits* 
Sntrepreneurs secure prof i ts hjr pressure aetlon. 
They operate direct ly on the structure of the sarket 
through adrertlsirig and innovation, and bring about Increasa 
in to t a l BOiiey-deaaQd by exerting pressure <m public 
• I IK - . 1 . . I I.. i« ,1,111 , , . , 1 1 I ,1 1 1 . • • . M i l l 
1* Jean Mar«liali *The Construction of a naw thaoxy of profit* 
^fttigfta^gonailg ^yrj^^if,voi.xi«i,i984, pp*54»-«5. 
2* Ibid*, p* 980* 
165 
ftiat]iontl«8 to adopt policies laadlng to that effeet. 
The l i s t of possible tgrpes of prsssoro aetion ttiBj 
resort to can, of oourse, newer he eomplete. Persuit 
of profit i s a struggle, a fight* Existing theories, though 
preteniiG^ to hs seientif ie , are extreoely narrov in scope. 
Profit i s both an aoononie and a polit ical and soeiological 
phenoDenon* Current profit theories are Inept, insipid 
and deeeptive* 
Marehal hardly e^ rei* refers to the specific points 
emerging froa the theories of sKiaopolistie eoapetition, 
l e t his views presni^ose the changed inage of the aiarket 
vhere gi«it oligopolistic concerns clash, battles are von 
and fortunes destroyed* 
166 
B • HHS KSZWSSIAll REfOLtJTIOir 
To continue b«ll«vin« in the e&paMlity of th« 
eapitallst systaa autoaaticelly to malntair? full eaplojraent 
at a tl«« vhen Qrcat Britain vas eiq^srlenoing 10 to 20 
per oant on j^iapXoyBent,^  with the eolossal vastd and 
widespread safferlng that aeconpanled I t , was alnost an 
laposslblllty* That the tireamiry baeked hgr the aoodemle 
oonoalsta — al l bom and bred in the classieal tradition 
— s t i l l argued against tha possibility of aaelloratlng 
the situation ly a policy of public woxki addad only to the 
irritation of the conaon »aa« Little wonder that when 
Keynes expounded the theory of eff«etivc dmiand and 
established the possibility of stabla uBdermploynent 
etfUllibriuB It took l i t t l e tioe to get wide aoeeptenet. 
Keynes* a^guaent was siaple* In a given situation 
of teehniqpi«y resources and factor cost per unit of 
employaantt *••• the volme of eaployaent i s given ^ the 
point of Intdrseetlon between the aggregate demand function 
and the aggregate supply funoticm, for i t i s at t^ls point 
1. Joan Roblnsoni Sfltta9glfl.P>moff9Bliy.p#71} 
Pelican Series, 1964, 
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that the entrepreneurs* expeetatlon of prbfit will be 
naximlsed*,' 
The aggregate supply fUaetlort, Z « fl (H) relates 
Z, the aggregate supply prloe of the oat pat for employing 
H men, f^leh I s *th« esq^eetatlon of proeeeds vhl(Ai will 
3ust make I t worth the while of the ent reprec^s to give 
that employment*,^ to !!, fhe aggregate demand function, 
0 s F (N), re la tes 0 *the proceeds whi<^ entrepreneurs expect 
to receive from the employment of H man* to 1f» The ^alue 
of D at the point of interseeticm I s called the effective 
d^iand* 
31ven the productivity per man, Income depends on 
the volume of ooplc^ent* 
Effective demand D i s the t o t a l of what the community 
i s expected to spend on consumption, D^, and Dg the amount 
which i t la expected to devote to investramt, D^  i s a 
fuBOtlon of national Income* Vihen income IncreaMS, 
eommualty*s ccmsumptlon also increases bat fey an amount 
less than the increasa In income* That i s to say, the 
marginal propensity to oonsiae i s less than one« Investment 
i s determined at a level which equates the marginal 
1. J.M.Seynesi The General Theory of Bmii2ayment.Interest 
fi^Msffiiiyf p.25t Haomillan and Co,,London 
£• Ibid*, p* 24* 
3« Ibid*, p* 2S* 
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•fficdoncgr of oapltaX in general with the rate of 
interest. Scaring• i s the part of ineoB« tliat i s not 
oofunasd* Thai for the level of enployment and income 
to be in e(]Uilibrii2B, iiwsstBKnt should just eover the 
gap in spending eTeat«d l9f saving* When employment 
increases 0^ wil l increase but not W so much as D« 
This insnffieiencjr of deoand ean lie made up onlr i f Cg 
i s incraai^ng so as to f i l l the inereasiuN; gap between 
Z and D.f, *Thns -^ except on the special assumption 
of the classical theory according to which there i s some 
force in operation ^ i « b , when aaploym^it increases, 
alwe^s causes Og to increase sufficiently to f i l l the 
widening gap between Z and 0^  <«* the eeononic system 
may find i t s e l f in stabl* eqixilibriiai with N at a level 
below ful l employ»int«,«*1 
Keynes e^qplalned the * paradox of pover^ in the 
midst of plsnty* Igr the insufficiency of effsetive demand. 
Furthemore^ the r i ^ e r the eoamunity, the lower the 
propensity to consume, and the less the inducement to 
invdst In view of the already existing sto<^ of capital,^ 
Having pointed out this gloomy prospsot he proceeded 
to analyse the Propensity to Consume,the Marginal Efficiency 
of Capital and the Rate of Intorest, For our purpose here 
— * - * — •' • • • • ' — - • • ' - . — . . — ^ , - • —, . r—--'It T^-i-Miiw r^iai .• i.iiimi.irT ii ,.nii ....ii.. ii. .j ii. .X-.J.. i.-l 
1. Ibid., p. 30. 
2« Ibid, , p* 91. 
let 
i t 18 not nsMSseiry to go lato the details of this analysis* 
Kty-net* theory of the Rate of Interest introduced the 
i>»y«hol©gical llqulduty preference as a decisive deterainaat 
alongwith the quantity of money and l^e level of Income, 
His discussion of the Marginal Efficiency of Capital stepped 
into the fresh air of * Ssq^e^tations* • 
In this context he distinguished between short teW 
and loi% tera esq^edtations* ^  Short tens expectations are 
concerned with the price which a manufacturer can expect to gdt 
for his finished output at the time when he co«iits himself to 
starting the process whidi will produce i t , and with the 
cost of output on varioas possible scales* These determine 
the day to day decisions of the hutlaessmen regarding output 
and ampleyment* Lon« tens eipectatiomc relate to the future 
yield of the new capital goods asd ec^pment which t^e husiaessmeE 
are intending to purchase today* They will determine 
their investment decisions c^ d the employment oi^ortunities 
^ u s created* ^ o r t tens cjqpectations ate mostly 
based OB realised resiats and current prices, costs, 
etc* Lons term expectations, to Which Keynes devotes a 
whole c^^ter, depend partly on the existing reality 
regarding the existing stock of capital assets and the 
state of consumers* d^and for gooda sCijiairing the use of 
1. Ibid. , pp. 4«-47. 
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eai^itaX a s i e t s , and part ly on fatura avents tfhleh can 
tmly l>fl foraeastad with nore or lass oonfldanes, such aa 
the taslba of tha conaonersi futura ehangas in tha typa 
ana quality of oapital aaseta, tha atrangth of affectira 
damand ffoa t i s a to time during tha Ufa of tha investnent 
undar eonsidez^tion and tha ehangas in vage^tmit in t ems of 
monay vhleh may oecar during i t s l i f a , 
intraprsneurs are ppone not to a t tadi great wai?;ht 
to raattars which are "vary uncertain, instaad they are guldad 
to a considerable degree ty the facts about whicto thay fael 
somawhat confidant, 'The state of long term aaq>aotations, 
up(» whieh our decisions are based, does not solely depend, 
t h e r e f o r , on the aost probable foreeast ve can make. I t 
also depends on the eqi^fidenea vith vhidi ve aaka th i s 
forecast -^ on how highly we ra te the likelihood of our 
bast forecast turning out quite WK)ng,'^ The state of 
confidence i s one of tba aajor factors detezniniog the 
8ch»«.:lc of the Marginal Bffloiency of Capital, which i s 
the saoe thing as the InTastment deoQand schedule* In t h i s 
re '^^ ard Keynes notes that ' the outstanding faet i s the 
extreae preaarloumass of the Imsls of knowledge on which 
our es t laatas of prospeetiTe yield have to be made.'^ 
1. Ib id , , p , U ? . 
2. I b id , , p, U8 , 
3 . Ib id . , p . U», 
1ft 
l a pra«tlefl, thereforti Imslnttiaien follow the *coiwantlc«i' 
• f asfOAing that the ead sting state of affairs wil l 
contlnu© IndsfIntel/, aaeeapt in so far as they hare 
speeifle raasons to expeot a ^ange* 
Keynes then proeeeds to disouss wama of th@ factors 
whloh ateentaate the preaariousness of autonoaoas Inrestaent 
«*» institutions whleh have heeoae part and paroel of modem 
enterprise eeononor* Then ther€ Is *the eharaaterlstles of 
hi»an nature that a large proportion of our positive 
aotlvit las depend on spontaneous optlaisa rather t^an on a 
mathematloal aj^eotatioii, whether iioral or hedonistic or 
eeonomie,*^ nftiich oontrihutes further to the InstaMlity 
of investsent* 
Keynes has also disoussad at some length the 
effeets of ^langes In expeetatlon^ noting that these 
effaets take tine to woTk t^easelTes out, aeanvhlle 
further changes ovsrlapingf and the whole thing taJdn^ a 
new eourse* 
This refreshing dlseu8sl<Hi of the state of 
azpeatatlons, of v^leh only a very brief suamary has beon 
presented above, serves to highlight the ls^(mderabl«!S 
n zbid»| p. tdt* 
Ifg 
l&volTsd in the dettrminatiaci of InvestBent demand, vhieb 
Itself Is the decisive faetor in tYm deteralnation of 
SffaetiTe Semaodi Ineoaa and Baploynent* As we shall note 
later on It Is vipon these aggrogates t^at the aagnitode 
of total profits in the ooono j^r dependSi iMnee the relevance 
of this disoassloa to oar subjeet of study. At a setter 
of faot Kefnes nay vei l he regarded as having pioneered 
the probe into 'ejcpcctations' which later grew to sisable 
proportion as we havo already witnessed in studying 
Shackle, and shall soon he finding in the profit theory of 
B,S, Keirstead* Bat Keirstead kas definitely drawn acre 
on Keynes than ISiaekle sight havci as Keynes did not 
analyse how witrepreneurs made deeisions on the basis 
of oult ipl ie i ty of expeetations held with varying degrees 
of conAdesee* In so far as he i s speoifle, Shaekle's 
views are not in syapathy with his i^proaoh, Keynes sayst 
'An entrepreneur wl^ has to reaeh a practieal decision as to 
his scale of production, docs not, of orarsci entertain a 
idogle c»doabting expectation of ii^at the sale proceeds of a 
given <»itput wi l l be, but several hypothetical ej^ectations, 
held with varying degrees of probability and definit^ness. 
By his eacpeetation of proceed I nean, therefore, that 
expectation of prooeads. Which, If i t were held with 
certainty, would lead to the same behaviour as does the 
bundle of vague and aore various possibi l i t ies which actually 
" ' " - • - - • " • - - - • • • • • • - • -
1* Ibid, , p« 24 lh«S« 
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maitQB vtp his state of espvetatlons when he readhes Ms 
daeision,*** 
For ona thing this a aethod &t arriving at a 
dafinition (of expeatation of proeaads) and doaa not 
propose to axplain how daaisioa i s raaohed^ or how thlt 
translation of 'vagua and various possibilities* into ona 
held witti certainty Is af feetad — aoaething that Shackle* s 
theory praswiably deas* Than hahind the reference to 
'probability* in the above note luzles tiie saaa*orthodox* 
approaeh uhloh Sha^la so vahaaently a t tars* 
l§ va shall see later^ Kairstaad* s Inspiration 
i s of an entirely different natara. He aiEplains irlndfall 
profits on Keynesian l ines and draws on Keynes* diseussion 
of Bxpeetatlons in his ovn dlstinotion betveen Partioular 
aivl General axpeetationa* 
Ths f^flffifftjl IUggiy v*» not intended to oover dis-
t i l but ion of inooasi i t s sole eonoezm being i t s detemina" 
tlon* In faet | Keynes took the distrlbtttlon of ineoae as 
given and did not ^ae i f ica l ly diseass i t s break*np into 
varioas functional shares, except for a reference to the 
profit share as increasing at the cost of rentiers vlth the 
rising level of prices which generally acconpaniecl the 
increasing volnne of emplaysent and output*^ I t s greatest 
U Ibid,, p. 24 fh«3« 
2. Ibid,, p, 290. 
I f i 
iB^aet en the theory of distxiljution in general, and the 
theory of profit In particular, waa the extension into this 
field of the aggregatife approach adopted in diseusslng the 
deteraiinaticm of IncoBs and ettployiient* fhe seeds of a 
fflaoro^analyais of distrllmtion are already there i f the 
-ISIMgftJL IhgQgy Is read alongvith the :?MiUfft TOl^gBgy* 
These ultiMately hloseoaed into the Biaero*t^eones of 
profits which ve shall disouss in a suhsecpxeBt ehapter. 
Pl^HTS IH TH3 «THSJaiSS« 
Sven in the greastiae(l98Q) Keynes was disoatsing 
profits at the aggregate level . Indeed he did not even 
touch the «loro*eQonoRiG theory of profit as this vas not 
warranted in a study on Money aai the Price lievel. Profits 
result fro« aovaaents in the price level due to disparity 
between Savings and Investaent, with the policy of the 
Banking system at the back of I t . FroM his Fundaaental 
Eqpiatians i t followed that total profits Q, which were the 
sxaim of profits in the consuner goods industries Q^  and 
profits in the investsMnt goods industries Q^  e<|aalled the 
difference between the value of increacnt of tb» n«w 
1W 
loTdstaent goods X and the voItuM of 8«rings S« 
Q- 3 !• - S t^s«r«a» I* Is the eost of production of new 
invastnent a&d (j^  « I «* X*, heaee Q « Q ^ * Q 2 " ' ^ ' ' ^ » 
B<|ailltei\» requliwd that Q ,^ % and Q should be 
sefo«^ Pjpoflts ¥epe the result of the system's departure 
from e<|ulllbnuii. 
Profits vere so defined as to eaolude the nomal 
rewmeration of the entrepz^neursp nhich was 'the rate 
of reauneratiaii idileh| If they were opeo to nake new 
bargains vlth a l l faotors of produetlon at the eurrently 
prevailing rates of earning, would leave thaa under no 
notive either to increase or to deerease their seales 
of operation.** They are, to be brief, 'windfall' 
profits. Having so defined profits, Kernes exolndes 
thesi, both fron Inooae and from Savings, irrespeetive 
of irhether they are spent on oonsuaption or net* ^ey 
do, however, fro« part of the value of ourrent investiMnt 
which i s the value of tt^ ineresent of capital during any 
period,* 
In this Context, he «iphasises the existence of 
long ter« oontraets with the agents of produetlon as a 
1. J^ .M^Keynest ^ T m U l S fB ^mYt?oUI, p.138, Maoalllan 
and Co*,London, 19S0. 
2* Ibid. , p. 151« 
3. Ibld«, pp. tS4*89» 
4. Ibid. , p. 126. 
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basis for tbi antnprsiMurs aaming profits or Incurring 
loss«s»'l Contraetfl lend a t las dinansion to ecmlUbrlia 
adjustaentsi li^us perpetuating the fruits of dlMqiulllliriuB 
—profits. 
The windfall profits, which ara the result of 
dlsaquilibriUKi thensdlves Initiate changes in the systea 
in fora of «aqpa&sioii(or coutraotioni in case profits art 
aagatifs) of the seals of operation of tha 0iitrepr«neurs. ^  
This accou&t of the rold of profits in the Traatisa i s latar 
ravlsad In tha lanftral Theayv to haooaa *Bora aeeurata and 
instruetiy«*« 
*In my Ifftft^lM gP )m^7 the eonoapt of i^^iBUf 
in ths assess of investeant over saving, as there defined, 
was a way of handling changes In profits, though I did not 
in that hook distinguish elearly between expected and 
realised results* I there argued that change in tlie 
excess of investaent or€r saving was tha motive force 
govezming changes in the volioie of output. Thus tiM new 
arguaent, though (as I now think) wich aore accurate and 
instructive, i s essentially a developaant of tha old* 
1. This poiht i s of f e c i a l interest in view of the 
iaportant place given i t )>r Sidney Ifeintraub in his 
theory of profltCsee 1ie3«wi chapter seven and a to^ 
chapter four^, 
2 . J.H.Keynes, A Iftftttgt flB M«9yt P«198* 
w 
BxpTGMS9& In the language of ogr l^y^atisa on MOBav i t vould 
roni ttet aspeetation of an Inoraased axeeas of InYas^ient 
over S«ring| given the fower volu*® of aaployaent and 
outputi vlXl induce entrepreneurs to inereaaa the Toluae 
of employnant and output**., the Toluae of employMent la 
detemined lof the estlsates of effeetlTe demand made hf the 
entrepreneurs, an inereaae of Investasnt rolatively to 
saring at deftnad in my IHitaiW MM ItBBfty ^Ing a eriterton 
of an inorease In effective deaand** 
fhua inoreata In effeetlve deraand replaeet the 
inereaaa In vlndfaXl profit• as the aotive force behind 
change* ^ e relationship betvaen ohanges in effective 
demand and profits i s studied separately ^ bringing 
in the e la t t i c i t i e s of output and prices* I t i s iaportaiit, 
hovever, to note that profits as defined in the aenaral 
ShSSHt ^ i3ot exclude *nox«al remmeration of the 
entrspreaeurs*• fhay are sispljr the ineone of the entrepre-
neurs! so that Factor Costs plus Profits equ^l national 
Inooas* Profits are a part of ineone and ^ereforc not 
excluded frov savings either* 
Change a in effective d a^and affect profits bf 
changing the level of prices to the extent th«^ fa i l to 
change the voluae of enplojraeQt and output* Keynes 
1. J.M. Keynesi XM Mmml 
 Mm.ml.MmuM. M\il9m^%»ln%^T^§% 
iMi4 lanttYa pp«yy*y8 
n$ 
desoiiBtrat«s that *the attia of the e last lo i t ies of prie« 
aQd of otttpat in respoaae to ohaages in eff«otive demand 
(measured in tsras of vage tsilte) la eqiial to uiill^* 
Effeetlve demand apenda itsdlf , partly la affeoting outpat 
and partly in affeotlng price, aecording to this last,*'^ 
Measuring Tidues In money instead of vage unitst 
' If tf stands for ^ e money wages of a unit of 
labour ant p for the oxpeeted prioe of a unit of out pot 
as a vhole in terms of money^  ve ean writs tp( a Sdp/pdD) 
for the ela8ti<^ty of money prices in respons@ to changes 
in effeetire demacid measured in tems of moneyf end 
•w( 8 0dtf/WdI3) for the e last ic i ty of money wages in response 
to dbanges in effeotive d«Band in terms of mon^* It i s 
2 
then easily shown that e p a l - O Q ? 1 - S w )•* 
Changes in profits are related diraetly to changes 
in prices and inversely to ohoiges in mtmey wages* If 
e^ s 1, rising prices wi l l leave profits unaltered* If 
moiMy wages are const^mt and s^ » 0, the rise In price level 
wil l d€p«nd on ttw value of e^i ai^ wil l increase profits 
to that extent* I f e^ « 0, total output not increasing 
at a l l in response to an increase in effective demand in 
tewis of maieyi the entire effective d«Tiand is expected to 
U Ihld*, p« 2a&, 
2, Ibid.I p« aas -~ 9p i s the e last ic i ty of output as a 
whole in response to changes in effective demand* 
I t f 
aeeru« to the entrspr^neura as prof i t s . Profits wil l lie 
1«88 i f 9Q 1 » po»itl-?«| baing aero wh«n e^ « t . Ordinarily 
•o wi l l have a valus intexmediata betvean zero and unity* 
Hotiiy vages are stleky, so that Oy i s far below unity. 
Though *a portion of any iiaerease In • f f te t ive demand i t 
Xlktly to be absorbed in satisfying the upward tendeney 
of the wa»e unit*»^ ITet rising prices are generally 
eeeonpanied lay inereasii^ prof i t s . 
Much, however, would depend on the y>nten^ of the 
inerease in effeetive demand "«- the par t icular goods 
whose d^and has increased,^ Windfall gains due to r i se 
In prices of the products of j ^ e l f i c Industries will wholly 
accrua to the entrepreneurs in those Industrtas, Horeorer 
the profi ts thus accruing do not gtimolate entreprenetirs 
to expansionaiy action, because of t h s i r windfall character.^ 
fo sua ups Profits arise due to moveoents in prices. 
Such no^ements are caused tgr ciiangi^s in effectlTe desand 
which occur mainly due to changes in businQS»i<f)n*s 
ejpeetaticms leading to changes in the ra te of Investiieat. 
At the back of chenges in the rate of investiSBnt are 
» » » « » i i » l — » « i w < — X — » n • m i l III! rmi 1 iMn——MMH Inn Bull •ammmmmiiim n ii Mimpii i i — — M — » » » — — « 
1, Ib id . , p . 301. 
2, Ib id , , p . 267, 
3 , Ib id , , p . 286. 
160 
Interest rate changes vhich are linKod up with t*ie (ptantity 
of aonay and Itqisldlty prefayenoa. Changes In th« 
propensity to consiMie may also I n i t i a t e changes In 
eff«etir« donand. VM • l a r t l c i t l e s of output and «on»y 
wages anter the plctApB In tha manner daserihad abora. 
I t 13 Interesting to aark a *paeuXlarlty' of 
profi t whl<ai Keynes noted *la passing* in h is XESAMjajaB 
HflTisi*, Thire he argued that i 
*If entrepreneurs choose to speadi a portion of 
the i r profits on eonsuaptlan(and thera i s , of ooursa, 
oothinf to prev«it thea froa dolns 8o) tha- effaet i s to 
Increase tim prof i ts on the sala of liquid ccmsuaqptlon 
gooAs lay &n aiaount eseaietly e(|i«l to the amount of profits 
^ l e b have thus hean a^^anded. fhls follows frcai our 
definition*'^ 
That th is conclusion i s based on the peculiar 
definitlOB of profltsC and of Income and sasrli^s) adopted 
in the yg^fl^^a i s too ohvlous to need elaboration. If 
prof i t s vara not included in Wational Inoooe, th^ i r 
azpanditiir^^ on eonsunptlon i s , in the language of tha 
l^npiral Thaory^ an incraasa in effective demandCcausing an 
equal Increase in prof i ts i f the e l a s t i c i t i e s of output 
and Boney wages aae se io) . But in the tenlnology of the 
^^aeral Theory entrapranaur's prof i ts are a part of 
national Inca«e and the i r expenditurt on consujqitloB i s 
n J.H.Kayuesi A .^y^^ija^ ga «nniy» P*139. 
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already aseoimtad for* Tbe above 'peeal iar i ty*, therefore, 
eannot be aeorlbed to profi ts ae defined In the (>faera^ 
fheoyv^ diveti zero eXastloitjr of output and money wages, 
any Inerease In effeetlve devand idXI svell profi ts by an 
e ^ a l aaoont* I t i s iBtsaaterlal vhether t h i s Inerease 
takes tho fbrm of additional InTestaent or additional 
eon snap t i cm expand i ture and whsethar I t I s flnaneed out of 
prof i ts or past s&Tin^ »s or i s the resul t of a deoreaw In 
tfm l iquidi ty prefsrsnee. I t should not. I t follows, be 
laoorporat«i, aneh less laada the basis of, a theoiy of 
aggregate p rof i t s which I s eonstmoted in terns of the 
{^aQgr|l g^^ry oategories. Strangely enough, t h i s i s 
ezaetly what some Baero^theorles of profit seek to do. 
CHAPTER 3IX 
AN ATTEMPT AT A SlfHTHESISi |KtB8TSAD»S 
THSOHI m PROFIT 
188 
I B the l ight of tha diseassloa that followed Knight*8 
foTvalation of the wieertidiity theozf and imder the iapaet of 
the Xftter deveiopments etodlod abovei the ground v«t prepared 
for a i ^ t h e e i t betveen the yarloae strands of thought with 
a Tlev to fonnil&tliig a eoapr^taslve theory of prof i t . 
Suoh an a t t ^ p t was aada b^ the Canadian aeonoBist B«S« 
Seirstead vho publlshad fft i a g y Ittt ^ f Tn^gnr Of PftCUt 
In vhat follonrs ve ihaXI brlafly smknarlse Keirstead*s 
• l avs so as t o hi f l i g h t i t s dis t inet ive features* As v« 
shaXl find on a o i l t l e a l evaluation of his contribution, 
the synthesis, thou^ nore eoaprehensive tSian the ear l ier 
theories , reraalns l i^aaplete In so far as the resulting 
theoxy i s essential ly aloro^eoonottle In nature and fa i l s to 
integrate the t radi t ional Knlgbt-Sohuapeter theory, 
st^plwieated by the aionopollatlo oos^etitlon theories, into 
a ttaero«>dlstrlbutlon soheise. 
According to Kelrstead prof i ts are tha result of entre-
preneurial ac t iv i ty based on eiqiiectations relating to the 
imcertain conditions tha t prevail in a c^ioiging dynamic societj! 
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NATimi OF RSSIDUAIiS 
Starting from the traditional position that thare 
18 no profit in the perfiotly co«petitlT« «(|Edllhrlna, 
he aff lms that the distribution of Inooae in the static 
state i s ejiplaintd ly the Marginal productivity theory. 
There are snrplases of th« nature of differential rents 
and *aonopo:i^  rent8% which are iii^uted to the relevant 
differential or aemopoly element•, Intt these are entirely 
different fron pure, uniaputed surpluses that art profits. 
On exaadnliig the nature of thast residuals that 
exist in the statio state, and those emerging under 
dfnanio eirmuistanoss, Keirstead finds that the latter 
result fi^B a departure of aotual iK>nditions froa vhat 
the marginal pxoduetivitgr theozyC and the Buler*s 
theorffis) assnaes them to he. 
Liaitatlons of the Marginal ProduetlTity Theory 
are noted, espeeially the faot that i t i s only a theory 
of factor domand Vhlch needs to he supplemented ^ a 
theory of faetor supply, hefore i t i s applied for explaining 
the determination of faetor prices. Despite these limitations 
i t i s Goneeded that, tmder certain appropriate assumptions, 
the s^ ai of the marginal value product shares would exhaust 
the total value product, and the marginal value-products 
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Would aeaaure the faotor rewards*^ One of the to 
asstmptlons Is piigrsieaX dlTicibiUtjr of faetors. In 
ease one of the factors Is not dlTlsihle and eannot be 
lncz>eased proporticmataXy vith et^er faetorsi the law of 
dlmlaishiBg retumt would t^pl^ giving rise to •Hlcardlaa 
Heats* *^ Laftk of ho«ogeneitr in Tarlous units of the saae 
factor, i . e . I differenoea in fnality^ also give rise to 
pent. Qualitatively inferior units of a faetor ara 
pressed into service in response to inereased deaaad for 
the produots i h l ^ the faetor helps produee* Increased 
demand Majr h« generally associated with populfttion growth, 
which gives these rents a dynamic character* Other dynamic 
forces 6«g* te^nologioal improvements, advance in dclU, 
ani innovaticms also give rise to similar rents* Heslduals 
accrue because these changes result in a mors than 
proportionate increase, over time. In the total product 
with increase^ in inputs* tJnder s u ^ djrnamlc conditions 
the marginal productivity theory ceases to apply* * Factorial 
rewards having been fisesd at something approximating the 
true(i*e*t s tat ic) marginal productivity rate, the 
technical advance produces a ««rplus return over timi'*^ 
1, B.S,Keirsteadi 4a i a j i f IB UMI V^iWJf 9S Immi 
^ , ^ ^ ^ f p*o« 
2* Ibid*, p« 7* 
3* Ibid*, p« to* 
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BvLOh 7«sldual« ar« *9i«ii«S8iv« dyaamle rents* •^  
Anottier iaiportaBt atftaiptlon of the aaxginal 
prodtietlYity tfmoTf and for the application of the 
Euler* s Theoren i t perfoet oospetition la the prodnot 
• a ^ 6 t and in the faotor oax^cet* *If either or hoth of 
those eonditiotis are not fulfilled» no reason exists for 
believing that the narginal val^w product <i«e», sarginal 
physleal prodaot tlae price) wil l deteimine or aeaaaro 
the reward paid to the faetor*.^ If ecapetition Is not 
perfeet l a the prodttot Marlceti avex^e revenue ourve of 
the f i n wil l he dovnvard sloptng IM that the raarginal 
revenae product, vhioh m i l aeasare the faotor* s revard, 
v i l l not equal the narginal s ^ s i e a l produet tlffls prioe* 
The »m of narginal revaaue products v i l l not eahaugt tho 
total value produet, thus leenriag a surplus, which i s 
oharaoterised as 'Boaopollst's profit * • ' 
Hiperfeet ooapetitloa aaong hugrers in the factor 
aajteet wil l give rise to *aQaopsonist*s profit*,* As tho 
average faotor cost i s an inoreasing function m such a 
situation,the aazglnal faotor oost eurve, i^ose inter-
seotlon vith the narginal reveaao product curve detomiaes 
'mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmHmmmmtmmmmmmmmmtmmmammmmmmmmimii mmKmmmmmmmmmfmmmm'mmmm m wtmtmmimmmmMmmimmmmmm 
1« Ibid, , p*10« 
2 . Ibid. , p, i n 
3* Ibid*, p. 11 
4* I | l d , p. 12 
ia« 
tb« aq^Xejradnt of the faetori vllX be above the avermge 
eost eurre* Aetiial reverdSy(whloh ecpal vrerase eoets of the 
faotoreyVlIX be Xest than their marginal reTemie prodiiets 
thereby Xearlng a surplus* 
L&stXfy Kelretead notet that the statle aodel to 
vhl<^ the SaXer*s theorea la implied assmiee that there 
are no ehaages la stoef prleee taring the period of produetlon. 
Therefore, *(diange« In the pnrohaslng power of «oney, froB 
whatever eausei wlXl result In ehangee In the valae of 
Inventories and In windfall profits or Xoesees In aoney 
textts% .. 1 
to sam xip this phase of the analysis, an essailnatlon 
of the assiaptions of the marginal prodnotlvlty ^eory of dls* 
trlbntlon en bles Kelrstead to Identify certain surpluses* 
These are classified as s *Hleardlan Bents resulting froa 
lndl7ls lbl l l t ies{ monopoXistlo (or aoRopsonistie) profits 
resulting froa dovtsrard sloping «rerage factorial eost ourres 
Innorators* profits resulting froa eost reducing innovations 
introduced over tiaef and vlndfalls(positive or negative) 
resulting fr<Hi dbianges In the general prlee level duii ng the perio 
of production**^ He then proceeds to relate these surpluses to 
entreprendurlal expedtations* 
«»»»l««ll»»«««»»»««l«»»»»«»»»-«l»»»«»ll-«l»«»»«P««iii»ll •mil i i i i « « « » i » « » » » « i i M » « » « l « I M » » » » i » « « » « M « » « « l « | » » ^ ^ > « » » « > « i | — • — M — 1 » » 
1« Ibid«, p* 1#« 
2* Ibid.I p, 18. 
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PaOFITS AID BXPaCTATIOHS 
Hloardlaa rents are not an obleot of entrepreneurial 
ezpeetations* fhey are not a dynaiaie phenooenon and 
accrue not to the entrepreneuy Imt to the Indlvlilbla 
factor* Monopoly profit* exl i t In Ifee static ctatc Imt 
th0f are amenable to policy decisions aimed at their 
maximisation OTQT a period of time* Innovators* profits 
and windfalls arc essentially dynwsio* I t Is these three 
classes of profit vlth vfcioh the entrepreneisrs are 
coneexmed* 
Sntrepreneurlal planning for profits Is tml<|GW to 
a dynamic eoonooQr and It i s the ftinetlon of thg entrepreneur 
to anticipate the earning of profltoe^ plan the opdratl<Mis 
of the firm to aalce possible the earning of profits* 
These dcclsitmc involve future which Is uncertfi4.n* 
Entrepreneurial decisions therefore must be based on 
their es^eetatlons regarding the values of the relevant 
variables which are not *lmown* and can at best be 
estintated* this leads Kelrstcad to an analysis of 
entrepran-aurlal expectations* 
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CIEJriSEAI, SXPSCfia?IOI©t WIMJFALL PHDFITS 
Szptetatlons a n <bali«fs ImU at tho prasetit 
Boneat about ths probabia nagnltudes of eoononie (mantitles 
or •ariabXes at seoie furure noaent of ttma**^ Thej^  involve 
both xlski whleb If a eaXcoXabXa ehanee and oan be Insured 
against, and anc^rtaioty lihleh eaanot be insured against, 
oaoartain altaatlons being imi<|ae situations. Keirst^iad 
rejoQts the appXioation of probability analysis to 
unsertainty on the seme grounds on Vhioh Shackle has 
rejeotod it* He distlnguii^et fro« situations of risk 
and uncertainty • third situation irtiich he characterises 
as 'objective uuoertaintyi subjective certainty'.^ While 
because of Its uniqueness It does not perisit of an 
objective risk ealculationy capiriCAlly the entrepreneur 
possesses present data on the basis of which he can extrar 
polate Into the future with sone confidence* Such lure the 
•ituatloas relating to %«neral Sxpectations <«* caq^ctations 
about ^ant i t ias vhich are geueral to the econmqr as a whole 
and are not peculiar to angr siim(lc fim* They relate to 
Xne^ aCi B^legnsentt Sscvit^s, lovestnent, B3q>orts and fiiports, 
and the future ooanercial| f iscal and Monetary policies 
of the Qovemnient* A change in the value of ond or some 
of thesa variables v i l l cause ohmges in the price level 
causing changes in the price of tha first's product* Oka^ies 
t . Ibid. , p. 17. 
2* Ibid*, p* 20* 
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Itt prio* level also result In appreeiatlonCor depp«elatloii) 
In the T&lue of Invsntorles* Timae changgs rasult In 
windfall gains (OP loasef)« Tlia entpspreneur tries to 
forecast or eartteate th««e eliao^es so as to l>eneflt Iff 
thefflu 
TiMse are 'gsnsral* ejpe«taticms also in %h» setose 
that thay are oosraonSy held tif buslnsssioiBn, &s th«y are 
single Talued projaotions basad on i^s prasent vc^lues 
of thasa •ariables. Though thay are not subject to control 
^ a single f lxs they are self justifying in oatura* 
Keirstaad aalntains that general sxpeetatlons relate to 
a relatively short period of t ine, about tvaleve mohths. 
The reason i s that nost goveriaaent polioias arc daaided 
aoBually, s*g«i the budgety tax changes, iaport and •xport 
policies , etc* 
Kolrstead's distinction batveen thasa and the other 
uncertain situations to be studied belov i s an laproreaant 
upon ttiB received uncertainty theory. Neither Knight nor 
those who contxibutad to the theory after hia had aade any 
such distinitii»i» His vievt on the nature of General 
S^eotations seen to have bean inspired by Keynes* refreshing 
discussion of 'th« state of long tarsi axpaetatlmis'* This 
Isparts to his theopy a aaero^aeoncttic flavour in so far 
as the objects of general aspaetatlons are aacro-aeonoalc 
U J.M. Kaynasi Xfat ^tegy^l XhgginryCaia t^er 12. 
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• a r l a b l e s . The dls t inc t loa i s Justified on th€ ground 
that the nature of those •arlabXes Is different frooi 
BKlsro-econoaic variables w h i ^ are objeots of Particular 
Sj^eetations* The degree of uneertaint / i s etitliMly 
dlffereat from ^ a t i t i s when the entrepr^siiiur also feels 
subjeotiirely laieertaiii* Consecfaently thti dleislon-»aklng 
process in *ob3eetiva uaoerfcainlgr, swbjeetive oertaiuty' 
sitaatiORS 1« different froa that deseribtfid by Shackle J 
PARTICTHAB FXPECTATIOHSlMOSOPOLISTS* PI^ OFITS 
The other s i tuat ions , which are objects of *Partlotlar 
Expectations', re la te to future Talus s of variables Whldi 
are par t ioalar to the f i ra i lilce relevant eosts , relevant 
pr ices , dan and for the firai*s product and the response of 
the r iva ls to the f i r a ' s pol ic ies , e tc . These expsetatlons 
are different vi th different finas and are not held in 
eoBiBon* The variables to lAiieh they re la te are , a t least 
SOBM of then, partly lusder the control of \A^ firm, 
Bntreprenurial ac t iv i ty i s , therefore, directed towards 
foreeasting as %MI11 as oontrollie^ them with a vlev to 
earning prof i t s . The prof i ts to which part icular 
ezpectaticms ar<i related are aonopollsts* Cor Honopsonists*) 
1« B,S« Ksirattadt lAJ^lttft p«20. 
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prof i t ! and inoovuton* profit*. Will© Innovatloni 
iQTOXve situations whl^ are both ob3«etiT«ly and 
suHjaetlvaly imeertaln, Kalrstead suggaits that partlcoXar 
expeetatlont direotad towards aonopoUsts' profits may 
ba, and tT9(pxm%lf ara, hald with soaa dagree of subjeetlve 
Qertalnty and talw the form of single valtted projaotlons, 
*Wmn a f i n has a reasonably ooaqilate control of the 
narket It Is possible for i t s es^ierts to saice forecasts 
of future demand for the product of the flXB* 'It i s also 
possible to project costs and aren to calculate costs 
idiieh potential competitors sight Inour If they- undertook 
to inrade the market.*^ 1*hls 'abil i ty of th« monopolistic 
firm to regard the relevant variables sufficiently within 
i t s control or within the eottpetenee of i t s knowledge to 
permit their projection with ctmfldence'i^ distinguishes 
these situations frost the uacertainty sltuaticms with 
which investors in venture capital unier coapetltlvc 
conditions are faced* 
PAHTIG.JLAB SXPSCTATION81 IMO?ATOBS« Pmnf& 
Particular eipectatloos directed towai^s Imiov&tors' 
profits are characterised by true uncertainty* Kelrstead 
U Xbld«, p. 25* 
2» IMd*» p* 27* 
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•ndofMS Bdbemp^teT* B d«flnltloii of Innovation bat dls* 
tingulslT«s luaovatlont in a p«rf««tly coapetitive situation 
froB tho8« in laparfaot ooBpetitlon dlracted towards 
areating a Monopoly or prtservlns an esixting one with 
a vi«v to earning aonopoljr p rof i t s . Uaeertainty I s 
present in l»th the s i tuat ions tint the hassards for the 
corapetltire innovator are greater. In the iaperfeotly 
coapet i t i re situation 'Ijqpectations of innovators' profi ts 
wil l soaet ims he Qharaeteriz^ed \iy suhjeetive uai t r ta in ty 
hot sometiaes they wil l be single valU€d •••• mhjeotive 
uncertainty would see^i s t i l l under the conditions of 
•onopoly, to diaractterise expectations of profi ts when 
the Innovation under consideration i s a major one •••* 
Another type of Imiovatlan which ordinarily i s not character-
ised Igr sttbjeetive uncertainty I s *t^e day to day kind 
of innovation, n«ver rwrolutionary in i t s effects on either 
aethods of production or the nature of the product,evolution-
ary rather, consisting of laprovam^nts in the mie or the 
o thar ' .^ 
Expectations of the * ccnpetitlve innovator* relate 
to sudi variables a[S the value outeoae of a new te^nl(|ii« 
or a new product introduced i n a coapetitlve aarket* By 
these Innovations the entrepreneur expects to raise the 
n i h i a , , p , 4i>. 
£ . I b i d , , p . 4 6 , 
t f i 
•argljn&X vwBwm produotir i t ies of th« faotors eaployed 
to a l&fBl higher than tt;o»t w ieh havs formed the basts 
of th« pays«att proalMd to th«m« M t th« present affords 
no basis for extrapolating ttot fature values of ths 
variables Involved. Heoaptton of the mv product Ijgr 
eonsmaersi raM»tlon of the potential eompetltcarsi and 
even the aetual eosts whleh have to h@ Incurred, are a l l 
highly uncertain. Bach si tuation i s •unique* In the sense 
that s l a l l a r si tuations had not arisen in the past , hence 
objective probability calculations are not possible, Sach 
decision i s * crucial* in the sense that the outcoae would 
affect the entlr® future career of the ent^^pr^^nour* 
Keirstead endorses ths analysis of the decislon-aalclng 
process offered by Sba^le^ but makes th« significant point 
that i t i s only the case of subjsctive uncertainty to vhlch 
that analysis applies. *Subjective uncertainty always 
characterises par t icular ex3>eetations diraeted towards 
innovators' p io f i t s . I t does not nsMJLy^ ss far as wa 
can t e l l fro& the way business sen talk and behava, 
characterize other kinds of eaEpeetations*.^ He also argues 
i n favour of taking Into account oonslderations of flead-
b i l i ty wMeh attands antreprsneurlal behaviour in taki i^ 
a dacifllon in subjectively uncartaln s i tuat ions, and notss 
Shackle's failura to do s o . ' 
1. Ib id . , 3« 19 and i>p.23-33| also B.S.KeirstQadiC^pj.tal 
2. B.i». iCeirstead, ia.MSM* P* 29. 
3 . Ib id . , p . 34. 
t«4 
Part icular esqpaetatlcmt dlreeted towards irmoTators* 
p w f l t t and aondpollsta* p rof i t ! differ from general 
expectations diraeted tovaids wlodfalXs In the i r time 
horlaoa* •When ona i s oonteaiplating the introdaotion of 
an Innovation, investment in tlxad pl&nt or machinery 
or a process designed to a l t e r or affect the Inst i tut ional 
strttcture of tiia market, one atast from the v«ry nature of 
the variables involved t ry to peer into the future for 
a pariod wM ch «^pit>3Ei«atflS to the t l»e required Jay 
the 'natural life* of the innovation, aaehlne or the 
process in question.. .^ Eelrstaad thinks a period of 100 
to 150 months i s the appropx'iate tiise horizon for sudh 
expectations*' 
With the length of the time period increases tlM 
uneertairty Involved. Hence the compttttive iiinovator 
wist expect a wach higher profit than the monopolist to IM 
persuaied to undertake the ^anture* K0irste<*d quotes 
empirical evidence to snp~ort tha point. 
PAHriC0LAR B3uP3CTATIOT(!8 
Xhis c lass i f icat ion of expectations into general and 
part ioular docs not mean tha t there i s no int.traction 
t l i ic^er£«e l i fe of u&*expired patents.see Keirilead, op.ei t . 
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between the two. In f&et the two are eloseXy Interrelatedt 
General expectations Influence the partleular •xp««tatloni« 
Bxpeetatltm ot a fal l in the general price level hae I t t 
lapact on the flra» • exgpeetatlon about the aartcat price 
of Ita own p r e s e t . Sxpcet&tlon of an increase In eaploT"*^ 
and incoaes, or expected dianges in the laport policy of 
the goremiaent, influence particular expectations aboat 
prices, costs, Toluse of 9^98^ etc* aeneral expectations 
of the entrepreneurs make thea *opttalstle' or *pesslalstlc* 
about the future v h l ^ affects their particular ezpeetations 
aal results In raising or lowering their focus gains* This 
l i the indirect effect of general expectations on the 
particular <m99 as dlstingultiied froa the direct effects 
aeationed above* Optiaisa leads to increased productlTc 
actlYlty* Pessialstic expectations aay result in the 
introduction of cost^redudng limovatioBS* 
Keirstead discusses the nature and iapaeti divect 
as well as indirect, of general expectations in Tarious 
phases of the Trade q ^ l e . He concludes that 'windfall 
profits are earned in the relatively short run during the 
upward phase of the business esrole* The source of these 
profits i s price inflation**.* these profits are t«nerated 
not so Bueh hy actual increases in demand, but ^sy the 
Incoae inflation which i s started ly general ejqjectattons 
of increased eoosuaptloni general eigpectatlons wiieh are 
generally held and acted upon**^ 
1* Ibid. , p. t n 
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A DISTIWCTIVB FEATO^ OP ESIB8T1AD«S 
ANALYSIS 
Thl» dlftlnotlon liotvsaii types of expeetations and 
th« Qatttre of maoertaln altuatlon* i t oxf of the eht«f 
oontrlbutloBi of Ktlrstted to the uneertainty theory of 
profit* The reeelTed theory had failed to distln^ulih 
•Ituattons of »oh3«etive imeevtalnty, lahjeotlve oertalnty' 
froa troly tmeertala sitaationi oharaeterl sed Ijy mabjeotive 
uaoertalnty, or| rather. It fooussed i t s attention only 
upon the latter* As a result It ooiHd not pay speolal 
attention to windfalls and profits of the Boaopollstie 
innovator* As Keirstead pidnts oat in the opening senteiM 
of his BsaaTy he had hefore hla the contrlbations to 
eeonoaie theoxy aiade Iqr I«ord Keynes and his followers as 
also those of professor Chaiaberlln and Mrs* BoMnsoni 
besides the profit theories of Knight and Sohmpeter* It 
i s the eaergenoe of ths Keynsslan and aonopollstle 
eoapetition theories whleh aeootmts for a elearer realisation 
of the faot that windfalls and profits of the aonopolist 
(and the aonopsonlst) a]*6 a part of the nomal pattern 
of the eeontMy rather than an esweption* Profits — 
windfallS| aottopoliSts*profits and ooBpetitive innovators' 
profits «— are a noraal share of national incoae whose 
pemananee i s deaonstrable bf analysis and emplrleal eTldenee. ^ 
1* Ibid*, p* 97* 
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Itt bilnginc t©tQ«ier ultteln %h& fraaeworit of a theoiy which 
f t m regards maeertalnty to Iw tha root cauae of profitt, 
the thre* tj^pas of profits assoelatad with dlffareat 
tjrpes of asq^aotations which ara foraad la different kinds 
of unoartalnty sltnatlons aaeh daaXt with in a dlffarent 
Banner, Kalrstaad has affaatad a Braah naadad synthasls 
In a aasterljr Banner* 
On theoratleaX grounds, as wall as on the basis of 
tha availahla aBplrleal avldanoa, Kalrstaad holds that 
tha principal praoooupatlon of aost eonteaporaf^ entrepreneurs 
Is Bonopollst's profit* CoapatltlTa Innovatora* profits 
are auoh less fraqitent^ Tery uKial in eontenporary 
haslness experience i s tha type of innovation whi^ 
extends the * degree of aoaopolar'* i n th is eontext, 
Kelrstead aeoeptS| rather unoritleaXl7| Kalekl*s *<|aite 
precise definition of the degree of »on^oly*« Bat he 
does orlt lalse Kaleckl on the ground that his 'degree 
of Bonopoly* i s a static concept \Ailch ignores Innov^ators* 
profits*^ 
Kelrstead axaBlaes the *lBoentiTes of the lntrepre«aur 
and the MaxlBizatlon of Profits** to conclude that in a 
dy-naale eooncny the saxlBlsatlon hrpothesls applies wit& 
1* Jhid. , p«3 Kaleckl hinself later ahondonad ^ i s definition. 
For a detailed dlseussion see tl^ next chapter. 
2. Ibid*, p. 49* 
3* Ibid*, p* 98* 
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eertain Modlfloaticsis* MotlYes and IneentlTas other than 
that of p«eiaiiaiy profitB are «aphaaiied, The entrepreneur 
has the d*lfe to poirep, the aearoh for seeurityi and the 
er«rlng for reputation* But in sK>dem sooietf suoeeet 
in earning profits i s a measure of professional ^ i l l t and 
the h&sls of entrepreneur* s reputation^ Bower and seeurltf 
•otlves dire«t tesiness efforts towards aonopolistie 
praotiees which Itad to Bonopollatic power, * Thus profits 
though relatively uniKportant as a personal Inoentlre, 
•ay s t i l l staai as an adequate eritericm for the suocess 
of the teaines«R&an In his searoh for power| sseurlty and 
personal repute*** 
Another B»difieation of the aaxlnisation principle 
i s that It Is the *euaulatiT« lajtal of profits within tha 
period hounded hy his horison'' rather than the instantaneous 
r^ l^ e of pro f i t I whidi the sntraprenaur seeks to aaalaisa* 
As noted above, intreaslng imoertainty advises 
entpspreneurs to go in for greater f lexibi l i ty and greater 
dispersion of investaent, This introduees another focus 
of atteiiticHiy and *in a l l oases of uneertaintyi the 
consideration of f l e x i b i l i ^ sakes for oonserfativs 
behaviour, for l iait ing the aaount of i n i t i a l venture' • 
— — — i • • » iii.i i»i« i i i o w w l — — « « 1 » i l « 111! II I rill Ill iiiim II I mmmmmmmmn i ii m 
1. Ibid. , p. 42. Also see his tfOTl^rtt^Htgr^att ftlMl fJTBXJlt, 
PP« 38-93 
2» Ibid*, p* 4S* 
3* Ibid*, p* 34* 
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BMMIIE SBAVm 
K«i78tead studlet the behavlo^T of th« relative 
shares of entreprtneurs, es^itAlistSi rcjatiers and 
workers ©•ertlaSf both theorstleally aiid empirically. 
In doing so he does not use the familiar tools of maoro* 
analysis as some other eeoaoaists attaeking the saae 
prohlea h«re done* Bis method i s a study of the relatiire 
hargalBlBg powers of the vaxloiis groups involTed and the 
way progress bestows i t s fruits upon the Tsrlous classes 
in the f irst Ingtanoe* H« arilves at the conclusion that 
' the Ion? run process of the eoonoaor might be expected 
to alter the distzlbutian of the national incoae in 
fear our of the sntrepreneurlal group axiA the cost skilled 
labour groups* The less skilled and unskilled labour 
groups sight experieneei frcv these causes, a T«iy slight 
iaproreaent In their relative shares, capital a<nie diminution 
in i t s relative share. • 
The fruits of progress f irst aeerue aainly to the 
entrepreneurs and are then gradually passed over tO| rather 
irrenched avay bSTi the other classes. 7h« growth of 
1. Ibld«, p. 64. In this context he rejects Kalscki's theozy 
on the ground that there i s *no clear evidence to show 
that the relative increase In the share of profit i s 
caused by an increase In the degree of aonopoly* HM 
l i l g y , p. 49). 
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•ooopoXlttie pr&0tlC0«y both lagr entrepreneurs and Trade 
tfnioBt &• the econonf pTosresses; the greater differentiation 
of labour and the inereaslag gap bttveea Skilled and im-
^ U l e d libour as regards productlvltsr and bargaining power} 
the growth of ooziporate enterprise^ and the egalitarian 
tax policies of iiost of the aedem govemaants, largely 
aocount fbr this transfer, 
Bsplrleal evldenee elted in support of this eonoluslon 
relates to Qreat Britain over the period 193a-5« to 1»48-49, 
The relevant s tat i s t ics Show that the r€latlTe share of 
labourers and entrepreneurs have increased, lAiereas the 
shares of capital suppliers and rentiers hare decreased 
both relatively and absolutely. 
A distinctive feature of Kelrstead*s study i s his 
separation of entrepreneur* s share froa that of the suppliers 
of capital whldi the oths^ r studies of relative shares fa i l 
to do* 
A study of relative i^ares ls» liovevari entirely 
different froa a study of the deteralnatlon of aggregate 
profits and aggregate vages« the latter sftiould be the 
prlaary concern of a truly aaero'-dlstrlbution thgoiy. It i s 
in this context that aaero*econoalc variables like eonsuaption 
Irardstment and aggregate d^aatid receive proper attenticMa 
and find their due plaee« As It i s , Kelrstead's study 
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of rtXatlTtt shares i s eotiduetad salnXy in tems of 
•iei%»*soonQBle •atiabiss* H« fa l l s to produoe a 
theoxy of th« dstaiolnatlon of aggregate profits and 
thsrain Ues th« ehisf vealmess of his theory, fhs 
ssmthesis reaains ineoMplete,^ though i t suooeeds 
ill bringing together ths various aiero-theorles of 
profit ia a oomendablG maanar* For tha theories of 
profit ragiaterlng the fa l l impact of the Kdf&esiaa 
Revolution^ we ffiast^ tSierafora, turn to others, vhc« we 
propose to study in the following ci apter# 
1. ^ e a the 1999 restateneat of the theory in Capital. 
I no not lee of the 1^ 
theories of profit' • 
iBttfffft p d Xraftt ^«ites ic iBf thea 
fsoiiliar 'Haero-eeonoaio e 
CHAPTEB SS7SV 
MACBOBCOROMC THSORIBS OF PBOFIT 
ao8 
D«splt« the f«ot that ealndat elassiaal eeonoilsts 
l ike Blcarte and Harx had deroted naoh of their attention 
to a itodj of aaero'*dl8tTlhutioii of aoelal income, the 
rl»« of Marginallift shifted the fooua of attention to 
«lero«dlstrlhutlon» Ro aerioas attempt at atudylng the 
aaero-dlstrllmtion of Inooae vaa made after Karl Marx* 
JTohn Bates Clax^ srlneed great Interest in the sahjeet 
^ t tha tools of analysis vlth which he worked vera not 
snltad to It* I t was Xtord Keynes ii^o peverfally redirected 
aeonoalcs towards aggregatlTe analysis. Ue have already 
studied what Keynes himself has to offer fegr way of macro* 
analysis of profits and Imsone dlstrlhatlon* It took some 
time for his followers to pick up the threads and weave 
them Into a oomplete fabric* The main macro*theories of 
dIstrllafatloA to be studied below emerged after a decade 
of controversy had firmly estbbUshed the authority of 
Keynesian economics* Studies In macro'dlstrlbation vert 
also encouraged ^ the growth theories of Earrod and Domar 
which related the distribution of Income to the rate of 
growth via the rates of savings and InvestBcnt* The only 
exception Is the theory developed by Mlohal Kaleekl which, 
in essence, had been presented as early as 1920*^ 
In view of l^e recent origin of these theorles(iAileh 
iBBldentally, have yet to find their way into the textbook 
1* cf* H.Kaie^i, IMgar, frstanartJLJraiaiaf ,p*4g fa. 
Qeorge Allen and l3i»fln,London, 1f»4* 
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dlseusslon on Profits and Inoose I>istributioii)| i t i s 
worth while to ask the foXlaiwiii^ questions at the veiy 
outsets 
(1) Iftiat i s seant \v a mac3*o-eeononic theory f^ 
Profit? and (S) What i s the need and usefulness of sueh a 
theopyt 
I t can be shoVB that the aaero^eoonoBie theory of 
profit i s a aeaningful 0Be{ that i t i s needed fo? bringing 
•Qonoaiie theory nearer reality and thus handle aaBy probless 
%mich a sioro^aeonoiiie theory fa l l s to deal with* A fully 
developed maoro- theory of profit wil l f i l l a widely fe l t 
ga^ in eoonoaic theory and effeetively help in foramlatlng 
oertain policy deoisions* 
Maero'-soo nosios deal with s u ^ eoon(»ie aggregates 
and orerages as national ineoBt, Oatput, and BBploysentj 
the General Price Leval} the Bate of Interest, etc* It studies 
the nature, interralatLonship and behafriour of these Tariafoles. 
I t seeks to esiplain tht ir deteiaination, Ganges in their 
Magnitudes, and their relationship with other eoonoaic 
variables. 
By aggregate profits we aean the sua total of a l l 
profits (positive and negative) atftfruing in an eeonoaqr 
over a specified period of tiae« Being an eoononio aggregate 
of great iaportaaee i t i s a proper subjeet of study in aacro* 
eoonoados« 
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IB^  a »aero*th6ex7 of profit we mean the theory vhieh 
seeks to answer the foXloving (]tiestioTist 
1. What i s the nature and souree of aggregate 
profits? 
2» What detemines the aotual •oloae of aggregate 
profits in an eoono^^t 
3« Eev do aggregate profits hehaye in response to 
changes in other eoonoaic Tarlables, and what is 
the eonrse they foXlow in a gMWin? eeonoay? 
In addition the aaero*theory of profit aay profitably 
probe into the following probleas. 
4« What i e tho relationship between aggregate 
proilts and the rate of profit in the eoonoBQT? 
5* What detemines the share, as distinguished fToH 
the Yoluaei of profits in National XnooiiSi and 
hoM i s this share related to the wage share? 
6« How <toes the extent of QOBpetition<or monopoly) 
in the mazket affeet the level of aggregate 
profits and their ratio to total ineone. 
The nere enuaeration of these significant questions 
gives as a fairly clear idea of the need and usefnlness of 
a aacro'-econcNiic theory of profit* To be more clear we can 
note the follo%dng points. 
A macro-sconoaic theory of profits i s needed because 
i t wil l be an illiminating study giving us an insight into the 
eonposition of national Income which i s the most important 
eeoQomic aggregate* Profits being a part of the total 
income, i t s study can usefolly supplement the study of the 
whole* Xiikewise, a theory of aggregate profits i s needed to 
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*appX«a6nt th« theories of tbe other eooac»ie aggregates 
with vfaoa It i s oXoself related, viz*, Savings, Consuaption, 
InYestMsnt, Price leyel , BaploTment, ete, 
S«eondl3rt as i t vould be evident froa subMcjaeiit 
diseussion, the theory of ineone distrlTBution i s a twin of 
the theory of inooae determination, &nd cannot he separated 
fr(»i i t* nie same faotors play a deeisive role both in the 
determination of income and i t s dlstrihation. Forces changing 
the one alter the other. A study of the one without an^ 
reference to the other will therefore remain incooplcte, 
Thlrdiyi the voliae of aggregate profits, i t s ratio 
to total incoige, and the rate of profit are significantly 
related to the rate of econoalc growth. Profits are the 
main source of the imrestible funds needed to finance 
development, and growth i s the (^ief factor causing the 
volume of profits to increase* A maero->theory of profit 
i s , therefore, a necessary complement to t^e theory of 
growth. 
Since the very early days economists have taten great 
interest in the study of relative shares of wasres and profits 
in the total iiiooae of society* For some time past i t has 
been held that the relative ahare of wages in incogs has been 
constant QPTQT tima* Statist ical material ia support of this 
8di 
thes i s has besn rsinforeed b^ r theoret ical argYaaents 
but controirei'sy eontlnues unabated, A laacro-dynaelc 
analjrsis of d is t r ibut ion i s aaeded to czaaine this issue, 
F l f ^ l y , prof i ts bolng the income of a more or less 
d i s t inc t soclaX class, a better undarstanding of the 
factors Inoreaslng or decreasing ti:as lacoae and d>3t;?rBtiniT!i|S 
i t s course overbite wil l be useful for pol ie/ mak^TS, Most 
of the aodem sta tes profess to pursue egali tarian policies, 
hence a clear understanding of the dst^rminants of profits 
and i t s response to various fiscal and monetary lasasuras 
i s necessary for judicious policy naking* 
Lastly, one of the main reasons why a macro-eoontmic 
theoiy of profi t i s needed i s the fai lure of the received 
micro-« eonoDle theory to deal with a nuaber of iaportant 
problems. I t cannot trace the various effacts of a change 
in the general price level and the general waje level , as 
the demand and supply curves cannot bs aggrej»at«d for the 
econoBiy as a whole* I t conceives of the demand for the 
prodt2et to be Independent of the factor prices (factorial 
incomes), th i s i s not val id in a discussion of t o t a l income 
of the faetors as changes in factor earnings Affect effective 
dmand and thereby the value-product functions, (In other 
words, tbe marginal vaius-productivlty of a factor i s a 
ftanction of the rawajpd of that factor) . 
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Sueh ar« the reasons which have rasuited In a nuaber 
of at tenpts at the forauXatlon of a aaeiro'-theoxy of 
profi t in the l a s t two deoados. These theories are based 
on ths faa i l ia r Keyneslan sariQg*lorestnent analysis of 
the eoQSuaiptiort function and the autononous Invoatmspt. 
Soae of thea go f\irther to incorporate tha productivity of 
lalK>ur and/or ^xe extent of competition in the 'uarkat. 
The eonrse of aggregate prof i ts overtime i s studied In the 
context of the th^>ry of growth* In what follows we shall 
briefly discuss the main contributions In t h i s flold i . e . , 
thos« ol Wicholas ^aldor, Mlchal !Cal^ckl,K.E.Bouldlng, Sidney 
Welntraub and 3'oan BoMnson, in that ordsr ^^riiich incidentally 
i s not chorenological)* Beferences to others vho have 
participated in the discussion on the subject like L.L, 
Pas lne t t l , F.H« Hahn and Anatol Murad wil l be made where 
called for. 
All these theories arc based on a rury simplified 
model. The to t a l inocraie of society la divided into two 
p a r t s . Profits ( including sa lar ies , in teres t and rent) 
and wages. Though soma theor is ts l a t t e r separate ren t ie rs ' 
income into an Independent category, I t Is generally maintained 
that the separation of rent a ^ Interest from aggregate 
prof i t s does not pose any diff icul t problem in viaw of the 
contractual natiire of theso incomes. The s^M i s true 
of sa la r ies . 
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Asfuiblai a s tate of ful l anployaent, and therefore 
a given l e r e l of Incone and output, Kaldor a tar ts with tht 
following ©quatlonst 
1.1 Y 3 W • P t o t a l Incoiii 1» Identical with 
tba soxa o A o t a l pi^oflts and 
to t a l wages 
1.2 s '^  S +S t o t a l ssEVtags are the sua of 
* P tsflrings out of wages and savings 
out of profits* 
1.3 I s S a behaviour equation expressing the 
equality of t o t a l autonoaous invest-
sent vith t o t a l savings. 
Taking the level of autonoaous InvestBsnt to be given 
and assualng slaiple proportionate ssvlnsjs functions 
J s • aoA S a • • bi olytalnss 
w w p p ' 
1^ + 1^ « *J^ * S^^^*^^ a («p - 1^ ) P • a I 
w 
ox P a ,.."^  . I - ^ n 
» ^ -
' w ®» ** *w 
t . »• Kaldor. 'Alternative Theories of SIstrlbttion*^Bevlew 
ale St I^OKL 
wTTTTWPTmt^ 
LjtMjLgS,?oI.JaiI. 196&-*S«ynp.a»*1<»,reprlnted 
^ ^_ta TajUt •m^u.filffm&ftUm*. Qerald Buckworth and Co. 
jj¥a« J toBdon, 1990| and If. KaldoftEssays on Econ«ilo 
BtaMUty and lrQWtfa,Qefald Bucicwoyth anS'Go.Ltd.liOTylon|19«1. 
sot 
Heaee the I'atlo of profi ts to Iricoiae 
P 1 I 1*4 38 mmmmmmmmmmm ^ ^ 
1 S - i . X S - 8 
and given the stodc of capi tal K, 
P I I A, Y 1.5 
K * » p - » w ' K • p - ' v ^ 
*ThU8, given the w««« earners* and the oap i t a l i s t s ' 
propeniitiea to s«r«, the share of prof i ts In incooQ 
depends si«ply <m the ra t io of investaient to output* 
(equation 1.4) • Froa •quation 1.5 i t follows that the rate 
of profit per unit of capital depends on the rata of 
aoci»B'jlation< I/K) and the Ineone-eapital r a t i o ( t /K). 
The iKidel operates only if the two savings 
propensities differ and the aarginal propensity to save fr<» 
prof i t s easeeds that fron vageS| i . e . , Sp / s,, and s^ > s^* 
As an interesting case i t nay ha r»ted that i f i/age 
earners save nothing out of the i r ineorae, i . e . , 3|, = 0, then 
1. I b id , , Eaaays on Tiilua and Distribution, p . 239. 
SfO 
P 1 J and p , 1 T 
f -p y .p 
In this ease the profit shape depends on the capital-
i s t s ' propsnsltlds to save and Invest* the less they safw 
aM the More thoy Inrast^ the more their profits shall be. 
In case the propensity to s*re oat of vages Is positive, 
the more tha wage earners sicre the lass the profit share Is , 
The nost crucial aaaimption underlying Kaldor's theory 
Is that tha 1/X ratio I s Indepaiwiant of tha savings 
fimetloasy l . e« , the ratio of Investaeiit to output i s not 
influanced lay Ganges In the propensities to save of tha 
aapltallsts and the woricers, Kaldor regarda this as a 
basic Keynsslaa assumption vhldi i s also real lst le to 
malEa* 
Kaldor mentions four l lAlts within lihich his model 
operateSI 
1 - Raal wages eannot fa l l below a certain subsistence 
minlnam. 
2 -* Pzt>flt rate eannot fa l l below the risk premium. 
3 -'The rate of profit wil l have to be higher than 
tlm risk premium V ^ Margin depending upon tha 
imperfeetlon of oompetition and elements of monopoly 
in the market. 
1, Ibid. I p* 2SS, 
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4 * Capital-output ra t io mnst be assis&ed not to be 
influeneed bgr tSia ra te of profit* 
Jkibjaet to these oonatralnts, the theory applies in 
the long run only, due to the downkiard inf lex ib i l i ty of 
the wage leyel and the rate of profit in the short run* 
KaXdor tiasn proceeds to re la te h i s thaoiy of profit to 
the theory of growth. Following Har2x>d, the determinants 
of the isrestfiient - output ra t io are disoribed in teiws of 
the ra te of growth ©f aetual eapacitf Cs ) and the capi tal -
output ra t io (•)• 
9 n Qtv 
for Harrod*8 second eepation t/f =» s he substi tutes his 
e la t ion . (1*4) above. 
I • S - "w > f 
and eoncludes that *the warranted and natural ra tes of 
growth are not independent of one another} i f profi t 
aarglns are f lexible, the fomer will adjust i t s e l f to the 
l a t t e r through a conssqusnUal change in ^ * 
Kaldor' s oodal i s dxtremely slKple* The fundsu&ental 
proposition embodied in his theoiy finds a place in a l l 
1* Ibid.) p. 232. 
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maero-theoples of proflt i The capi tal is ts* behanrlour 
regarding savlnga and Imrestaent play a dotezmlnlng role with 
r e d a c t to the i r aggreglit« prof it«« 
But t h i s simplicity has been achieved at a great cost 
and the bargain can hardly he regarded as profl tabls . A 
theory of dis t r ibut ion which takss the level of Incoae as 
given i s seriously handicapped as the same set of forces 
detsrainss both the level of inoorae and I t s distr ibution, 
though purporting to be a lorg run tdieory, i t ccMBpletaly 
ignores the supply side and conducts the entire analysis in 
terms of the oiapositlon of a ^iven aggregate dersand. Then 
Kftldor»s ident i ty X2 p • w i s an .^ JSIftSJb ident i ty . But 
t o t a l ws^es are a function of l^e level of eBplojnient and the 
stock of capi tal (given te^nologica l conditions). The 
ra te of profit on capi tal deteiwines th« price level ^ i c h , 
via i t s influence on consumption, affects th« level of Incoae, 
This rata i t s e l f Is deterained by the rate of accumulation 
il/K) and the capital output r a t i o and the p i ^ e n s l t l e s to 
save (vide equation 1«S above)* 
I t has been contended that Kaldor Is able to exclude 
productivity only because he takes the level of incoos 
to be given, and tiire p^coposition that va^es eqptal aaz^inal 
produetlvl t / oust be incorporated in the saoro'^lstrlbatioB 
a i l 
tliaory t o give the supply ph«tto»9non i t s du«. Bat KaXdor*s 
r a j ec t lon of th« prodticttvity theory i s wel l considered and 
¥•11 founded. l a an l ape r fee t ly coape t l t lve eoonoiy, as Isy 
anid larg« a l l the r e a l vo7ld eoononlts a r e , marginal 
product iv i ty aare ly provides a boundaiy eondi t lon. The price 
of l&bour eanaot be grea ter than I t s na rg ina l product, hut 
there I s no reason to suppose t h a t i t coald not be l e s s . As 
swoh| Mar^na l product iv i ty doss not play any role In 
detenainin?, the wa^e r a t a s as long as they f e l l vrlthln t h i s 
bound&?y,^ Then in a l l econoailes, p roduct iv i ty of labour I s 
Itsfelf determined lay the l eve l of employmant and the exis t ing 
stock of c a p i t a l , glvan ths tachnlfue of production and the 
degrg's of u t i l i s a t i o n of the ex i s t i ng capaci ty . 
All the ex is t ing capaci ty , as indicated by ?', I s mt 
always fu l ly u t i l i z e d , And ygum i t i s no t , the pr ice p o l i c i e s 
of the f ins play a role In determining the ra te of p r o i t t per 
u n i t of c a p i t a l . As sha l l be seen in the subsequent discussion, 
i t i s i n swich a s i tua t ion t h a t "toe degree of aonopoly has 
t o be taken i r t o consifleration. As Joan Bobinson has ramariced, 
'The proposit ion t h a t the share of p ro f i t In income i s a 
function of the r a t i o of Investeent to Income I s perfec t ly 
co r r ec t , bat capacity and the degree of monopoly have to be 
1, Sidney V.',iintraub» ^MuT9I^Ph t o tl^ f^, X i^gflry 9g,IatO|Mi . 
BiigtTl teitlQntpp, 106-« and a lso H i r o ^ l Atsamli»Mr,i:aMor« s 
th^^ory of Income Dist r ibut ion* Heview of gconomia Stp^j^ep, 
7 o l . XXII, 1959-«0,p. 117, 
kk TJ,Kaldor:*A Hejotoder to Mr» Atsiaai and Pi^fessor Toblc ' , 
su 
brought in to detemlofl ^ a t inooae It la that profits are 
a share of and inTestMent i s a ratio to*.^ 
The aistOBption of a stable and linear oonsuaption 
ftmction, i«e«y of siaple proportionate savir^ propensities, 
«y and Sp, also beaoaes less plaasible i f ve treat tha levels 
of incoae and enplo^raent as variables* The price level i s 
l ike l f to change with changes in eaploy&ent and output, and 
the savings propensities oan hardly remain stable in these 
conditions* 
SoBie of these ^ortecnsings co ild be r«ioved by including 
certain other variables, along with the f\inctional ecjuations 
governing their behaviour, in Kaldor's nodel* To be nore 
specifio ve need introduce into the model a production function 
relating the level of income to the level of employment 
(assuming the stock of capital to be glvan) and a modified 
profit maximisation principle stating that the rate of wages 
i s less than or eqpial to the marginal productivity of labour. 
It void.d s t i l l leave open, however, the problem of the 
determination of price level and of excess capacity leading 
to the degree of iionopoly* 
1. Joan Bobinsoni ^9Ufif^«4 MSkmiLit l*iB9rafVol*^wo,p*U9, 
BKil Blackwell, Oxford, 1990* 
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For treating th« prl©« I w e l a» a variable we h«f e 
to bring into the system the supply of aoney^ the demand 
for money and the rata of interest* Kaldor* s own treatment 
of the price level l i e s in assiiai&g that there i s a 
maohanism in the system Igr vhleh the level of prices with 
reiqpeet to money vages (i«e«, profit margins) i s detemtined 
by demand, rising with a xlse in investment and falling with 
a fa l l in investment, so that the system i s stable at full 
employment,^ This explains why his model excludes the 
degree of monopoly, tot this assiaiption implies that the 
existing oapaoity i s folly ut i l i sed, leaving no freedom 
for firms to deteznine prices* The prices are determined 
by the Interaotion between a variable offsetive demand and a 
technologically determined supply* But oase the fUll 
emplojrment assiaiptlon i s dropped sueh an assumption about the 
behaviour of prices oannot be made and the degree of 
m(»nopoly must be takisn into consideration* 
Besides orltioal comzaents, attempts have also been 
2 
made to improve upon Kaldor* s model* B«H* Davis seeks to 
add sciete qualifjring elauses to Kaldor* s conclusion that wa^ e 
1* ^' Kaldor, Sigaril 9B Tftllf ftn4 PlgWMlOat pp.229-30. 
2. R,M,0avist 'Income Distribution in a Two Saotor 
EoonoBor*. Qarfffrg ^^nn^llg ?ipgri»yol,18, IMt, 
pp* S l S - f 
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•arnert can iner«ase their share \xy aaving less , Tha 
(jaali float!ons are In taae nature of refineaenta and do 
not affact ths eoncluaton as luch uhlch Is also supported 
hf the aore aatheaatleal aodel of Davis* 
A aors strongly suggested eorreetlon eoaes from 
L.L. Paslnettl.^ In view of the fact that workers also save 
and their past savings would be made available for investaent 
only on payaent of Interest, % l^ch would aean a part of 
profits going to wage earners, he reconstructs Kaldor*s 
aodel by introduoii^ into i t the rate of interest* He makes 
the ttieory of the rate of interest a prareqolsita to tha 
theory of profit. But in reforaulatin* Kaldor* s theory 
he proeeeds on the assua^tion that in the long run equllibriua 
aodel the rate of interest e(foals the rate of profit* He 
Bakes the point that the distribution of ineoae between 
profits and wa^es aust be distinguished froa the distribution 
of Inooae between capitalists and workers* Paslnettl claias 
that a study of the latter i s not possible anless Kaldor's 
aodel i s corrected along the lines suggested \3y hia. 
1, Ibid*, pp. 319-80, 
2* L,I>.Fasinettlt *Rate of Profit and Incoaa Distzibaticm 
in rslation to the Bate of Eeoooalc Irovth** Hevlew of 
^aUfflilS §tH4ifif Vol* X3CtX, t9«2, pp* 267-2T9, 
21? 
Pa8lnftttl*8 wfoTttolation of Kaldor need not be 
rapro4uee<} here In lt» entirety* TbB following brief 
aumaary should suffice* 
Total profit, P f P • P , l . e * , profit share of 
eapital lsts plus the profit share of the workers. 
Workers savings S^ « n^  ( W • P^), s^ bting workers' 
propensity to save* 
eapltalists* savings 8^ a s^P ,^ s^ being «apitalists» 
propensity to save* 
The ecpiilibpitM condition i s 1 9 t^ { ^ i- P^) •• t^ P 
or I * «^ . I • < »e - «w > 'e» 
fioffl lAich ve obtain £ l « « J » i - !K ^ '^^ ^ 
. !fl ^ ^ •w y ( I - ' ' ) 
ana *rf* s ' • a *• • •"•'" '" •'" 
* S * - S w 1 S * - 8 „ -e "" ^ 
Which may now b® compared with Kaldor*» e«|aations(l*4) and 
(1*5) to note that the latter gives tis not the deterainatlor 
of total preftis but of the eapltalists* share of i t only* 
A P P. P^ 
AS -» aj «,a 4. —a (1*8) 
X X X 
and - a - i • — (t ,») 
K K K 
and voikers share of profit (F^) equals the interest they 
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obtain on the eapltal (K^) owned bgr tb««, ve obtain 
P 1 I •« 1 t^^ ^ ^ 
T bolng the rate of interest* 
In dfnaalG eqalXibrlua 
^ ^ •w^T_r?c2 Jtf * »g ^ ew 
K S I ~ f o - f v * I s e ^ s v 
8abstltntlni this eiQ^resslon, and that of e^at lond ,? ) 
into ( U t ) abore vre obtaint 
I . 1 I • 
^ se-'fir E se*tv 
% exaetly the same procedure^ eiq^iresslon (U9) along with 
(1*6) above givess 
£ 1 I mi « * W * e ^ flWK 
I 80-nf ? se*sv '^ se*8V • I s«-«if It' ^ •^^ •*^  
Paslnettl stresses that Kaldor's eifaatlon (1«5) wmat be 
replaeed by equation (1.11) aboTe, and for his equation 
( U i ) vs Bust snbstitnts e<patlon <t.t2) above giving the 
distrlbntlon of Inceae between profits and wages, and equation 
(1*6) giving the distribution of Inooae between workers and 
capitalists* On the basis of his assuiQ»tion that tht rate 
of Interest equals the rate of profit, he then substitutes 
P/K for r in equation (1.11) to obtain 
81f 
and I . •»a*%t) ^ ,^"^»vX,. (1.14) 
whence, provided ( I - i ^ X ) ? * 0 
I « JL . 1 (1.16) 
and Iqr an anaXogous pzooasa eqitttfclon (U12) beeones 
P ^ J ^ I^  (1.1«)^ 
vherQupoa he notes that thes« results *haTa been reached 
without making any assuaptioas whatsoever on the propensities 
to sore of the woi4cert« This i s the aost striking r e u l t 
of our analysis* It neaas that, in the long run, workers* 
propensity to savs, though influenolng the distribution of 
inooae between capital ists and workers «•• ••• does not 
influence the distribution of ineoB» between profits and 
wages •••• Nor does i t have aagr influence whatsoever on the 
rate of pxofit • • •• ' 
The institutional assmsption that profits are dis-
tributed in proportion to tlm capital owned implies that 
Hn tht3 long mn profits wi l l feam out to be distributed in 
pro]K3rtic»i to the anount of savings which have been 
gl|M|HBK. 4 M M M M 0 oontribttted*. i . e . , ' ^ ^ fc 
U £»«X*,Pa8inetti| op*cit*, p* 272« 
2. Ibid*, p. 272« 
S, Ibid. 
i » f i ^ u « » nm% •'•iMi^ M.iiiii « .,i,i„ii,,i,i„,i„..,., « « ^ m d o h •«n 
For mf «iv«a i^ tl^ @7« l a only ari«^  prqiortl »f)«ll%r F«l»ttofi 
•«««,••• tti^mf^t^t **i^ SiMs« Mf vol* <l«t«f«ifilr^ *^w 
VAtio 9f profits to tmlm f^^ *^^ •tttfng s'^ o^ ip* ^^ 
eo''»«f^tt«iitl7 al46 %b« InOQtto ^t i t i l^ci t i^ ^W«9«! profits 
A« r«g«»lt t ^ stAMUtr «miU^%i^ t Pwi^attti eoneludca 
%fm% ^tiimmm* la t}i« «bi»ft fiiit i t i » ii«««sMr3r t\m% m > m^ in 
the ioiit y«i t ^ only iit9«»«ar|f e^tiditlozs i« M > Q»^  
F»ila*ttl*« r9f)»f«»l«ti<m i9 a»«ftij. i f * sl^^r of ti« 
di«trl^istlon of ino«M l^tiPton pfoftts ana ir«i«« I t to bt 
AittiKfititfitd tmm that lMtV€#9 •apittOltt* tM «»flift«« 
But in th«t • • • • i t wst'f %%IX te tiftlHid idit^^i' wotictrt 
^ fi»t hm% difftor»»t •atlnc pir^^eAtititt fsor VM^IW i^mmm 
tttm latarttt imd th«ir vot^t* f^lti«iMorfi| tlit intfo^ooti«« 
o f «ll«i IP«t« of l l l t«l«Ot i a t o tllO «»ftlf«i» IMO been de -ivec of 
«nt^ of Ito iiol#titi«liti«« <!«« to t ^ otoiaq^ion of Ito 
•<piaiir m^ iti« vi#« of pr^rit* 
i^iimmiiiiiiimw 
8« IM4»9 9« 8?f« 
tai 
FftiLn«tti flharos a l l th« shorteoBings of Kaldor vhieh 
arlaf tmm aftafonlas fa l l employaent and a given lerel of 
Income. Sucb a theoiy can at best be a short tem theory 
In yhleto the long t em aisiaptKm al»oat the rate of Interest 
la rather laeongruoas* Pasinettl's refoznulation also robs 
Kaldor*» wxiel of I t s s tapUdty without reaioflng soae 
of I t s More serious defects. 
Kaldor»s theory satisf ies the criteria laid down }ry 
Anatol Muradt^  aa earlier oontribotor to the subject, for a 
aacro'eeonoolo theory of profit* It eiwisa^es the sasia 
conditions for accrual of positive aggret^ a^te profits whieh 
Murad does, Kaldor^s analysis also seeas to be in syapati^ 
with Hurad* s oontention that the extent of oonpetitioa In 
the naitcet has nothing to do with the deterninatioci of 
aggregate profit8{ i t affeats i t s distribution among IndiTldua] 
entrepreneurs only. Kurad i s right in so far as the voluse 
of profit i s eono3med, but the ratio of profits to incoaa 
i s a different natter* 
2 - MICHAL K4LBGKX 
Stated in simple tsriss, Kale«ki*a theory ta i l s us that 
assuming the waft earners* propensi^ to sanre to be sero, 
gross profits equal private InTestment plus eapitallsts' 
i m III i m • • ! i i l iMl i i ) I I I > II ir II ' > li i • i i i i l i i n m M i • 
1* Anatol ^radi *Qaestiaiis for Profit Theoxy* aestions for rofit eoxy*. Ihe Amayiea^ 
oonfUBptlain* %is follows dirtetly froa tht l}&lanee sheet 
of Kational Xneost* OB ineone sld« National Ineone Is tti9 
warn of vixoas Profits^ Mages lnel\idlng Doles and QToss^oveTn-
•ant I&vestaent* On the asi^eiiditiire side t in sane equals 
the si» of total QTOSS Investeetitf Capitalist ConsuHptlon 
and VIoTlcers* Co&siui^ tlon* As voikers* eoasimptloii etpials the 
vages and doles t^ey reeelve, and as private iRvestnent 
eqiials total gross Investaetit islfsis govemnent Investnent, 
i t follows that gross profits etfual private lEivesttaeiit plus 
eapital ists' eon sumption, 
P a I • Cp ( 2.1 ) 
I f workers save part of their earnings, profits wi l l be 
redue^ lay the ssae aaoont 
It also follows that increased savings on the part of 
the eapital ists redues their profits* The sore they oonsume 
the l e ^ e r their profits* 
The a»?nit^e of profits thus obtained i s , however, 
subject to eorreetloQ due to uneiqpeeted ehaages in the 
value of stocks* ftit Kalecki regards i t a minor factor 
not calling for any modification of the tbaory,^ 
1. 5* Kaleckii /The Theo^ i|.P^<^i*»*« ^gaWiaiffJflttmiai 
Tol* LII. 194S| pp. S8d-8«7, also see M*Kaleeicit 
Theory of feonoaie Bynaalaty.pp,.*a*89.(lflflyg« Allen and Vmln 
liondon, 1994* 
88S 
It I t Intorestlng to note that KaXdor' s equations 
(1»4) and (1«6) studied earlier ean both be derived frc« 
KaXoki't e(|aatioii (2«&^ tqr slight reirranieBient of teics.^ 
This theoiy of tha deteraination of ag-jre^ate profits 
i s suppXaaented tigr Xaloki's earlier theory of relative 
shares vhleh i s based on the degree of aonopoly concept. 
Bat before taking i t tip ve should exiaminc what Kalclci has 
to 3ay- regarding the long run theory of aggrega^ profits. 
In fraalng lang run propositions Kaleoki takas the 
giovth of t^e eeonoiBiir into consideration* The magnitudes 
of infestnent and eapitalist eonsoq^tion are nsasured in 
real terms and are arfived at bf averaging them over a fa l l 
eycle period* thas the aver£«e i»t profit in the long rta 
equals the average eapitalist eonsuaptlon plus the overage 
net private investment in the same period. 
? « C 4- T (2.3) 
U Foi^  p a I • Cp - S|| ean bs rewritten as 
P - Cp a I • Sy o r 8 a I - S y o r I L P a 
I - s ^ . Subtraeting aj^ from both sides ve get 
P ( s P - ' » f ) a I - « r ( t f 4 ' P ) « l - i i d l or 
P a ^ .. '.•••. , I " - • • . Y 
•p * • » "p * "if 
Vhleh yieldsKaldor*s e<|iiations(l.4) and (t«5) on 
division Xf^ Y and K respeetively. 
eonaists of a slabX^ pij»t ft «nd a part proporti atmt* to 
tlsi r^ aX profits f^^ of i08» tl»e «|^ « C^  » A • x P^  
ilh«f« K i» posltiv* m^ 1099 tban cmt* A i t %tm r«tiiXt 
of INiMts «B<pif«d )r eapltaXli^t dttfing tlit lam fsa 
4«f«XQ|p9i€Sl III tht 9«B%« • ««a IM i|pior«4 as tlia ttat 
lag irxvoXvad i s raXatlYaly She>xt« Sn that 
(2«4) 
•oaMning (2«3) ani (2*4) abovs v« g«t 
f « & t ,1.,. 
t - X 
< » • » ) 
Asimiiiic )^ ^ to be ths •alas of tot&X oi^ltaX e(^|««fit 
at ouffTditt prions of IsvsstMsat at ftie bsginiiit^ of ts^is 
poriodf slTiOa I i s tlis msTm^B net raal iaEVustfUftnt in tlis 
p<silod imdar eomsi^ sratlai&i, at prloss pr i^mlXlng at ths 
iHslimlng df tlis psrio^^ ^ s r»aX oapltaX at ths '^ »d of 
ths psrioA i s i^ • w3t^ Vliers ft i« ^ s XsBg^ of tin 
p«Jiiod# 8o that ths sppToxiaats avsva^ va3jts of sapltaX 
stOQiE cjvsr ths psrtod will bs, W a K^  • § T (2,e> 
laXssiii than obtains ths p^s of profit p«r suit of 
Oi^itaX laf divxaing ? in sfsatisn (3.0) ^ t im s^piation 
(il»i)« Thus ^ « avsifsss rats of profit i s a Itmstioa of 
ths ratio of tht sr^ags iar^sta^t T to tho initiaX vaXns 
of sapltaX K , giirsn ths propsnsity to OODMM out of 
o 
sm 
profi t x \ 
Kaldor*s ec^uatlon <t«8) also giires th6 s^ a eonelusion 
though his magnitudes are not averages for the whole period 
of a cycle as Ealteki* s are* When » » 0 Kaldor* s equation 
( n s ) becoffljs f = -rf- • jf • Both Kalecici and Kaldor hold 
•p 
the view that *lfen th« propensity to savs out of pi-ofltg 
aai wagos, the rate of profi t depends on the ra te of 
accuraulationn 
As regards the rati© of aggregate profi ts to National 
Inoone, V/If and the re la t ive shares of profi ts and wages, 
Kaleeki has a difforcnt theory to offsr . I t depends, 
aoeording to him| on the degree of aonopoly in the eeonosqr* 
The degree of monopoly of a fiita i s defined as the 
r a t i o of the diffsrenee betwean price and mai^lnal cost 
to pricfi.S fhe degree of monopoly A = ^ * ^ . 
Bf a process of averaging he arrives at the degree 
of monopoly in an industry and the average degree of 
•onopoly in the eeonos^ as a nfhole yU » .-~~«. 
1. K« SaleoiEi, ep*oit«, pp»26t*2«9$ also see theory of 
IgQI^ ffilQ Pyn«ilff,^l PP.63r-56, for a eifldlar for»ulation with 
8(3«e chaoge of notations* 
2, The concept i s borrowed froa A,P* Xiamer who suggested the 
above as a measure of the * index of the degree of aonopoly 
power* in hi a a r t i c l e *The Concept of Hoikspol^ and the 
Measureawnt of Monopoly Power*. Mftk^ fit l<^OTll^ #t<l!lli| 
JTune 1934* Kalecld.'* f i r s t a r t i c l e on ths sableet appeared 
ta MaBl^ilifi |fVol»«>. 1«86 'The Deteraiaants of the 
DistritRxtlon or Incone* • 
It 1ft also ftssuned tSiat tor the econoogr as a vtioXa 
•argloal oottfl aqiial ororage variablo eosts vltb a high 
f 
dagrea of lypx^oxiaatlon* Then hjr an analyala of eoats 
and prieas agd a prooeta of aumaticm for the entire 
aoonooj Kalaokl ifeovs that just as the degree of monopoly 
of a fixM Biaasuras the profit margin over sale of the f lrm,^ 
aaasures the nrere^e rate of profit per unit of tumorer 
in the •cotLmsfk 
If T id the gross turnover {T - Z x»p where x stands 
for products, so that T e^oals gross national income plus 
the aggregate cost of narketabXe rav materials)| B the 
aggvegata antrepreneurial IneoMOi and 0 the aggregate mer' 
head costs (interest plus salaries plus dapreelatlon charges) 
so that S **- 0 i s gross eapitaHst income, the weighted 
vreraga of the degree of oonopoly in the econooy, 
// s 1-1-2 I which allows that Hhe relative shares of 
gross capitalist Inooae and salaries in th« aggregata turnover 
i s , with great appiosdmation, eq;aal to tha average degree of 
•oaopoly*. 
1, M«Kaleckit 'The Dlstrtlmtion of Watloaal Incoaa* in 
George Allan ant tlhwia,London, 1$i9« This assi^r i s 
reprinted in * ^§^Xm§ %% %mm^n Qt jwrn^ QlS&SiJmSiXsm* 9 Anarlcan Eeononie Assoeiatlon,pp.l97-21T. 
2 . Kaleckl, Readings p. 803. 
In perfact «dsp«tltlon prlee e<|aiL].t aarginal oost 
hcnesA i s fero whl^ Inpllas that piv>flt8, laterest | 
salaries, d«preelatlo!i ete», are xaro, vhteh i s paradozleal. 
Bat tie theorr i s not meant for that ease as the assoaptions 
on % l^ch It 18 basad do not apply In ooapetitlve conditions,^ 
But perfectly ooBpetltiva conditlwis are rarely found, hence 
the theory i s real ist ic and applies both in the short run 
aai the long run, Critlcisn of the aiboTe concept of ddgres 
of monopoly persuaded Kalecki to redefine i t and moilfy his 
theory accordingly. Thus by 1*43 the degree of monopoly had 
beooffle * the wrerase percentage gross aargln' reflecting *not 
only the changes in the degree of market laperfection and 
oligopoly and the bottlenecks in available capacities but 
2 
also changes in the rates of prima selling costs*« In the 
latast •ersi(»* the Individual firm*s price(p) i s based on 
nyera^e prims costs (VL\ vhioh are assumed constant over the 
relevant range of output| and the weighted average price of 
a l l firms in the industry ("57 so that p a mu • np 
where both m and n are posltivs coafficiants and i t i s 
postulated that n <i« 'The coefficients m and n character-
izln% the price fixing policy of the firm reflect what may bs 
called the degree of monopoly of the f lns's poirttlor'. Such 
an ecjuation i s obtainsd for each firm in the industry 
weighted hy their respective i«tpttts added together and 
divided by the output of the industry to obtain 
1« Ibid«, p. 204* 
2, Kalacklt^tft4ifl? IB ti^Bffilfi .Ppm^ftitP* 16»<lqorge Allen 
and TMwlB, London, 191^ 
i* W y ^ ^ * ^ « > ^ of EsoBflmlo SyHaBicg,19ft4,p.10, 
m ti -f n p 
¥bloh jMIIdt P » •« J^ » u • 
1 • n 
Af , M . Is Kal«elci*8 degree of OKHiopdlyt the abov^ 
1 - n 
6(Illation states that the ratio of average prioe in the 
iadustiT (?) to the tcverage imit eost (u) depends on the 
degree of aonopoljr* I f the degree, of monopoly TiaBS, priee 
itioreases ralatlYO to ti»|t priae costs^ i . e . , the rate of 
profit per unit of oatput iaereases* Thus the above ecjuation 
beooaes the basis for KaIeoki*s reforwalated degree of 
aoBopoIy theory of relative shares, Aseording to hia^ *the 
ratio of average price to average priae eost i s eqaal to the 
ratio of the aggregate proceeds of the industry to aggregate 
priae costs of industry* .^ Kale del then proceeds to build 
a theory of the *Oistri'bation of national Incoae* on this 
basis. As ^ e value s^ed l»e»| value of the national product 
l ess the cost of materialS| Is etpial to the sua of wages 
overheads and profitSy^ he obtains, denoting aggregate wages by 
Vf aggregate eost of raw aaterials by H, and the ratio of 
aggregate proeeeds to aggregate priae eosts ty Ki 
OverfcsadJ * Profits « (K - 1) (W 4- M ) 
n Kaieckii t^$u M ^^nmAtJ^mmiUf P*I«< 
S»9 
fha ralatlTO share of wages in the Talus addsd bgr Industrsr 
Is given lay If a tf V (f >^%^ (V » M^  • Dsnoting ths ratio 
of aggregats eost of TtOf materials to ths vags b i l l Igr j hs 
concludes that 
„ - ..^ ._^_„_._ .^ 1 
1 • (k - 1 ) (3 • 1 ) 
*The relative share of wiigas In the value added i s 
dotersined ^ the degree of iBonopoly «aA W ^^9 ratio of 
2 the materials h i l l to tiie wage hill«» A rise in the degree 
of aonopoly or la th« raw material prices in volaftioii %o unit 
wage costs causes a fU.1 of the relative share of wages in 
ths valua added* Besides those two factors 'industrial 
S 
eonpositlon* i s also one of the deteminants of the relative 
Wage share, hy whi^ Kalooki means the ooaposition of the 
value of tho gross inooise of the private seotori i^ieh involves 
not only ^ e voluae hut also ths relative prices of the 
ecmpcment product s« 
The degree of nonopoly tends to increase in the long ran, 
and thus to depress the relative share of wages In incoae* 
1« As W -t* overheads + profits « W >(K - 1)(W -•• M ) 
or total value added « H •» (^ "^ tX*^  t 1) 
g W 
or wage Share v = yalSe added • U«-(k-iKW^M) 
2, Kaleeki, op*cit«, p.28, 
S. Ihid., pp. Bd^aO. 
aso 
Bat AS no generalisations are possible about the indtistrlaX 
coiq^osltion or the relation of raw naterlal prices to anlt 
wage «osts, no ^ HCLftZi statement i s possible as to the long 
TMn trend of relative share of vages in Ineone*' 
Saleekl seeks to blend his aggregate profit theory with 
his theory of relative shares as folloirsi 
*Slnee profits in a flven short period are determined 
Iqr eapitalists* deoisions as to their eonsiaption and invest-
•ent foMed in the past, the factors detemlnlBg the distrl-
buMon of ineoae %rill affset not real profits bat the real 
wage and salary M i l , and eonseqpiently the national output. 
If, for instance, the degree of aazket iaperfection.,, increase 
and, as a result, so does t^e ratio of lorofits to imges, real 
profits do not ^anga, but the real wa»e b i l l f a l l s , first 
because of the fa l l in real wags rates and secondly because 
of the consequent reduction in the demand for wage goods, and 
thus output and eaploynent in the wage good industries, . . .* 
Percentage gross margins Increase, but the national output 
fa l l s so much that, as a result, the real total profits 
2 
remain the same*.*" 
The same principle has been enunciated elsewhere also. 
Thus the aggregate profitCP) determined ^ caq?itallsts» 
decisions to invest and consume i s brought into conformity 
1. Ibid. , pp. 30-31 
2, Kaleeicit §,Ml9ff to »?9Mil<? %Biaiff?,P*»Q> 
9* Kaieckii XhtgrT Qt JfifiiMwIfi grnaalfiat p*«7« 
SSI 
with relative share of profit(P/T) through adjuatiuenta 
In the level of output and ths as:negate vages* A» Increasa 
In the degree of nooopolf ineraase* the profit laar^lns, 
but the aggregate profits reaain the same, tSiou^h thejr font 
a larger share of the now redueed total output* At the same 
tiae wozicers* share deellues both In absolute and In relative 
terms* The above analysiS| therefore, reveals that the 
degree of sKinopol^ r has no dlreet effeet on aggregate profit 
(P), the rate of profit per unit of capital (P/K) or the 
ratio of profit to total incoae (P/X)» It only affeets the 
last nentioned Iqr affeeting the total inooaeCX)* 
The same point establishes the superiority of I^lcclsiiiii 
analysis over those nodals vhicSn take t^e level of incooe 
as given, for Kalcoki's ^eory treats total output as a 
variable in the system md stakes the degree of iaiperfeetior 
in the Btarket one of i t s deoisive determinants* It succeeds 
in bringing a odLcro-economie i*iano«enon into play in the 
detenoination of najor aaeioeeoncHiie categories* 
But, as Kaleeki has dearly specified, the application 
of the degree of nonopoly theory i s liadted to the case vhen 
there i s ejcsess capacity l a the industry* ' Finss cho«M in 
this situation a price p o l i ^ so as to •ajcinlse their profits. 
1. IMd*, pp* 11-12* 
fhesm profit aarglns deteivilns the average laval of prices 
and the voluae of output and eaployn* i^it and, therefore, th« 
wages bi l l* Tha graattr the degree of l»perfeoti<xi In th« 
•arket tha higher the degf^e of th is freedos and the more the 
influence of the flnm* policsr ou thsse irariables* There i s 
no sueh fp«ed0B for the firms nhan production i s at fa l l 
eapaeitgr* In that situation the snrailal^e eepipaent deteraiiMs 
the level of output and pxleet are set at a level vhioh 
equates aggregate deaand to the given aggregate supply. 
Kaleeki*! f irst definition of the degree of monopoly 
had bean erltleiaed on ^ e ground tdiat It i s not leglt lsatt 
to ohtaiu an avtri^se degree of aonepoly for tha eeon<Hii3r as a 
vhole on tJie basis off the individual flrna* degree of nonopoljr 
as no valid aethods of sveraging are available. His later 
foraulatioiis are, to soaie extant, l ess snenable to this 
charge but they are far froa being precise. They s t i l l beg the 
significant tiaestioni Hbv to define mn industry in aonopolistic 
oonpetitloiu Horeover, defining the degree of aonopoly 
as the ratio of aggregate proceeds to aggregate priae costs 
reduces i t to a tautological ea^lauati on of class shares*' 
1« Hossvell H« Vhitoant *A Hote on the Coosept of degree of 
Monopoly*, gQonoaio Journal, VoUU, 1941,pp.S#1^9. 
2 . Paul Saridsoni BtMrtff gJC^AS^ rflgfttf Im^m ilitl|liteUOR't 
p. 94, Hutgers University Press, New Bumsirldc, Hew Jermr 
tiS 
Aee«pti!ig the view tbat the shfire of v«ges la Watlon*! 
Inooaa had a tendency to reaala constaat war t lae , Kalecki 
sought to a3q»laia It by argnlag that the degree of Monopoly 
did not undergo vlolaat «ftiai?«d»« Thle proposition has been 
or i t l e l s^y aaong others, \if Keyaes vho c^stloned Kaleekl's 
asstaiptlon of eonstaat aarglnal costs.^ fhea hanrlng shova 
that a ehaa^e In the degree of aonopoXsr caused the level 
of output and ^ployaent to ehaage, It vas necessary to 
eacpdre hew the degree of iwnopol^ r Itsel f vould responi 
to a ehaage la the level of output and enplo^raieat caused hy 
cbaages la their auioroeeonosle det^zalaaatst lavestiaeat and 
Consuaptlon, 1!hls Kaleokl fa l l s to do fts h« regards the 
desires of aoaopoly to ho aore or l e s s eoastaat over t lae. 
Bat th i s aaottats to a fallJEire la ooapletlng the Uak 
betveea the naoro-theory of dlstrihutlcm aad the degree of 
B»nopaly theory of relative shares (vhleh I s essentially 
ad 0 roeooaom ic In aature ) • 
iJCBSRSra 3, BOtJLDim 
Bouldlng's naoroaconemle theory of dlstrlhuUon i s 
1« J.H,Keva«st 'Relative MoV'saents of Eeal Wages aad 
Output*, Economic Joumal,?ol, a i X , 19Sf,pp* 44t 49,Ealeckl, 
hovever, sticks to his positloa and claims, tbs support 
of empirical enqulrlesjvidai P\m^ Ml ^^mn%^ Pl^mU^t 
p« 12, f n , ( 2 ) . 
t84 
«oach8d In different teriaa* lacoae oonsists eas^ntlally 
of the gross additions of valus to th« to;al atock of capital 
which rgfl'3Cft ItseXf in gross a&lltiona to net v#orth. The 
•ecHioD^ i s divided into tvo eapps» ^sinessCh) and households 
(h) , while iaeome i s ilvldad hyoadly Into two oategories, 
vagesCtf) and non-wagssCT)* The deteraination of National 
Ineoraa a»%3 i t s distribution in wages and nonrwages i s 
•ff««ted hf the interplay ©f a mBober of factors which are* 
IL, tim stoek of aonsy held Isy basinsssaen^lThe Licpiidity 
• ll^eferenee 
Mjj, the stock of aoney held hy households J ftaietl ont 
K^^ debts of households to basin«ss| 
K*. idebts of business to households} 
K^ y dsbts of business to business; 
Q^ f the stock of goods held tor 
business} 
Q|iy the stook of goods held by 
households} 
D , dividend distribution ly 
business; 
C , household oonsuaq^tion} 
Invvstsant function 
asset holdings 
Dividend policy 
CouMsmtlon function 
ai^, the rates of ehange of those varlabl@s« 
u K.E. Bouidingt A ItcapflmfilrlPBt.i^ ^mmwUsiiPP*^^^^^ 
Science Kdltion^ tnc.lfew fork, t9#8tt 
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Balance sheet statements y ie ld the following r e s u l t s 
on combination and rearrangement. 
Indica t ing business net worth by ^^ ^^^^ household 
ne t worth by Ojj) aggro|.-tte p r o f i t s eqpial changes in business 
net worth plus the i n t e r e s t and dividond d i s t r ibu ted by 
the flKBS, 
T 2 d0|, + D (3 .1) 
*The oore business d i s t r i b u t e s i n i n t e r e s t and dividends 
the more w i l l be returned to I t in p r o f i t s to d i s t r i b u t e ' J 
In the above i d e n t i t y , business net worth 
0^ 5 Mj, ••• % • (Kj^  - K'jj) (3 .21 
Dif fe ren t i a t ing the above we have the following expression 
for changes In business net worth o r business savings 
(or d issavings) 
m^ 2 # ^ •• d (^ + d% - dX'j^ (3 .3) 
As <l3|j r epresen ts the p a r t of t o t a l p r o f i t s 7 which has not 
been d i s t r i b u t e d , subs t i tu t ing i t s value In (3 .1) ve have: 
V 1 i% + dMjj + dK^ -¥ dKj^  «• dK»jj 4. D (3.4) 
This I d e n t i t y , which i t s e l f i s based on I d e n t i t i e s 
(3 .1 ) and (3 .3) above i s the essence of Boulding's theory, 
1. I b i d , , p , 280, 
2 . I b i d . , Preface, p . 2 . 
%u 
H» BTTireB a t a i ln l l f t r Iden t i ty ^OT wages Ty f i r s t 
developing an i d e n t i t y for changes ir> bousahold s«irln?;8 
(d l j j ) | assonlng the t o t a l stock of roney to be cor>»t£nt 
(dM 3 dM^ <f d% a 0 ) | «nA Fegardinf; ohai^es in household 
Qet worth a« the mm of wages and dividend earned plus cbantr,a« 
i n businass net worth l e s s household eon8u»ption» The 
i d e n t i t y for wa^es f i na l ly arrlYed a t i s as follows^* 
vr S Cj^  • d% -<dMb • « | i - i t \ • D) (S,8) 
The i t en CdM^ -»• dK. - dJK*. + D ) iqppeara in both eqpiatlons 
(3*4) and (3*&)« I t nay be ca l led th« ^ t rans fe r item* ( to 
be designated by T)« The equations for wages and for gross 
p r o f i t s are now brought togetlKJr and i t i s shown tha t 
between then they aaiiaast the t o t a l product 
W S Cjj • d% - T (3.e,A) 
• J dOb • T (3*«,B) 
Total net product P^ « W • T » Gh + d^j • 4 % (»• '> 
I n the f i n a l i d e n t i t i e s dQ|j, ©r eliaaga in the value of 
a s s e t s b^ld V bus iness , I s the same as net business 
inTss taen t , 0^ i s the aane as t o t a l consuaption in the 
eeonoay as t i l l consuatption i s done lof houaeholdSi and 
1« I bid*, pp* SOO-St, 
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^\$ the change in asscjfc holding Igr liouseholds, r e f e r s t o 
the aasfets wliic} houssholdK aoquiriad fvom Imsiaesaaen but 
did not consume* Bouldir^g tsalls (Cj| •»• flf^) household 
ahforption^ vh i l e l a ths conventional (Itejriiealfifi) teminoXogy 
i t would he tertmd ^QofiBvmptiori^ Thus i n famil iar tertns t ) ^ 
three eq^at iot i t (3»7) | (3tt4|A) sad (3*6,3) may be rewri t ten 
as 
P « I • T 
If • C « T 
Bouldiug himself s t a t e s aaieh the sane whan he says 
t ha t the e(|aation C3,6) above shows t h a t ' t h e d^stfrl^tautlon 
of the product l»tweeB wages and p r o f i t s i s determined by 
two e l e a ^ t s t the eosipositloa of th« product absorpticm on 
the one hand as between business i i r restnent and household 
absorpt ion, and a t i ^ n s f e r faotor iii^ich we add t o busirisss 
absorption t o get the t o t a l of p r o f i t s , and subiVaot froa the 
t o t a l of household absorption to get the t o t a l of wages**' 
The novel element in Boulding*s theory, the re fore , l i e s 
in h i s t r a n s f e r faotor , whose Items ha has analysed • 5ach 
1. Ib id*, p , 2S2* 
2* i M d . , p« 2S2* 
3* IMd*, pp* SSS-SSS* 
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of ttkese four Itsaisi Fol«tlv« l iquidi ty preference of 
bttsiaess and tioaseholdt whlah deterainec (4X1^ )9 eredit 
policy of f i i n s (d%) | households purchase of teisiness 
seeuritLes (dK*2^ ) and the dividend distriliution poliey of 
the fLiBis, i s highly significant* Bouldin?»s analysis of 
these factors serves to underline t h e i r iaportancc in 
detarraining the distribut?.on of incone between wages and 
profits* I t i s , howeveri noted that *all these effects are 
l ikely to be more iaportant , the shorter t*ic t ine we take, as 
the longer the period, the saal lar the balance of payments 
i ta« i s l ikely to be re la t ive to the other t h r e e ' • ' 
Cr i t i c s have pointed out that the itsras of the 
tranafgr factor are not Independent of one another, and the 
same i s true of the i toas on the right hand side of 
iden t i t i es 6.1) and 0.3) above* Balance sheet accounting 
procedures indicate that whenever there i s an increase in an 
asse t , there aust be either an offsett ing increase in a 
l i a b i l i t y or a decrease in another asset or an Increase in 
net worth* On th i s and s l a i l a r jrounds Johnston declared 
that ' i t can be shown that Professor Boulding% conclusions 
would hold good only under a aost extrsaie and unreal is t ic 
set of cireuBStanecs**^ Ikit the iaportant q^nstlcxi Is 
1* I b i d * , p. SfSS. 
2« Johnston,Js *A iTote on Prof* Boalding*s Macro i:irCon<»dc 
Theory of Distribution^ Icanoalc Journal.Yol.IiJCri^ 1952, 
p« isd* 
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whether the alleged Inter^dependenoe ^ t v e e n Tarious Iteae 
la so laportaat as eaxtnot be Ignored, 
Bouldlng then proeeede to eonstiniet models of 
distr ibat ion on the beads of the above analysis^ adding 
certain s iapl i iy ing assuaptlons. Of tha two he describes,'' 
the aora r e a l l s t l e one nakes eonsasptlon a fimotion of natioiwl 
Income ?.'"<? I?irest25<*r«.t a f^jTiction of aggregate prof i ts . 
The f i r s t model I s constructed on the asstaaptlon'that 
the greatsr ths proportion of output wtilch goes to wages end 
the l a s s to gross prof i t s , the greater w i l l be the voltaie c f 
household absorption and tha l e s s w i l l !>;= the volune of 
S 
business absorption*. The oodels are eiq^lained dlagraaetleallir 
Of the rarious conclusicdfiSf umnQ ot then highly qualified, 
a f^ w Bay be noted, postponing a detailed study for the final 
•ers ion mentioned below. 
According to the f i r s t aodel a rise in the oonstaiptlon 
function w i l l alw^rs shi f t distribution towards irages, and 
a r ise in the investment function w i l l shif t i t towards 
p r o f i t s , ^ This i s the conclusion KaHor reached later on the 
basis of s i v i l ar assuaption and Indeed Kaleolci had stated the 
1, Ib id , , pp* 2fie'-69, 
2 , I b i d . , p, 298, 
3 , Ib id , , p, 263, 
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sane earlier, 7he second aodel makes oonsuaption independent 
of the distribatioa of 1IIOOIB«« In this case the effect of an 
increase in the transfer faetor irill he to increase profits 
and reduce vageS| profits incrsasing ^ aore than ^ e increase 
in the transfer factor. Fartharaore 'a shift in distribution 
tovards profits or avajr froa wages alviQrs increases output 
(unlesS) of coursei eapaeitsr hes been reached)* An increase 
in transfer faetor aay occur due to one or acre of the 
following! increased dividend distilhution to rentiers, 
relative Increase in entrepreneur* s liquidity preference, 
increase in the credit extended to households by firas, and 
repayment of loans taken by the f izat froa households* In 
effect i t aaounts to an increase in payaents by businesasen 
to rentiers* This conclusion i s also siailar to that of 
Kaledici aentioned above* 
A later version of Bpulding*s aacro-distribution theory^ 
aakes both consuaptlon and investaent ftinetions of wages and 
profits* These two behaviour CGfoations along with two 
identi t ies coneemiog the ooapositlon m.d distribution of ^ e 
s 
national incoae are 
1* Ibid*, p* 267* 
2* K*£* Bouldingi *%e Fruits of Progress and the Dynamics 
of Distribution*. 4lfflffB^MH9|ti? gfnfflt Vol. XLIII, 
May 196S, reprinted in 'A Heconstructlon, pp* 473r-83* 
3* Ibid*, A RfgQngtTO<?tri9Bt P* 477* 
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I 2 W • V ( 3^8) 
C « f (W.T) ( 3.9) 
I « Fj^  (W,T) (5.10) 
I f c + I ( a a i ) 
Th« Sf stem i s IneottpXete as I t has four equations \mt 
f ive unkBoVttJi, so t h a t i t needs another eqaation to naks 
I t an Gquiltlarltffii s y s t ^ . Bbuldins; has no s iaple solution 
for the proW.3B t h a t thus a r i se s* He sacaoiRas both ths 
^e l a s s ioa l ' and tha • aargin&l product iv i ty ' solut ions teit 
r s j e e t s thaa as imconvin«lng» ^ e c l a s s i c a l wags foad thsory 
provided the reiniircd f i f t h eqjuation W ss k , S wherein S i s 
the t o t a l stock of e ap i t a l which oan he taken as given in 
t l ^ short ran, azid k i s a knovn f r ac t ion . The marginal 
p roduc t iv i ty tlieory i meffset pos tu l a t e s W = F^il») where I, i s 
the t o t a l labour feres and i s assimed given. 
At t h i s stage BouXding t akes reeourse to h i s e a r l i e r 
balance sheet analys is iidiose a(|iiation (3 .4 ) ^ o v e i s capable 
of boooains the equation a iss ing here . In deference to a 
c r t t l c i sB! by Tnrvey^ Bouldin^ p re fe r s to v r i t e t h a t equaticm 
as 
T « I ^ • D * ^ • d K b (3.12) 
1 . I b i d . , p . 470. 
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l a this ©(jiatlon I^^^  « I • dX^Cvritlng I for dO )^ an& 
st&nds for internally finatie«d Inrestnaat* 
Bat th0 n«Y o^foatlon laringi four sore tmknovns Into 
the Bjgteui dMiii dlt i^ D and I^t ^ ^ neeessltatet four aors 
beharloar oqaatloaa* Boulding finds that aaeh of thasa 
variables oorresponda to a fpaeifie araa of deeision, Heno* 
i t i« not iBpotsible to find suitable aqiiatlons relating 
then to their deteainants* Also^ *w« ean treat then simply 
as exogenous variables in tha siodel or they caa be regarded 
as functions of so»e of th@ other variables of the systen'. 
Re then prooeeds briefly to exaaine th« possibi l i t ies of 
doing sO| I t amst hovevar be admitted that any muber of 
as«wptlons are possible leading to any nisuber of oonelusions. 
He, nevertheless, ooneludes that dK^  and dK^  oan be aegleoted 
i n the loBg runt ^^  *basines«Ben oan neither aeeuiaulate aonay 
t 
nor expand eonsuners* credit for ever*. Also in tha final 
equilibriim X^  s dll|| • &^^ « 0, so that T « ID* Henoe t ^ 
ultiaate long run tend«aey of distrlbation det^nds on the 
nature of the dividend fanotion* 'The existence of eontraetual 
distributions in interest and rent v i U pr^ent the dia* 
appearanee of non-wi^es altogether, bat unless there i s 
^ • Ibid,, p. 479» 
H , I|fid», p* 480» 
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Xerfttl of profits at ifhioli total liuslilsss dls171 button• eqp.aX 
profits ¥lth positive divtdtndi ( i f S . , a loffal at which 
therQ Is no attsaptad nat ^s iness savings,) dividemls will 
disappear**^ 
Tims va find tiiat even though Bouldingts analyj^is 
doss not lead to a slapla aoneluslon regarding the 
deteminants of ag^ragata profits, aggragata wages, national 
Incoae a«l ths relative ^aras . It has tha firtue of giving 
a More ooiqjlete systaa inelisdlng suoh iaportant variables 
as divldand dtstribatioa polley and liquidity preferaneei 
soB^thiag vbiah the aodals of Kaldor and Kalaoki fa l l to 
aehleva« Meraqiver, It Tisaallses slMiltanaous detezvlnatlon 
of the leval of Inooae and Its distribution, as a truly 
naoroaooBOHlo theory ^ould, for a theory of inooae distribu-
tion which takes the laval of inooae as given Is Iqr nature 
tmsatisfaetory* then by suggesting alternative aodels 
Bouldlag has underlined the faet that the assuaption of 
separata saving propensitlas(or eonsuaption funoticms) for 
wage earners and capitalists Is not at a l l neeess ly for a 
study of maoro*^l8tributlon* Indeed too nuch eaphasis on 
these propensities obscures tha role of tha other active 
forces involved^ soaetlae axeluding thea altogetharCas in 
Kaldor* s nodal)* Boi^ding* s theory also suoceeds in 
U Ibid,, p. 400. 
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dl8tla;uishlng between the In teres t , rent and salaries 
part of profi t froa the reBalolng part (the wilnputed residua, 
to borrow the old teolnology) and showing that while the 
l e t t e r aay he gero In the long ran the foamer asai res 
agS^^SAte prof i ts of peraanmice. 
Sone cr l t les^ hare wrongly inferred that because 
Bouldl!^ adopts tftie balanee sheet approaeh he raust have 
rt^garded the level of Income as ?lTan and constant. But 
Boulding* s aodels of distr ibution as also his l a t e r 
a r t i c l e clearljr t rea t the level of Income and eraployaent 
as a var iable , and speelfleally discuss the effect of chansjes 
In the various factors, and the conse<pent distr ibution 
pattern, on the level of Income and employment.* 
4 . Simm WEIREBAUB 
Weintraub sets out %flt3i the i^eeiflQ purpose of 
integrating the theory of Income distr ibution with the 
1, Paul Dscvidsoni Op.clt*, p, 70. 
2. K.K. Bouldlngi A aWTOfftrao^lfflt pp.2«3|a«6|2«7 and 481. 
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theoxy of Inoose deteiTBlnatlon. Discarding the shorter 
tout nlslaading route of reXiaaeo on savings - Irarsstment 
•(Ipiality and dlstloftt tstfing propensities^ ha adopts the 
aggregate deaand - aggregate supply approach to deteralniition 
of eaploymeiit end oatput, Ringing In the marglnaX product 1^ 11 
principleI the degree of monopoly concept ted the contractual 
nature of factor Mrs as factors Influencing the dlstrllMtlon 
of inooae* He also eaphaslses the element of tncertainty 
Involved In Imsln^ss decisions to explain business profits. 
Pilce level is treated as variable and a theory of Interest 
1s Bade part of the system* Veintraub has thus atteapted 
a fusion of the accepted aiorocconcBie bases of distribution 
vlth the aacroeconoalc deterslnaatt of inaoae and I ts 
distribution* But in doing so he has xmavoidably increased 
the BKUibdr of variables nAiieh has rendered the construction 
of a neat and siaple taodel alaost iaposslble* 
According to tfeiotrsub the level of aaployasnt, the 
level of sales proceeds (i«e«9 National IUCOB^ defined as 
anticipated gross product}| the nature of fixed contracts, 
the money wage level , the amcmat of fixed capital, the 
productivity of labour, and taie degree of aonopoly pover 
a l l have soae influence on and govern the profit level* ^ 
" i i " " • i i i i u m I I I 111 I I I l l II I II » i m i i I . • II I I II 
1. fidaey Weintraubt ^ AfPgaftCfr to , tfafi, IbQOfy Qt IntftM 
frla^miXgBi P* 199, Chilton Co., 19M. 
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C^ iT0B the amount of fixed oapltal and the nature of 
eont?a«tSy the level of eaploysent and output are detemined 
hj mggrtgata d^and and aggregate amppljr. The equllihrluB 
hetveea aggregate deaaad and aggregate aupplf entails a 
Toluae of ^plojrnent at v^leh the ejqpeeted SUB of sales 
proeeeds Is exactly equal to the outlay oonlog fros 
eonsualng and Investing groups,* 
Aggregate deaand Is the su« of deaand for consmsptlon 
goods amd the demand for Investaent goods* 
DefflMid for consuaptlon goods depends on personal Incoae 
fg and the vealth or asset holding of the individuals, A, 
©t « Cf 4 • X A 
where C i s the average propensity to con suae out of 
personal Incoaie and X Is the dlsssnrln^ oooffleient. The 
personal Incttse t^ equals the noney wage rate (v) tines 
the nuBber of aen «Biplqyed (H)| plus the flxisd payaents to 
rentlers<F)| plus dividends received (kS), plus transfer 
psyaents (T^) less direct taxes(Tq^) 
I^ » vW • F • k B • (T^ • Tjj) 
R i s total profits Including salaries, Interest payaents 
1. Ibid*, p* 44. 
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and Indlreet taxes and depreeiatlon allovanea and k the 
proportion dis tr lbated as dividends* 
The dematid for investaent goods B|^  i s a function of 
the rate of profit and the volume of output, given the 
eapi ta l output ratio* I t can bo treated as an increasifUl 
function of t t^ level of emplQy«ent <S), though aach would 
depend on anticipation!, nonetarj policy and in teres t rate 
phenomena* 
Aggregate sapplar or the t o t a l expected sales proceeds 
Z depends on the vage rate and t)m level of omployvent, the 
esQ^eeted profi ts and the eontraotuaHj fixed payments* 
Z a wH + F • R 
The aggrei^ate suppler s^edule i s oonstrueted on the basis 
of the part icular supply riilMdulesof the individual 
industr ies vhid:i thenselves res t on factor prices and 
productivity data in the ooaponent firms* The to t a l 
employment N, accompanying the proceeds Z,is determined 
through proauotivity relations* Bach output volume entials 
a precise volume of employment determined by the factor 
productivit ies and ruling factor prices* The volume of fixed 
payments F i s assumed t o be invaTlant i n ti^e short tea* 
The rate of wages depends on the marginal i^oduetivity of 
labour and the ra te of profi t depends^ among other factors, 
g4f? 
on th« dagret of monopoly* 
As 2 « PQ« the total output aniltiplied lagr the 
average price level , we haro 
w- P ^ a « i | « f § 
l*e», real wages equal th« marginal productivity of labour 
And as F, the flawd payments, aM Invariant in the short run. 
^ := V + ^ so that ^ > 0 T^ic^ i« 
th0 profit maxlolsatlon i^othesis* 
thus we ean traee th« eourse of wages and profits 
with ttos Changing level of national Income along with 
the fliianging volume of employment* I t can be shown that 
the rate of change of slope of the Z function will determine 
the dianges in the relative wage ^ar«^« 
Furthermore, as M i s the marginal productivity 
of labour and J i3 the average productivit/ of labour, 
H 
i«a*, J&« s M s V and B « A^  we get 
which »<«>iweys the Important theorem that the Inooae s^nf 
1, Xbid«, p« 49 also see p« 89* 
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iQMt wtnm^ Bra4^ 9^  Qrial?9 '^,«^ 
I t also follows t h a t the rtiare of prof i t s,deflned 
as a l l Income other than wages, sinst ecpal 1 • ^ 
W P P W M 
tfeintraub then p3?oc««ds to show t h a t with iiii5>erf«ctlon8 
i n the maiket, the r a t i o of p r o f i t s to Inooae w i l l a lso de;oei?d 
on the degree of monopoly power, defined as the reciprocal 
of the e l a s t i c i t y of demand,'^ He po in t s out , however, tha t 
i t i s not possible t o eonelude tha t an increase i n the degree 
of noQopoly always lowers the r e l a t i v e w ^ e share , as Kalecki 
does* 
^ e l n t r a a b ' s ana lys is leans heavi ly to the aggregate supply 
s i d e , ^ to the neglect of a thorough study of aggregate demand. 
This i s aost evident in r e l a t i o n to the investtaent demand 
4 
function i^ose 2x>le in the system he has somewhat *de-emphasised 
IIH I I I I I J M — — • — — — I IHIIM I I I I I I . I I I M I • m l I « i i i i i W U M i i i l i ] | I » i i i . i . i I . I I I I II . . I N 
n Ib id , p . 5t» 
2 . I b i d . , pp. W-dT* 
Assuming p ro f i t laaxiaisatlon in the short run, mr s ac , the 
degree of oonopoly 
* p*fe * p'w '^  M > ®® ^^^ 
e l a s t i c i t y of demand can \m defined as P 
p-rar 
3 , See spec ia l ly p 106 — Weintraubt j ^ Apprea^b ^ t^^ ?hfQry 
4« Paul Davidson, op«ci t« , p .105, 
«I0 
In ttm absenoQ of any elear analysis of the composition of 
aggregata danand, tha aQtive rolo In tha diatrilxitlon prooasa 
pasaaa over to tha aapply phanonona sueh as produetlTlty and 
Monopoly power* 
Veintroub has savaraly er l t ie l sad Kaldor fbr ne^Ieeting 
tlTiS K>la of productivity in the determination of tha waga 
r a t a , hut his own introduction of t h i s phenoaencn ©an ba 
Just if ied only on tha basis of h is asamption that pura 
ooapetltlon previdls* 2van i f wa Ignora tha problea of 
•aasarlng tha produotlvlty of labour In a systeis with 
ehanging profi t rata and ehanglng prlee Ieval | tha 
proposition that wagaa aqual aarglnaX produotlTlty I s not 
traa under la^erfaet ooapatltlon* Tha wlsd(» of assusdng 
pure oo^petition In a r ea l l s t i a laodel of distr ibution I s 
highly doubtful* The objeetlon b-ooaes isore weighty iftian 
tha degree of aonopoly la also aade a datsruioant of tha 
systan» Ik>es Ifjisintraub want to st ipulate that a monopolistic 
anployer oust parforee yielxl to labour the full valua of i t s 
marginal productf car i t s marginal revenue product, for that 
matter? In the l ight of h is own very able crit icism of tha 
marginal productiTltqr theory of d is t r ibut ion he can hardly 
do so* What, then, ls ti« meaning of laying down that 
productivity governs libour hire if I t only sets a boundary 
condition, as Keldor has shown? 
1* i^elntraub, op.cl t*, p . 106* 
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AaaXyslQis tSxe aggragat« supply function, Wslntraub 
obaenras t h a t an t reprsnaur la l i n i t i a t i v e U e t laainljr In 
introducing Innovatlonf wlilch would r a i ae th« W - Z l eve l . 
Labour saving invent ! onsi In p a r t i eulay, l i f t Z r e l a t i ve to 
W, t o the r e l a t i v e detriment of labour a t each leve l of 
employ««it«* Entrepreneura genera l ly Improve t h e i r r a a l 
poal t ione with r i s ing 2 • If l e v e l s . Bat In so far as the 
average propensity t o save grovs v l t h Increase In eaployttent, 
the ul t imate Income development vftU he checked and aggregate 
and reiatiVii p r o f i t s w i l l be res t ra ined* Larger Investment 
ou t lays enlarge pit>Clts d i r e c t l y , while g rea te r dividend 
d l s t r i h u t l o n s do so i n d i r e c t l y through t h : re turn flow of 
Incrsas^ad consumption e3Epettdltur««* 
Due to changing an t i c ipa t ions and innovations the 
economy i s forever in the g r i p of atttono&»ms demand-cost 
changes and lagging adapta t ions . Agreements regarding 
fac tor h i re being based on imperfect fores ight a p ro f i t t r a i l 
r e s u l t s from the f i n a l d i spos i t ion of the product. In the 
macro-economic jsociel described above these elements mainly 
esoerclsa t h e i r effect on the aggregate supply function. Thus 
he has res tored to uncer ta in ty i t s key pos i t ion in p ro f i t 
theory v i l c h most of the o the r macro-theories f a i l to do. 
1. I b i d , , p . 198. 
2 . I b i d . , p . 39. 
3* I b t d . , p . 95. 
4 . I b i d . , p . 94. 
8»S 
In this conttxt Welutmab lays great emphasis on 
th« eontraetaal aode of f&etor h i r e . Contraets usually 
proTidfi for a arlgld te i^oral payaeiit plan, regardlass of 
economio Qhangea, A change lu aooatmlc conditions from the 
oxpactatlon tm whdch th« eontraots wire baaad wil l est tbl iah 
so&B derlatlon between l»puted raluea and contractual earning a 
and i t la thl« diaareptney which creates profit a — and 
losses,"* I t la aalnly th is faot ndilch accoints for the 
pe!rsistenee of profi t share in incon^ distHbation* 
Welntrsctth also distinguishes between the determination 
of profi ts and th'sir sharing out by individual entrepreneurs. 
Tha l a t t a r iriTOlves soaw transfer aspects* 
Though oar brief smamary of welatraub's theoiy leaves 
out a detailed conside rati<an of some of the rar lables 
inflU3ncing aggregate supply, aggragata demand and the i r 
various c^^ponants, i t should suffice to give a fair ly 
clsai' Idea of the eoaplexity as wall as the coaprchensivtness 
of his system. I f on^ gets a feeling of meeting naisy loose 
gnds, i t is probably because there are too many of them to 
3oin, 
1, Ib id , , pp. 192-94, 
8B« 
5, jrOJOf B0BI1ISOH 
On» of ths ehiflf eontrlbutors to the fflao7960onoai« 
theory of distrllmtlon Is Mra« Joan HoMnsoa vhof« ^jm 
AfigHiaX^ l^aB 9X ffftBltjat i«»psared la 1«W. The analyali 
presented there has ¥a«a aade siapler in *^§^a^^ la the 
Xl»f flgT: 9t ^mnmU ^tm%U* <19<8) and the theory of 
dlstrlbotloa h&s l>een aore olearly stated la an essay. 
Profit theory or the d i s t n ^ t l o a of Ineoae i s aot 
the prlMary oonoem of l^ ft j^fflnal^ti^ QC ^jBltflJlf It i s 
a ooaprehenslTS study of asdnaalatlon and growth earrled on 
at various levels of abstraetion* The theory of dlstrlbntioa 
that eaergeSf on the *s«iaption of a fully eaploysd labour 
force, a eertain degree of aeehanisatloa and/or teohnical 
progress ean ha stated as follovsi Total output being glveni 
ti» distribution of incwoie depends solely on the eoapotitlon 
of aggregate demand* The relatlTe shares of workers and 
capital is ts in total ineoae depend && l^e proportional 
allocation of labour in ^ e consuiqptKm sector and the 
isrestment sector. I t i s asanaed that i^rkers eonsuae their 
entire ineoae* Profits therefore* ar€ e(|ual to net Investaent 
1. Jom Roblnsont CoUmya ^g9M»4g PftBgrSft ^o^^ two'The 
Theory of Distribution* pp.t4S'*14d* It^ls an eaended 
rerslon of a paper publisftied in Fren^ in 1987. 
»i4 
^'lf^^ rentier exptndltui*',^ 
Her * analysis of th« ooap(»ieats of aggregate d^and 
laads to the caneluslon that th« rslatiTS shares dapend 
•ss@ntiall3r on three sets of eonditionst (a) Isvastnent 
deelslon vhleh are partly datemined lyr the anxiety of tha 
entrtpreneur to aeouamlata, partly W tha physieal conditions 
of production and teehnioal prograss, and partly lay tha 
real vaga rate vhlch aay affaot tha degree of aeehanisatlon 
or stimulate biased Innovatlonsf (h) daelslons on the 
distribution of profits via dlTldends and contraotual obligat-
ions which w i n depend on a 0€»plez of liquidity desires, 
and (e) eonsuaptlon deelslons*.^ 
As the argUKent prdoeeds further^ other assumptions 
are also relaxed* land %ftiloh vas ezeluded from the aodel 
la the f irst Instanoe does not ooaplloate Matters i»hen 
Introduoed* Bent payaents salnly affeet the level of real 
wages since 'expenditure out of rent InccffiA keeps prices, 
relative to aoney wageSf higher than they would be i f rents 
were lower, so that entrepreneurs as a whole reoelve back 
(as reealpts froa the sale of oomodltles) a large part of 
1. ;oan Bobmsoy J ^ 4f1?mWjlfl,| 
Maoaillan and Co,, London, I9Q8« of 9*^ftllflf P'^ S t^ 
2* Psul Davidson: TfaaQgJSi.gf . t o f f l i ^ ImQm Vll^lVm' 
what tt»r ptjr in mnV. ^ Iiitar«at i s treatdd as a transfer 
paynsnt not naeassltatlng aogr •odifleatlon of the above 
venoIttsloBs* 
IQ the final analysis dlstrlbatlon of Ineome and 
deterslaatiain of the rate of profit and the laveXs of rent and 
vages i s effeoted siatiltaneotisl/ ^F ^  nmabar of foroes In a 
oOBpIioated aanaert 'The level of rent and wages and the rate 
profit are not deteralned lagr the Marginal produets of land, 
lahonr and inrestnent* All these are deteralned together 
In a GOnpUoated vagr 1^ the speetrua of teohnloal possibi l i t ies , 
the sapply of land and labour available to the oeonoajr as a 
vhola and the movBit of aeoearalatioii that has already taken 
plaoa, and t^ * the level of effeetive d^aaM for eonsodities 
and the rate of icnrestBi^it**' 
Robinson* s later writings on the snbjeot do not involve 
anr departure f POII the theory oatUned in ISMuMfifflBlft i^aa 
of Capital} instead thoy have gained in elarity and aroi 
therefore, aore aaenabla to the type of study «• are aaking* 
In wiMt follows w@ shall study her eontributlon in the 
l ight of these later worka, 
ilm Makes a distinetion between two oireuttstaneesfi 
oaJTs^oB produetion i s going on at Itill eapaoity and the 
• • • • • ^ • • ' • • • • ^ • • • • • • • • • • • I ' M | I IW»MM«l««Mr»»«» . l »»»»»W»»W»«« | l l III II II III! » « • II I I II II 
U Joi^'^^Mnaont The Acouaiilatian of Caplti|^y p*Sa8. 
2* Ibid^y p^ 9tt» 
S 
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other when •xctss eapaelt^r «xl8t». In Qie latter situation 
e«rtaln factors play a doolsi^e role tn datapminlng the level 
of incoae and i t s distrlhatlon wheraaa they do not do so In 
the f irst situation. These factors are the price poller of 
the f ims and the bargaining position of labour in the 
aarket, thus involving the degree of aoaopoly or the 
extent of ooapetitioii iti the eeonony* 
When oQtpttt i s at fUll eapaeil^ the ratio of InrestMnt 
to output along vith the propensities to eonsune of the 
Yorkers and ^ e capitalists* propensity to distribute 
profits detemine the level of Inoose, aggregate profits, 
total wages, and the ratio of profits and wages to total 
ineoBie <— given the stoek of capital, and the eapital 
output ratio (the technique of productimi)* Output in this 
situation i s lat isately deteznincd by the existing capacity 
of production* *The strea«i of noney demand enoounters a flow 
of output lljdted by c^pacll^i and prices are set at a level 
which c<2uates aggregate dwiand to aggregate supply*. Total 
Wages are fixed by aBployaent at capacity (as the tve detemine 
labour* 8 productivitjr), total profits are fixed by investaent 
and rentier eonsuaptlon (assuming woikers to be eonsuning 
a l l tliat they get)* Averecc level of profit margins (profit 
over costs) equals P/H* Rentier eonsunptlon depends on 
1. Joan Boblnsont SflUfltttffl if<m9MU ,fftB<iX.»tyol*'^ ^»P*H'y» 
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eapitalistA* propensity to dlstrlbate profits and th« 
propensltgr to eonsxioe of th« r6ntl«rt (1*8«| capital istt end 
other reel plants of dlTldends)* 
fhas the degree of non^olor does not enter Into t^e 
pleturo In this situation. Nor Is mf role assigned to tiie 
productivity of labour, It being fixed by the •brute fact of 
produetlTS eqpadty'* BoblnsonU analysis of this situation 
agrees with that of Kaldor vhi had sxactly ^ I s situation 
before hla. The one slgnlflcmt dlfferenoe I s , however, 
Boblnson's eaphasls on dividend polley of the flras as a 
detemlnant of rentier oonsm^tlon, beeause *the balanelng 
Item vhldh equates the value of net lavestaent to net 
savings I t the undistributed profits of the firms'*^ 
Bat the above sltuatiaa i s an eztreae one and under-
e^paolty working of industrial plants i s the nomal condition 
l a Isperfeet eompetition* In this situation the level of 
ut i l i sat ion of plants depends partly on the price policy of 
the firms concerned and the degi^e of aonopsly has to be 
brought into the question of the detexnlaatlon of aarglns*^ 
Profit Margins, and therefore the price level i s detemined 
by ^ e degree of mcmopoly, *vhleh remits from the InteraetiofR 
of price policy of flxms and the bargaining position in the 
labour mai^et*.' Total wages depend on employment at the 
1. Ibid. , p. 147. 
2. Ibid,, p. 147. 
3. Ibid. , p* t&2, also see p. 180. 
eorrespondlng 3.6V«X of utl l isatloB of eapaeity* Total 
money wages and ths pTiee Xdvel detanBlti« vorkors* daaaad 
for coaiuBption goodaCgivea ftieir propeaslty t€« eonaume). 
This along with tha «iq>itaXlsts* aad rvntlars* oonsiuiptloa 
and eapitallst liwastBant det«T»liias th« lavaX of ineoma, 
•ulth a ^iTen rate of iBEvestBeot going on, tha lavel of 
enpXopient and tha output of ooaBodltlts i s Xov^r tha higher 
Is the XaveX of profit margins, f^r a givau flow of nonay-
vagas providas purohasing pover tor Xess Mmsoditias when 
prieas are higher, and a given global profit i s raeoverad 
froK a saallar output whan profit par unit of outpiat i s 
graatar* • ^ 
Tha raaatioii of rantier eonsuaption to higher prices i s 
Important as profit vouXd he larger or saaller dapendlng 
on leather they speM at a highar or a l^ver total rate* 
These eonelusions are highly raminiseent of lCale^i*s, 
whoB BoMnsoa ^ndoTmB vitli referanea to tha above situation, 
though agraament in details of the analysis i s not possible, 
8ha then reaores a serious confusion and reeoneilas tha 
aaero*thaories of Kaldor and Kaledci by pointing out that 
•tha ^are of profit in inccae i s deterained by the ratio 
of investaent to Inooae, but t^a anount of incone associated 
with a given rate of Isrestma&t i s influenead by the aaooat 
1« Ibid«, p4 148« 
So9 
of «ap&eit7 In exist«nQ« and th9 de%rem of Monopoly*• 
The diffsrenoe betveen the xpXes assigned to degree of 
Monopoly ^ BoMfiflon and Kale^l are obrions and Robinson's 
treateiaent i s not exposed to the type of erlt ie lra vhLeh 
Kaleeki*8 treat^aent has met« 
BoMnson does not aakS produetivlty a deteralnant 
of wa^as In her systea for, 'aoeording to the laperfeet 
eoq^etltlon theory wa^es are norsalXy less than aarglnal 
prodiiets . . . • ^ and as Kaldor maintains, prodnetlvlty at best 
defines the iiypper l i s l t beyond vhidi vages aannot go*' 
Moreover, produetlirl^ of labour i s i t s e l f detarulned by the 
other Tarlablas of the [^stem»^ 
In both the situations ths eonditlon for eqtuillbrliai 
i s that savings wist eqiial investment, vhich i s ths independent 
Tan able. In the short ran this equality i s brought about by 
adjustments in the level of Ineome and ^ e level of ut i l isat ion 
of the existing eapaolty* In the long run, given the teehnieal 
conditions vhich date mine the eapltal'^output ratio, InvestaMn t 
i s in a definite proportion to the stoek of capital. For 
1« Ibid. , p« U9« 
S* J. Robinson, Coll acted .ilconomlc PapeTS^^ol^  Two, p»24^» 
S. If.Kaldor, 'A Rejoinder* gtT3.?W Of ^^m^^X<i n^^Xqjjfol.IWil, 
i9i9*go, p. tan 
4* J.Boblnson, Jifgyi X^Mm yfafQfY 9f gfQBgtt^ fi -IrflWldliP S^g 
also p* 45 fn« Ma^d l^lan «md Co*, 
London, 1M2« 
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• (Salllbrlusy tfcerefors, th« Tolia* of sanrlE«s aust 1>« 
STioh that the savings ** eapital ratio (S/S) Is acpial to 
tha ratio tihlch Invettaant bears to ^apltal (I/IC, ^ s rate of 
aeeuiawlatloD). This ocpallty i s brought about by adjustneists 
iB both ths lovel of Inaoae and i t s distribution* For, given 
tho propensity to eon suae of c a p i t a l i s t s and workers, sayings 
out of a given Ineoae w i l l be aore, the larger i s the Share 
of prof i t s in inooisB* The aAjustaeats take place throuf^ 
ehanges i n the pile© l eve l whioh i»v tum, depends on the 
rate of profit.^'Whatever the ratio of that investasnt to the 
value of the stock of eapital aay be, the l eve l of prices aust 
be such as to aake the distribution of ineoae such that net 
saving perenstnit of value of capital i s eqcaal to i t . Thus, 
given the propemslt^T to save frosi each type of ineoae (the 
thr i f t iness condition) the rate of profit i s determined T3gr 
the rate of accumulation of cap i ta l ' .^ 
The exist ing state of the science of economics does 
not permit aEQr generalisation about the long tera behaviour 
of the rate of aocuaulaticn CX/K)« Sie , therefore, does not 
c lose the systea and leaves the question what determines the 
rate of accumulation, unanswered. As a skitter of fact the 
1. I b i d . , p. 10. 
2 . Ib id . , pp. 11-12, 
3 . Ib id . , pp. 13-16. 
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re lat ionihlp between the rate of profit and the rate of 
aecuffiulatlon i s double-sided} the l a t t e r determining the 
former and in turn being Influenced by i t . The f inal outcome 
depends upon the particular conditions assumed In the 
grovth model. ^ 
Joan Bobinson's vork may be rightly looked upon as 
Incorporating the essent ia l aspects of Kaldor and Kaleckl 
theories , putting each In i t s proper place , In a genuinely 
Keynesian fraaework. The system as f inal ly emerging in the 
hanls of Robinson v i sua l i s e s simultaneous detezminatlon of 
the l eve l of income and I t s distr ibution, assigns to degree 
of monopoly I t s proper role in the relevant s i tuation, 
emphasjMS the role of dividend distribution policy and 
rentiers* consumption, and dist inguishes between t*ie short 
run and the long run. Al l t h i s i s done while preserving 
the decisive role for Investment decisions and the thr i f t iness 
condition and postulating savings-investment equality in 
the Keynesian tradit ion. Comparing the l i s t of the variables 
i iwolved, the system may not be as comprehensive as that of 
Welntraub, bat I t does achieve the purpose of integrating the 
theory of income detersnination with the theory of income 
distribution In I t s own manner. The simplicity with vihldi 
t h i s aohlev^ent I s made m^ well be contrasted with the 
coaq;>lexlty of VJeintraub*s more comprehenadve system. Then i t 
1. Ib id . , see p 37 and subseqpiient disocttssion. 
2«2 
l a also eouohed In tents much more famlXlar than those 
which Bouldlng has chosen and excliides only tha lesser 
Important ones of Boxilding's var iables . I f Robinson's model 
appears to be open at one end| i t does not aaan that i t i s 
not possible to close i t j only she would rather not coBmit 
herself to any of the al ternatives avallabla* 
COHCLUBIOH 
What i s the upshot of a decade of model building 
i n macro*diatribution? The Kaleckl - Kaldor - Robinson 
approach i s M.flipler and y i e l d s the nain conclusions by 
ea^hasisir^ the chief determinants of the system, but the 
role of the lesser important variables i s neglected* I t i s 
also biased in favour of aggregate demand on \riiose composition 
l i e s the main burden of distr ibution to the neglect of 
aggregate supply which i s undoubtedly of greater importance 
so far as determination of the income to be distributed is 
concerned. In trying to restore the balance, Weintraub has 
certainly t i l t ed i t too far , by underemphasising the role of 
invest»ient and paying more attention to aggregate supply to 
the neglect of the composition of aggregate demand. Then his 
supply biased model envisages a role for marginal productivity 
which Ignores the r e a l i t i e s of an imperfectly competitive 
system. 
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Because of the managablllty of t h e i r y a r l a b l e s , Kaldor 
and Hobinsoa have found i t possible t o proceed further to 
study the growth of the econoi^, r e l a t i ng d i s t r ibu t ion of 
income to the exigencies of growth* IHiiB has not been 
poss ib le for \#tlntraub because of the more r ig id assuaptlons 
and the complex i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s of the nuaerous v a r i a b l e s . 
Boulding* 8 work I s highly en l ighten ing , but because of 
I t s unconventional approach i t i s not d i r e c t l y cemparable with 
e i t h e r of the two t h e o r i e s mentioned above* Shorn of i t s 
pecu l i a r terminology and r ewr i t t en i n famil iar terms| i t i s 
nearer the Kaldor - Hoblnson model than tlM Weintraubian 
aorsteffli because of I t s emphasis on investment and consumption 
demand* 
The ' t r a n s f e r factor* i s , a f t e r a l l , a useful device 
to make more prec ise what Bobinson has emphasised in her own 
manner — ef fec t s on consumption demand, and through i t on 
the volimie of p r o f i t s , of a t r ans f e r of income from 
entreprenaurs to r e n t i e r s * I t should a lso be possible to 
incorporate the l i q u i d i t y preference function into Kaldor -
Bobinson model i n the context of a va r iab le pr ice system. 
Thus, we can v i s u a l i s e a more comprehensive model 
ass imila t ing the e s s e n t i a l s §m Kalecki and Boulding, 
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Kaldorian in structure and RoMnsonian in seop6, 
which wi l l compare favourably with th« Weintraubian 
system whose d is t inc t identi ty wil l serve as a pointer 
to an alternative approach ^ i c h may under certain 
assunpticHis be found more s i i tab le for dealing with 
cer ta in problems* 
CHAPTSR SBHT 
C O N C L I T D I I T G O B S E R T A T I O H S 
The abov« study of the deveXopnents in profit theory 
cleaply brings out the faet that uncertainty I s the chief 
explanation of profits and losses at the mlcroeconoffllc level . 
Evar since Knight explained the nature of prof i t , ev-ry 
alcroeconawlc analysis of profit has recognised the role of 
uncertainty. Contributions of such eminent economists as 
Ricks, Harrod, Kelrstead and Shackle have ftirther strengthened 
t h i s position. As a resul t of these contributions we have a 
clear idea of how ttje uncertainty surrounding entrepreneurial 
decisions in a dynaalo economy causes unlmputed value r-^sidues 
to occur after contractual cXalns are mst. The nature of 
these deoisi(Mi8 and the way these surpluses accrue to 
entrepreneurs i s fully explained by Shackle and Kelrsteai 
respectivsly. a i t the uncertainty theory does not eacplain 
the magnitude of prof i t s . 
The Baoroeconomie theories study the determination of 
aggregate prof i ts In the economy. I t i s quite clear that 
uncertainty does not influence th i s »5?r©gate esKjept through 
i t s influence on the voluas of Investment, The forces determin-
ing aggregate prof i t s , whlcdi we have studied In the previous 
chapter, are different from those responsible for profits of 
the individual entrepreneur. I t i s nevertheless necessary 
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tha t the sua of Individual profit« and losses Is the same 
as th€ aggregate prof i ts determined hy th« aaeroecononlc 
foices — a point fully argued tjy Anatol Murad, 
A problem Is posed, hoWB^er, hy the fact that profit 
as defined by the aacroeconoalc theories i s a nuch wider 
category than the pure profit of the uncertainty theory. 
But a solution i s possible on the following l ines . Contractual 
payments awch as rant , interest and salaries can easily 
be separated from non-wages leading prof i t s in the accounting 
sense. Distribution of these asong the individual entrepreneurs 
can then be studied in the manner suggested \yy Ktirstead, 
Surpluses accruing due to monopolistic adfantagas and c^asi 
rents arising from ind iv i s ib iHt l e s and ine las t i c supply of 
ce r ta in factors of production can be distinguished and 
accounted for, "nie remaining would be the algebraic SUB of 
pure profits and losses in the economy. 
This i^ppears to be the correct relationship between 
tlM microeconoraic and macro economic theories of profi t , "Phe 
former eacplains the nature of profi t income and the 
circumstances in which such inccxae occurs and accrues to the 
1, Anatol liur ad, * ^ e s t ions f o r / r o f i t Theory*, 
^ a i a i a S f t Vol,13, October laJS.pp.T-g. 
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• ntreppeneur^ I t p3?ovides useful insight into the voiklng 
of an entarpris© eeonoaty and has great significanca for a 
study of economio behaviour* The l a t t e r studi«s the 
deterciinatiori of aggregate prof i t s . Individual fortunas 
in the earning of prof i ts may raJPy widely, biit t h i s has vary 
l i t t l e to do with the SUB of profi ts and losses in the 
econc»sy as a whole. The laacroeconomic theory of profit 
deals Mith such forces as determine th i s magnitude. In 
I t s e l f ths magnitude of aggregate profi ts has an important 
bearing upon the state of expectations whl^. I s of v i t a l 
signifieance for Indirldual deelsion-oaicers (vide Keirstead's 
theory <!^seussed in chapter s ix ) . Th© voluiM of savings 
i n the eeoncnay i s also related to the volume of aggregate 
p rof i t s . There i s thus a strong ease for the study of 
prof i t s at the macroeconosjo level* 
Seen in th i s l igh t there i s no conflict between the 
micro and the macro- analyses of profit* Bather, they 
supplement e&dh other, A study of profit cannot be complete 
unless the two approa^es are combined. Developments in 
prof i t theory during ths las t two decades clearly point out 
th« need of taking a broader view of the subject incorporating 
both the micro economic and macroeoonomic analyses, Keirstead 
made a frui t ful attempt in that direction, Ona of ths avowed 
purposes of Weintraub was to integrate the microeconomic 
foundations of profit into a theory i^ich i s basically 
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maeroecononlo* Joan Hobln«on*8 saialysts a lso gives due 
recogni t ion to the uncei-taln nature of business expecta t ions . 
Whfat I s needed i s a c l e a r demarcation of the d i s t i n c t ro les 
of o4ero~and macro- analyses In thg study of p r o f i t . 
I t has been noted above t h a t eoonoadsts d i f fe r as 
regards the def in i t ion of *jBPoflt* which should form the 
object of study In a theory of p r o f i t s . The uncer ta in ty 
theory s tudies pure p r o f i t s as d i s t i n c t from p r o f i t s In the 
accoimting sense* Some econoodsts r e j e c t t h i s d i s t i nc t i on 
as an rea l l s t lC i and the maeroeeonomlc theo r i e s are frankly 
concerned '.fith a auch wider category than economic p r o f i t s . 
We have already dea l t with one aspect of t h i s divergence 
In approach t ^ showing how the sum of pure p r o f i t s cam be 
separated from p r o f i t s i n the broader sense4 But an en t i r e ly 
d i f fe ren t problem I s a lso Involved in the context of a 
reconc i l i a t ion between the micro and macro approaches to 
p r o f i t . Pure p r o f i t s defined as an ^ ante category have a 
s ignif icance for behaviour t h a t the 4 j T^ osty accounting p r o f i t s 
do not have. Here again a careful examination leads to the 
conclusion t h a t these two bas i ca l ly d i f fe ren t concepts of 
p r o f i t s have d i s t i n c t ro l e s to play. The concept of ex ante 
pure p ro f i t I s of v i t a l Importance for economic ana lys i s . 
For f i s c a l policy and s tudies of na t ional Income,employment 
and economic growth i t I s the QJ po^t category of accounting 
p r o f i t s t h a t I s r e l evan t . The cor rec t remedy of t h i s 
dichotomy I s , t he re fo re , t h e i r coexistence In a comprehensive 
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theory of profit which aoooimaodat«s Tartems concapt* 
of pK>fit serving dis t inc t purjwjses, each having i t s 
own relevance to the existing r ea l i t y whidi i s nothing 
i f not coaplex. 
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